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By analysing two different cases of popular movements in Turkey (the 
Gezi Park protests) and Spain (the 15M movement) that received extensive 
support from different segments of society in both countries, this research 
aims at accounting for the question of what factors brought about popular 
disaffection and led to mass mobilisations under different circumstances. The 
contention is that one of the central factors behind these mass protests has 
been “the crisis of representation” resulting not only from the lack of voter-
party congruence, but also from the failure of political parties to meet the 
demands of responsiveness and responsibility – the core requisite of the 
party government model. 
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Türkiye’de (Gezi Parkı protestoları) ve İspanya’da (15M Hareketi) 
halkın farklı grupları tarafından desteklenen protesto hareketlerini 
karşılaştırmalı olarak inceleyen bu tezin amacı hangi faktörlerin toplumsal 
muhalefete ve protesto hareketlerine yol açtığını araştırmaktır. Tezin temel 
argümanı protesto hareketlerinin arkasındaki önemli faktörlerden birinin, 
seçmenler ve partiler arasındaki uyumsuzluktan ve parti hükümeti modelinin 
temel gerekliliklerinden biri olan partilerin seçmen taleplerine cevap vermek 
ve kamu yararını sağlamak arasındaki dengeyi kurmakta yaşanan 
aksaklıklardan kaynaklanan “temsiliyet krizi” olduğudur.   
 












Coming to the end of long road of my PhD research, I would like to express 
my gratitude to people who turned this journey into a bearable one. First, I 
would like to thank my supervisor, Ioannis Grigoriadis, who has been very 
considerate and helpful throughout the whole process. Without his constant 
support and guidance, the journey would be much more troublesome. I am 
grateful to him. I want also to thank Alev Çınar who reinvigorated my interest 
into PhD research and has shared her views with me generously both during 
my board meetings and in our informal chats. I am deeply grateful to Feride 
Acar who, from the very first moment we met, has been extremely 
supportive. Her encouragement and support have utmost importance for this 
research not only academically but also emotionally. I am thankful to my 
thesis defense jury members Başak İnce and Feyda Sayan Cengiz who 
accepted to be part of my jury and provided me with helpful feedback. Ayşe 
Sözen Usluer and Gökhan Güler, have been wonderful friends to share this 
long journay of PhD. From my undergraduate studies onwards, İkbal Erbay 
and Nevin İpek have always been great friends with their endless patience 
for my academic complains. I am thankful to my family; my mother, my sister, 
my brother and my sister-in-law. I consider myself extremely lucky to have 
such an awesome family who has always been very special. Particularly, I 
vi 
 
would like to thank my mom for always believing in me. Last but not least, I 
am grateful to my husband, Utku, who is the man behind this work and the 
works to come; he has never given up to encourage me and always kept my 
hope alive. I also would like to thank my son, who will hopefully join us in 
December 2015, for giving me hope and also courage to complete this 
research as soon as possible. Last but not least, I dedicate this dissertation to 
the memory of my father who will always remain as the major source of 
inspiration for me.    
  
 Finally, I thank to The Scientific and Technological Research Council of 
Turkey (TÜBİTAK) BİDEB for awarding me with National PhD Scholarship, 


















ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................... iii 
ÖZET ................................................................................................................................................. iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................. vii 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Turkey and Spain from a Comparative Perspective .................................... 7 
1.2. The Gezi Park protests and the 15M movement ....................................... 11 
1.3. A Brief Literature Review .................................................................................... 17 
1.4. Theoretical and Methodological Approaches ............................................. 24 
1.5. Organisation of the Thesis ................................................................................... 28 
CHAPTER II: PARTY SYSTEMS AND THE CRISIS OF REPRESENTATION ........ 32 
2.1. Representation and Democracy ........................................................................ 33 
2.1.1. The Notion of Representative Government ......................................... 34 
2.1.2. Emergence of Political Parties as Key Agents of         
Representation ............................................................................................................. 40 
2.2. The Role of Political Parties in Representation ......................................... 44 
2.2.1. Party Government Model ............................................................................ 45 
2.2.2. Responsiveness vs. Responsibility .......................................................... 52 
2.3. Decline of Political Parties ................................................................................... 57 
2.3.1. Citizen Disaffection with Party Government ....................................... 59 
2.3.2. Crisis of Representation ............................................................................... 63 
2.4. Concluding remarks: .............................................................................................. 70 
viii 
 
CHAPTER III: GEZI PARK PROTESTS: A PARTY POLITICS VIEW ........................ 72 
A Brief Look into Gezi Park Protests ....................................................................... 74 
3.1. Party System in Turkey ........................................................................................ 75 
3.1.1. The Last Decade under AKP Rule ............................................................. 75 
3.1.2. Turkish Party System in the 2000s ......................................................... 83 
3.2. Crisis of Representation in Turkey and Gezi Protests ............................. 88 
3.2.1. Identifying the Gap in Turkish Politics: Polarised           
Competition ................................................................................................................... 88 
3.2.2. Unrepresented Citizens: Responsiveness Overriding 
Responsibility ............................................................................................................... 93 
3.3. Implications for Party System and Democracy in Turkey ................... 101 
3.3.1. Turkish Party System .................................................................................. 102 
3.3.2. Future of Democracy ................................................................................... 104 
3.4. Conclusion: ............................................................................................................... 105 
CHAPTER IV: 15M MOVEMENT: A PARTY POLITICS VIEW ................................. 107 
A Brief Look into 15M Movement ........................................................................... 108 
4.1. Party System in Spain .......................................................................................... 110 
4.1.1. Politics in Spain since Transition ........................................................... 110 
4.1.2. Spanish Party System in the 2000s ....................................................... 118 
4.2. Crisis of Representation: No Los Representan ......................................... 126 
4.2.1. Identifying the Gap in Spanish Politics: All Parties Alike ............. 128 
4.2.2. Responsible but not Responsive ............................................................ 137 
4.3. Implications for Party System and Democracy in Spain ...................... 142 
4.3.1. A New Actor in the Party System? ......................................................... 142 
4.3.2. The Implications on Democracy ............................................................. 144 
CHAPTER V: AFTER THE MOVEMENTS: TURKEY AND SPAIN IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ............................................................................. 146 
5.1. Relationship between Contentious and Conventional Politics: Gezi 
and 15M in Comparative Perspective ................................................................... 148 
ix 
 
5.1.1. How Contentious Politics Interacts with Conventional        
Politics? .......................................................................................................................... 148 
5.1.2. What Changes Gezi and 15M brought in the Short-run? ............. 153 
5.2. Turkey: Interaction through Election Campaigns ................................... 155 
5.2.1. How did Political Parties Frame the Protests? ................................. 157 
5.2.2. Political Developments in the Post-Gezi Process ............................ 162 
5.2.3. Elections and Gezi ......................................................................................... 165 
5.3. Spain: the Rise of New Politics ........................................................................ 173 
5.3.1. Birth of a New Political Party ................................................................... 174 
5.3.2. Interactions with the Political Structure ............................................ 180 
5.3.3. Elections and Podemos: A New Party System? ................................ 183 
5.4. What Explains Differences? .............................................................................. 187 
5.4.1. Institutional and Social Constraints in Turkey ................................. 189 
5.4.2. Politics, Society and Movement Politics in Spain ............................ 191 
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION................................................................................................ 193 
6.1. Summary of Findings ........................................................................................... 195 
6.2. Significance of the Research ............................................................................. 199 
6.3. Future Research ..................................................................................................... 202 













Following on from the Arab Spring, the contemporary wave of protests and 
occupy-style mobilisations has been very influential in many parts of the 
world, from the Mediterranean to Wall Street. Leaving aside the mass 
protests in the Middle East,1 following the global economic crisis of 2008, the 
protests that have spread throughout Europe have pointed to the fact that 
there are grave shortcomings in the representative democracy of many 
nations, and citizens are dissatisfied with these prevalent power structures 
that leave no space for the direct participation of individuals in decision-
making processes. As a result, they call for ‘real democracy’.  
 
Long before the occupation of public spaces in Madrid, Athens and 
Istanbul, several studies had already demonstrated that a certain level of 
distrust in relation to the principles of representative democracy had been a 
                                                            
1 Although the Arab Spring was the inspiration for many global movements, it has to be 
analysed within the context of an authoritarian state structure, since the grievances that 
drove the Arab Spring related more to authoritarianism rather than as a call for greater 
participation.   
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prevalent undercurrent among citizens and political elites alike (see Gray and 
Caul, 2000; Blais, 2000; Wattenberg, 2002). Election turnouts, party 
membership, party identification and trust in parties have all experienced a 
steady decline – all of which indicates that there is widespread disaffection 
with not only the institutions, but also the processes of representative 
democracy (see Dalton, 2003; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Norris 1999). 
However, only a small number of these studies have predicted that popular 
disaffection with parties and elections would lead to anti-system, popular 
mobilisations in several parts of the world questioning the efficacy of 
representative politics.  
 
 Essentially, as the major slogan of the protests, “They don’t represent 
us” (see Acedo, 2012; Macia, 2013), ably demonstrates, this research 
contends that one of the central factors behind these mass protests has been 
the crisis of representation resulting not only from the lack of voter-party 
congruence, but also from the failure of political parties to meet the demands 
of responsiveness and responsibility – the core requisite of the party 
government model. Whilst responsiveness refers to a party’s ability to fulfil 
the demands of the population, particularly their own constituency, 
responsibility requires acting prudently and consistently in policymaking 
(Mair, 2009: 11-12). In other words, in responding to the question of what 
caused mass mobilisations calling for ‘real democracy’ throughout Europe, 
this research provides a party politics account and argues that certain 
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failures in the functioning of party systems have forced people to take the 
issue onto the streets, in order to make their voices heard.  
 
The logic behind this notion is that since political parties are the key 
agents of democratic representation, linking citizenry to the state and 
mediating the processes of accountability and representation (see 
Thomassen, 1984), understanding the dynamics behind recent deployments 
requires a careful analysis of the functioning of party systems. The famous 
proposition of Schattschneider, namely that “the modern democracy is 
unthinkable, save in terms of parties,” has been widely employed by party 
scholars, suggesting that as democracy continues to exist, parties will retain 
their privileged position on the political scene. However, as Mair (2005) 
correctly argues, within the framework of the aforementioned discussion, it 
is also possible to read it as being the other way around, in that the 
questioning of democracy by social movements should be comprehended by 
examining the ways in which the most important agents of modern 
democracy, political parties, function. 
 
 By analysing two different cases of popular movements in Turkey (the 
Gezi Park protests) and Spain (the 15M movement) that received extensive 
support from different segments of society in both countries, this research 
aims at accounting for the question of what factors brought about popular 
disaffection and led to mass mobilisations under different circumstances. 
Although the outcome has been the same – widespread protests throughout 
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the country leading to the occupation of public spaces, calling for a greater 
say in the functioning of the political regime – different types of crisis of 
representation have brought about these movements.  
 
 In this research, representative democracy is defined as a democratic 
form of representation in which voters choose political parties to represent 
their interests in a democratic regime, and in return parties as 
representatives, whether in government or in opposition, provide for both 
responsiveness and responsibility. From this perspective, we argue that a 
crisis of representation occurs when (1) certain segments of society feel 
unrepresented and lose their trust in political parties’ ability to represent their 
interests and when (2) they do not believe that their representatives are acting 
responsively and responsibly at the same time. The contention herein is that 
this is what happened in both cases under examination, albeit with different 
manifestations.  
 
 In the case of Spain, on the one hand, the convergence of two major 
parties, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialisto Obrero 
Espanol, PSOE) and the People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP), in the ideological 
spectrum made these parties more and more alike (see Torcal et al., 2002), 
and they failed to come up with alternative policy proposals. This in turn 
limited their ability to respond to the diverse demands of the population. On 
the other hand, the pressures of EU membership as well as globalisation 
decreased the parties’ ability to generate new policies but rather steered 
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them toward following internationally approved guidelines, and through this 
process they lost touch with the Spanish electorate and failed to be 
responsive.  
 
 In the case of Turkey, conversely, the major political parties 
systematically drifted apart from one another, thereby creating a gap in the 
party system which left certain segments of society unrepresented. 
Subsequently, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 
AKP) government failed to balance the demands of responsiveness and 
responsibility, by enhancing its responsiveness to its Islamic constituency 
while disregarding other segments of society.  
 
 By analysing the two dissimilar cases of Spain and Turkey, in order to 
illustrate its claims, this work seeks to enhance the literature in four different 
ways. First, through providing a party politics account of mass protests in 
two countries, it links social movements study with that of party politics 
literature. Until now, most studies have tended to approach these areas as 
two separate universes. From this point of view, and by relating the 
emergence of protest movements to failures in the functioning of party 
systems, and also by discussing the interaction streams between movement 
and routine politics, this paper bridges the gap between the study of 




Secondly, the thesis conceptualises a ‘crisis of representation’, defining 
it on the basis of a lack of voter-party/party system congruence and the 
simultaneous failure to meet the demands of responsiveness and 
responsibility. Although several studies to date have underlined certain 
aspects of the concept, by focusing on disaffection with democracy and 
political parties, not many of them have managed to establish a clear 
definition of what is meant by a crisis of representation (see for exception 
Mainwaring et al., 2006). Furthermore, mostly, these conceptualisation and 
empirical assessments have remained aloof, and so this research not only 
clearly defines what is meant by a crisis of representation, but it also applies 
this meaning to the cases of Turkey and Spain by analysing how different 
types of crisis were experienced in each case.  
 
Thirdly, the thesis accounts for not only the factors that caused the 
protest movements in both cases, but it also analyses the aftermath of these 
factions and discusses cross-country variations in adaptation and change. By 
analysing two different countries at the same time, the thesis provides a 
simultaneous explanation of the similarities and differences between two 
protest movements. In other words, it relates movement politics to that of 
electoral politics by comparatively analysing the mechanisms of interaction 
between contentious and conventional politics in Turkey and Spain.  
  
 Finally, accounting for the specific and dynamic factors that have 
widened the gap between representatives and represented in various 
7 
 
circumstances, the research not only demonstrates trends in popular 
disaffection with party politics in various parts of the world, but it also 
provides hints about the future of democracy and the party government 
model in general.  
 
 
1.1. Turkey and Spain from a Comparative Perspective 
 
Case selection is particularly critical for any comparative research design, not 
only because the cases to be analysed should respond to the purpose of the 
research (McLaren, 2008: 270), but also because the validity and reliability of 
the research should pertain to the logic of the case selection. It is common 
practice in comparative politics to take regional proximity as a basis for 
comparison. From this perspective, Southern Europe has also been 
considered a region wherein countries share a host of common features, in 
that many studies have analysed the political and economic structures of 
Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece comparatively (see Gunther et al., 1995; 
Pridham, 1995; Whitehead, 1991). Some studies have also added Turkey to 
this group of countries, mainly because, in the process of democratic 
transition and consolidation, the country has also faced a number of 
problems relating to “frequent resort to repression, excessive centralisation 
of state power, a heavy reliance of patronage and weak civilian control over 
the military” (Yardimci-Geyikçi, 2015: 531). It has also been suggested that 
the state building processes of Southern European cases occurred around 
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similar times, and during the process of democratic transition Turkey and 
these countries had similar levels of economic development and 
industrialisation (McLaren, 2008). Accordingly, most of these studies have 
employed John Stuart Mill’s Method of Difference, or “most similar systems 
design” (Pzeworski and Teune, 1970), which “seeks to identify the key 
features that are different among similar countries which account for the 
observed political outcome” (Landman, 2008: 70). In other words, they have 
aimed at accounting for why Turkey has failed to become a consolidated 
democracy while all others have succeeded, even though it shared a host of 
characteristics with these countries during the process of democratic 
transition. 
 
However, in this research, rather than explaining a different outcome 
in otherwise similar cases, we aim to account for the same political outcome, 
namely mass mobilisation, in otherwise dissimilar cases. Although in the 
1980s the Turkish and Southern European cases shared several 
characteristics with regards to economic development, state-building 
processes and certain political constraints, as these countries became 
members of the EU and Turkey could not, Turkey’s path in terms of political, 
social and economic development started to diverge – a process which 
accelerated throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Particularly when we compare 
Turkey and Spain on the basis of the most basic political, social and economic 




According to 2014 OECD data, while GDP per capita was around 
$33,720 in Spain, which was classified as a ‘high-income’ economy, in Turkey 
this figure was $19,054, and so the nation was classified as an ‘upper-middle-
income’ economy. Furthermore, while Spain scored 0.869 on the Human 
Development Index ranking and found itself at 27th in the world, Turkey’s 
score was as low as 0.759, ranking it 69th on the global stage (UNDP, 2014). 
More importantly, nowadays, Turkey remains partly free so illiberal 
democracy, according to major democracy measures (see Freedom in the 
World, 2014), while Spain has been considered an established consolidated 
democracy since the end of the 1980s (see Freedom in the World, 1990- 
2014). In other words, according to macro-level indicators at least, the two 
cases seem to be strikingly dissimilar to one another. 
 
This dissimilarity also applies to short-term economic trends and 
more specific social factors. For instance, after the 2008 economic crisis, 
Spain struggled to cope with an economic downturn, exemplified by an 
average -0.04% annual growth rate and an average 22.5% unemployment 
rate from 2009 to 2014 (OECD data, 2009-2014). In the case of Turkey, 
conversely, albeit lower than its potential, the country experienced an 
average annual economic growth rate of 3.5% from 2009 to 2014, and it also 
enjoyed relatively lower levels of debt and unemployment (OECD data, 2009-
2014). On the other hand, according to one of the most important social 
indicators, the World Gender Gap Index 2013, which is based on “four pillars 
of economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health 
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and survival, and political empowerment”, Spain’s overall rank was 30th, 
while Turkey was ranked at a very lowly 120th (Sedghi, 2013).  
 
Despite these striking differences in macro-level and more recent 
socio-economic indicators, both countries have faced the same phenomenon 
of popular disaffection from the way politics function, leading to mass 
mobilisations throughout the countries, i.e. the Gezi movement in Turkey and 
the 15M movement in Spain. As a result, this research will employ Mill’s 
method of agreement, or the ‘most different systems design’, which “seeks to 
identify those features that are the same among different countries in an 
effort to account for a particular outcome” (Landman, 2008: 70).  What is 
critical in this method is to find out the factor that is common to both cases, 
which then will be identified as explaining the particular result, even though 
most features of the two countries differ from one another. The major 
problem with the ‘most different systems design’, according to Geddes 
(1990) and King et al. (1994), is that it runs the risk of “selection bias,” which 
limits researchers’ ability to make inferences (Landman, 2008: 72). 
Nevertheless, it is possible to overcome this problem, especially if the 
researcher considers the explanatory variable as a necessary rather than a 
sufficient factor behind the observed outcome (Dion, 1998).  
 
All that said, by employing the comparative method of ‘most different 
systems design’, this research compares Turkey and Spain not only based on 
their regional proximity, but also because despite their striking differences in 
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socio-economic development both countries have experienced widespread 
protest movements demanding new ways of doing politics and the provision 
of a new type of democratic governance. In order to avoid the 
abovementioned problems with the method, the research does not aim to 
establish causality but rather to highlight possible factors that are shared by 
the two countries which might play an important role in the emergence of 
protests and so be considered a ‘necessary’ but not sufficient or sole 
explanatory factor behind the observed phenomena. From this perspective, 
the contention is that regardless of their striking socio-economic differences, 
both countries have experienced the same political problem with regards to 
the functioning of the party system – a crisis of representation –, which 
therefore seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for this type of 
protest movement to emerge in the name of establishing a real democracy.   
 
 
1.2. The Gezi Park protests and the 15M movement  
 
The 15M movement in Spain, whose name comes from the date of the first 
mass demonstrations on 15th May 2011, was one of the first mobilisations in 
Europe to gain global popularity. The population at large, deeply affected by 
the financial crisis, organised a mass demonstration against the ineffective 
two-party system, corruption in the banking sector and incompetent trade 
unions (Alcaide, 2011). In a very short time, protest movements spread 
across the country, and increasing popular support for the movement led to 
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the occupation of Puerto el Sol, the central square in Madrid, and Plaça de 
Catalunya, in Barcelona. With the slogans ‘Real Democracy Now!’ 
(¡Democracia Real Ya!) and ‘They don’t represent us!’ (¡Que No Nos 
Representan!), the 15M movement turned into the symbol of what Della Porta 
calls “nowadays movements” (Della Porta, 2014). Accordingly, the 15M 
movement represents a unique case in Spanish modern history, and even 
global history, mainly because it was the first occupy-style mobilisation on 
the European continent that showed that not only the authoritarian states of 
the Middle East, but also advanced democracies could suffer from a lack of 
political legitimacy. The protest movement was distinguished from its 
predecessors in terms of its demands for social justice and greater 
participation in decision-making procedures, its organisational style that 
used direct forms of democracy, its use of social media tools and the multiple 
identities of protestors. Perhaps one of the most striking outcomes of the 
movement was the formation of a brand new political party, Podemos, which 
aimed at redefining the parameters of Spanish politics shaped by a long-
lasting two-party system. The increasing popularity of Podemos in Spain 
challenged not only Spanish political elite, but also other European 
democracies facing with the same problem of popular disaffection.     
 
 The Gezi protests, conversely, started with small ‘sit-ins at the park’ 
protests, organised by a group of environmentalists to rally against a plan to 
demolish Gezi Park, which then spread across the country and received 
widespread support from different segments of Turkish society. These 
13 
 
protests unexpectedly became one of the most significant landmarks in 
Turkish politics, as they represented the most widespread spontaneous civil 
movement in the history of the nation. The protests were exceptional in 
terms of the diversity of the participants, the uniqueness of their means of 
mobilisation, the widespread and effective usage of social media, their 
creative and humorous slogans and the wide spectrum of activities, ranging 
from public forums to painting walls. One of the most significant features of 
the Gezi protests was the ways in which individuals from different 
backgrounds came together to protest against government policy, regardless 
of their ideological, political, social or cultural differences.  
 
Although there have been a significant number of scholarly works on 
both the Gezi Park protests and the 15M movement, almost none of these 
studies has considered the functioning of the party system as an independent 
variable. While some of these studies mainly discuss characteristics by 
focusing on the demands, organisation, motivation and incentives of these 
movements (see Likki, 2012; Morell, 2012; Tastan, 2013), others have 
attempted to explain the factors that led to the mass protests.  
 
In the case of the 15M movement, the first set of assessments argues 
that Indignados was questioning neoliberalism, the accumulation of financial 
capital and free trade that had forced all countries in the world to act in a 
similar fashion in destructing social rights, increasing inequality and creating 
enormous levels of unemployment; therefore, it asked for radical 
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transformation of a political system subordinated to capitalism (Charnock et 
al., 2012; Pino, 2013). As a result, these assessments provide a Marxist view 
of the protests, arguing that the 15M movement was part of a global revolt 
against neoliberal capitalism, the contradictions of which, they argue, became 
more visible following the advent of the 2008 economic crisis. From this 
perspective, Castañeda (2012), based on non-participant observation of the 
15M movement, also argued that the movement had a direct relationship 
with the Occupy Wall Street movement, i.e. similar goals, tactics and 
organisation. Others have looked at domestic factors and tried to locate 
movement within Spanish political history. These studies assert that 
Indignados represents popular dislike from consensual characteristic of 
Spanish democratic transition, which was imposed by elites (Sampedro and 
Lobera, 2014) and which failed to solve the most inherent problems of social 
conservatism and did not face the traumas of the Franco regime (Kornetis, 
2014). There are also works that have examined the role of communication 
technologies, particularly the internet and social media tools, in creating 
“networked citizen politics” (Peña-López et al., 2014).   
 
More elaborate accounts provide a theoretical view of the protests. 
Lorey (2014), for instance, suggests that the formation and functioning of the 
assemblies organised during and after the protests actually realised 
Ranciere’s conception of democracy. Based on this realisation, she develops 
the concept of a “presentist democracy that is inspired by Ranciere’s non-
15 
 
constitutional thinking about democracy and of politics as collective 
invention by anyone and everyone” (2014: 2).  
 
The Gezi Park protests also received widespread scholarly attention. 
While some studies, inspired by social movements theory, focus on the 
meanings, subjects, methods and actions of the protests (Farro and 
Demirhisar, 2014; Metzger, 2014; Tufekci, 2014), others provide a 
sociological perspective of the movement, by focusing on the formation of 
“public space as a way of enhancing and staging democracy as part of 
everyday practices of ordinary citizens” (Gole, 2013: 8). Others, conversely, 
establish a Marxian account, arguing that the effects of neoliberalism with an 
Islamic bias have provided political opportunities for social mobilisation 
(Gürcan and Peker, 2014). Likewise, Boratav asserted that the Gezi protests 
represented “a mature class uprising,” since its participants were mostly 
educated and well-skilled proletarians (Boratav, 2013). Contrary to Boratav, 
post-Marxists have suggested that Gezi should be seen as a “newly emerging 
middle-class movement,” the members of which take ownership of cultural 
capital and struggle against the dominance of economic and political capital 
(Keyder, 2013; Tugal, 2013; Wacquant, 2014). Against this background, and 
based on an analysis of quantitative data composed of three surveys, Yoruk 
and Yuksel (2014) assert that the Gezi protests should not be seen as a class 
movement, since multiple layers of social groups existed within the 
movement, and the distinguishing characteristic of the protesters “was not 
their class background but their political and cultural orientation” (2014: 
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122). The most widespread view on the protests sees Gezi as an expression of 
outrage against not only the government’s rising authoritarianism, but also 
its attempts to redesign the social and cultural lives of citizens through 
Islamic social engineering (Arat, 2013; Kalaycioglu, 2013).  
 
This research aims to go beyond the existing literature by providing a 
rather neglected perspective – the party politics view – of protests. Neither 
the 15M nor the Gezi movement case has been analysed through the lenses of 
the functioning of party systems, and so it has significant explanatory value. 
More importantly, there are also almost no studies that provide a 
comparative analysis of the two cases. The comparison of an electoral 
democracy, Turkey, with that of a consolidated democracy, Spain, extends the 
literature also, as the problems of representative politics have been mostly 
analysed in the context of established democracies. Accordingly, a parallel 
demonstration of a crisis of democratic representation under different 
circumstances highlights the real and significant consequences of popular 










1.3. A Brief Literature Review 
 
This research will draw on the literature on political representation, the 
relationship between representation, democracy and party politics as well as 
the literature that bridges contentious and conventional politics.  
 
 Studies on political representation are mainly composed of two major 
strands: theoretical and empirical. While theoretical works are concerned 
more with the question of how to conceptualise representation and 
representative government through analysing the historical development of 
the concept and the functions it performs, empirical studies focus on the 
ways in which representative government works. In his seminal work, Manin 
(1997), for instance, discusses the meaning of representation and looks at the 
historical development of representative government, from 
parliamentarianism to party democracy, and from there to what he calls 
“audience democracy” (Manin, 1997). Birch (2007), on the other hand, 
describes the functions of representation as ‘political recruitment’, providing 
a series of public competitions, ensuring accountability and working for both 
responsiveness and responsibility in the conduct of government. What makes 
Birch’s study relevant for this research is that he provides an idealist account 
of political representation by arguing that one of the major functions of 
representation is not only to respond to the demands of the population, but 
also to act in a prudent and a consistent fashion for the sake of the public 
good (2007: 140). Actually, Manin, Pzeworski and Stokes (1999) also have an 
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idealist approach similar to that of Birch’s and they define representation as 
“acting in the interest of the represented” or as “acting in the best interest of 
the public” (1999: 2). In a similar vein, Pitkin asserts that representing refers 
to “acting in the interest of the represented in a manner responsive to them” 
(1967: 209).  
  
 This collection of works is particularly relevant for this research, 
because while conceptualising the crisis of representation concept, we also 
adopt an idealist stance and argue that political representation by political 
parties requires being responsive to the demands of a given constituency 
while much more importantly providing for the general public good. From 
this perspective, theoretical research on representation provides this 
dissertation with tools to define what is meant by not only representation but 
also its crisis. Rather than readopting already existing definitions, we prefer 
to opt for idealist stance and define political representation broadly in that 
providing for wider public is considered one of the central requirements of 
legitimate representation.  
 
 Empirical studies on political representation can be considered under 
three groups. First, using the trustee-delegates model of representation, the 
Michigan school analysed to what extent representatives are linked to their 
own constituencies (see Miller and Stokes, 1963; Barnes, 1977; Converse and 
Pierce, 1986; McAllister, 1991). The second group is composed of studies on 
‘party government’, which focus on the relationship between voters and 
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political parties (Rose, 1974; Castles and Wildenmann, 1986; Katz, 1997; 
Blondel and Cotta, 2001). The third group, conversely, has discussed the 
degree of parties’ ability to genuinely represent the individuals who voted for 
them (Dalton, Farrell, McAllister, 2011; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999; 
Weisberg, 1978, Wessels, 2007).  
 
Both strands of research on representation remain aloof from one 
another. While theoretical works prefer to stay on the conceptual level and 
do not apply their conceptualisations to real cases, empirical works do not 
focus too much on the conceptualisation and all consider voter-party 
congruence the major indicator demonstrating how democratic governments 
represent the public interest, and therefore their central concern revolves 
around explicating voter-party congruence.  However, this research applies 
an idealist conceptualisation of representation empirically. In other words, 
we not only elaborate on definitions and conceptualisations but also go 
beyond the existing literature by applying them to actual cases of Turkey and 
Spain. From this perspective, we broaden the literature by addressing the gap 
between theory and empirics. 
 
For instance, the core problem of most of the empirical studies is that 
they all assume that programmatic convergence between voters and 
legislators indicates that democratic representation functions properly 
(Mainwaring et al., 2006: 2). In other words, looking at congruence, they 
conclude that the patterns of representation remain stable over time 
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(Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Converse, 1969; Lipset and Rokkan, 1990). 
However, as the recent widespread protests have indicated, the patterns of 
contemporary political conflict have exceeded the capacities of 
representative democracy, due to individual and cultural transformations 
(Warren, 2013: 225). In other words, the demands of individuals have gone 
further beyond the control of representative democracy in which voter-
legislature congruence has lost its relevance, since the voter asks for direct 
involvement in decision-making processes and their demands are not met 
within conventional parameters.  
 
However, without elaborating on conceptual approaches to political 
representation, this problem cannot be observed. In other words, due to the 
gap between theoretical and empirical studies, empirical studies fail to see 
current problems political systems face, which go beyond voter-party 
congruence.  
 
In order to address this problem in the literature, in studying crisis of 
representation, this research analyses voter-party congruence not only on 
the basis of the existing parameters of left and right, but also on the basis of 
the existence of popular demands for new politics, which goes beyond 
existing parameters, whether defined on the basis of ethnicity and religiosity 
or left and right, and new cleavages, which would also indicate incongruence 
between voters and political parties. For instance, as societies of both cases 
under examination have experienced cognitive revolution or what Warren 
21 
 
(2013) has defined as individual and cultural transformations existing 
parameters of left and right are unable to respond to these new masses. 
While in Spain it arises due to party’s convergence in the ideological 
spectrum, in Turkey it is resulted from divergence of political parties. Both 
instances produce gaps in the system and these gaps are further reinforced 
by the already present limitations of the left-right spectrum. In the case of 
Turkey left-right spectrum based on ethnicity and religiosity not only leaves 
unrepresented the ones who stand at the centre but also the one who 
demand new ways of doing politics. This also applies to Spain wherein 
parties’ increasing similarity left diversified electorate, the end-product of 
individual transformations, unrepresented. Both trends cannot be observed if 
one only checks for the degree of voter-party congruence quantitatively but it 
also requires a careful look into the demands of protestors which points to 
need for new cleavages or a new understanding of left and right.  
 
Moreover, representation is understood more than voter-party 
congruence, in that conceptually the requirements of party government in 
terms of responsiveness and responsibility are also taken on board when 
examining the ways in which political representation works or fails to do so. 
Assessing the degree of responsiveness and responsibility empirically 
addresses the aforementioned gaps in theoretical and empirical works. 
 
 This research also benefits from the literature that lies at the 
intersection of representation, party politics and democracy. These studies 
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mostly revolve around the concept of ‘party government’ and what function it 
has to perform for political accountability (see Ranney, 1954; Rose, 1974; 
Katz, 1987; Harmel and Janda, 1982; Rose, 1969; Thomassen, 1994). 
Needless to say, in order to provide a party political account of popular 
mobilisations, it is critical to refer to the requirements of party governments, 
since only then is it possible to pin down party failures. As it will be clarified 
in the next chapter, what is understood from “party government” determines 
what is to be expected from parties. It is argued that party government model 
is legitimised only when parties provide for accountability, responsiveness 
and responsibility. Henceforth, this research checks for to what extent parties 
are able to balance the demands of responsiveness and responsibility not 
only because it defines representation on an idealist bases but also because it 
looks closely to the literature on party government and clarifies 
requirements of this model based on this literature. The literature on party 
government once again focuses mostly on defining what is expected from 
parties under party government model and with the exception of Mair (2008, 
2013) do not elaborate on under what conditions parties would fail to meet 
these demands or what are the signs of party failures. Relating crisis of 
representation to party failures this research addresses this gap and not only 
analyses protest movements as end-results of parties’ failure to meet the 
demands of party government but also discusses the conditions which led to 




The literature on contentious politics, conversely, not only analyses 
the political opportunity structures that facilitate the development of protest 
movements, but it also looks at the relationship between social movements, 
states and political parties (see Goldstone, 2003; Tarrow, 1994; Tarrow, 
2012; Tilly, 2004). These studies are particularly important for this research, 
because differences between the current wave of protests and their 
predecessors have to be clarified, to account for the ways in which these 
protests challenge the conventional understanding of modern democracy, 
and because they provide significant tools for analysing the culture of 
protests. Aiming to discuss how movements have interacted with their 
respective electoral political systems, in the final section we also benefit from 
studies that bridge the gap between contentious politics and conventional 
politics. Here, what is observed is that there are different mechanisms of 
interaction between protest politics and routine politics in two cases under 
examination. While in the case of Turkey, protest movement has shaped the 
content of electoral campaigns and influenced existing parties’ discourses, in 
Spain, a brand new party emerged out of the protest movement which is 
considered the most extreme version of interaction between electoral and 






1.4. Theoretical and Methodological Approaches 
 
Theoretically, this research relies on historical institutionalism, adherents to 
which underline the importance of historical conditions and concerns in 
relation to the ways in which institutions structure and shape behaviour and 
outcomes (Steinmo, 2008: 118). According to March and Olsen (1989), 
institutions are not only expressions of societal interests and cultural 
patterns, but more so they are also the major actors that influence the 
workings of political life. 
 
 First of all, focusing on the ways in which political parties function in 
explaining the protest movements in Turkey and Spain, we also consider 
political institutions as crucial factors that shape the ways in which 
democracy works or fails to do so. Moreover, the research also highlights the 
importance of the interaction between sociological factors and the 
institutional framework. Within this context, it values the ways in which 
societal cleavages, together with institutional structure, shape the ways in 
which party politics adopt to the crisis of representation. And from this 
perspective, it approaches parties not only as critical political institutions 
with far-reaching implications for how democratic politics function, but also 
as reflections of institutional constraints and social constellations. In other 
words, we strengthen the historical institutionalist approach to sociological 
explanations of party failures (see Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), by explaining 
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the degree of change and adaptation in the political structure in order to 
respond to social movements.  
 
Methodologically, viewing qualitative and quantitative methods as 
being complementary rather than mutually exclusive (Dick, 1979, see also 
Webb et al., 1966), this research adopts a convergent methodology, or what 
has been called ‘triangulation’, both between methods and within methods 
(Hussein, 2009). Triangulation refers to the use of multiple methods – 
qualitative and quantitative – in analysing the same phenomenon (Dick, 
1979). In this respect, this research employs multiple quantitative and 
qualitative methods to explicate the causes of protest movements in Turkey 
and Spain. The rationale behind using triangulation is that this way of 
researching not only provides a wider and deeper understanding of the 
question under examination (Hussein, 2009), but also it increases the validity 
of the research, since “researchers look for convergence among multiple and 
different sources of information” (Creswell and Miller, 2000: 127, see also 
Denzin, 1978; Golafshani, 2003; Webb et al., 1966). From this standpoint, this 
research conducts an extensive review of the literature on political 
representation and democracy as well as on the roles political parties play in 
the process of representation. It also draws attention to how the practice of 
representation varies and how the roles of political parties change across 




What is meant by democratic representation and the crisis of 
representation is defined clearly before analysing the cases. Then, each case 
is examined in detail by referring to the last decade of party system 
development. Here, it is also important to explain the ways in which we 
operationalised the concepts of responsiveness and responsibility. In order 
to measure the degree of responsiveness, the position of parties on the left-
right spectrum is checked against distribution of voters on a left-right scale. 
Data on these are taken from Turkish Election Studies conducted by 
Kalaycioglu (2012) and from World Values Survey for the case of Turkey and 
from the Centre for Sociological Research (Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociologicas, CIS) and Latinobarometer for Spain. Moreover, this data is 
supported by an analysis of protestor’s demands. For the Turkish case 
researches conducted by KONDA Research Institute and academics from Bilgi 
University are used to observe the demands of protestors. KONDA Research 
Institute conducted a survey in Gezi Park on randomly chosen 4411 
protestors between 6 and 8 June 2013 and generated a report on these 
surveys. Academics from Bilgi University, on the other hand, conducted an 
online survey which was filled by 3008 respondents 73.2 % of which was 
from İstanbul (Ercan-Bilgiç and Kafkaslı, 2013).  In the case of Spain 
researches and interviews conducted by respected research organisation, the 
CIS are used. CIS conducts research by making surveys and generating 
qualitative data and the organisation published a detailed research on 15M 
movement titled “Estudio cualitativo: Representaciones políticas y 15M” 
[Qualitative Study: Political Representation and 15 M].  
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Responsibility, on the other hand,  is assessed qualitatively by 
referring to the certain policies of governing party and the statements of 
party leaders. Particularly, in the case of Turkey tracing the government’s 
discourse and policies for the last ten years, the extent to which the 
government attends to the expectations of wider segments of society is 
analysed. Here, government’s response to protest movement both on 
discursive and attitudinal levels are analysed looking at policy acts and using 
newspaper resources. 
 
Triangulation is adopted in this dissertation in that we use both 
quantitative (official data and statistics, together with other datasets) and 
qualitative (interviews, internet sources, party manifestos, speeches of 
leaders) data, the former of which are used mainly to complement the 
thorough examination of political context in each country. Besides above 
mentioned data sources, as quantitative data, official data and statistics for 
election results are taken from Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik 
Kurumu, TÜİK), Turkish Election Studies and “Parties and Elections 
Database” which “provides a comprehensive overview about the 
parliamentary elections in the European countries” (Nordsieck, 2015). 
Moreover, data provided by World Values Survey has been used to check for 
polarisation levels. In the case of Spain, data from Latinobarómetro is used 
which is an annual public opinion survey conducted by Latinobarómetro 
Corporation. As for qualitative data, this study used party manifestos, 
speeches and statements of party leaders as well as newspaper resources. 
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Interviews are not used for the Turkish case. For the case of Spain, on the 
other hand, interviews with 15M protestors made based on key informant 
techniques and reported by the CIS (“Estudio cualitativo: Representaciones 
políticas y 15M”) have been used.  
 
Consequently, this study employs a comparative method by 
systematically analysing a small number of cases, with the goal of examining 
co-variation among cases and highlighting to what extent cases are different, 
“thus establishing a framework for interpreting how parallel processes of 
change are played out in different ways within each context” (Collier, 1993). 
More specifically, it uses the ‘most-different systems design’ (Lijphart, 1971) 
in understanding popular mobilisations and how they interacted with the 
political structures in both cases.  
 
 
1.5. Organisation of the Thesis 
 
The thesis first provides a broad picture of representation, party politics and 
democracy, and then it specifically focuses on the cases of Turkey and Spain, 
respectively, which is followed up by an analysis of what happened after the 
protest movements and how politics in each country has interacted with 




Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical and analytical framework 
informing the empirical cases. Here, not only are the concepts of 
representation and party democracy clarified, but also an in-depth analysis of 
contemporary disaffection with party democracy, referring to both the 
supply and the demand sides of the story, is provided. Consequently, what is 
meant by a ‘crisis of representation’ is defined clearly for the subsequent case 
study analyses. 
 
 Chapter 3 is the first empirical chapter and analyses, through the lens 
of party politics, the widespread the Gezi Park movement protests which 
took place in Turkey. Looking at the last decade of the Turkish party system, 
party failures and how these led to a crisis of representation are examined. It 
is argued that, on the one hand, extreme levels of polarisation left certain 
social groups unrepresented, and on the other, the AKP government 
enhanced responsiveness at the expense of responsibility. This chapter ends 
with a brief discussion on the future of the Turkish party system and 
democracy in the country. 
 
 Chapter 4 is the second empirical chapter, in which the case of 15M 
movement in Spain is analysed in detail. Here, also referring to the 
development of party politics since democratic transition, party system-
related factors behind the mass protest movement are provided. Once again, 
party failures created a crisis of representation, forcing the populace to take 
to the streets in order to make their voices heard. This time, however, the 
30 
 
two mainstream parties’ distinct similarities, and their inability to act 
responsively, created the crisis. In other words, although both cases suffered 
from a representation crisis, opposite trends were experienced. At the end of 
the chapter, we offer a brief account of the implications of protest 
movements for the Spanish party system and democracy across the land.  
 
 Chapter 5 discusses the process after the movement, in order to 
explain the dynamics of interaction between contentious and conventional 
politics. In this chapter, the cases of Turkey and Spain are analysed 
comparatively, and how electoral politics in each nation has responded to 
their own particular protest movement is examined with the aim of 
observing the ways in which they adopted the crisis of representation. In this 
chapter, which provides an institutional and sociological analysis, we also 
account for what factors explain the differences between the two cases. 
Herein, the ways in which developments after the movement were related to 
the crisis of representation are also discussed, and it is demonstrated that the 
terms of adoption change depending on the type of crisis.  
 
 Chapter 6, which is the concluding chapter, addresses the broader 
implications of this study for democratic regimes elsewhere. The overall 
argument of the dissertation is that in understanding the recent wave of 
protests, it is critically important to analyse the workings of party systems, as 
party failure is a major, albeit not the only, factor behind the disaffection of 
populations. This in turn forces party democracy to adopt and change, in 
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order to meet the demands of increasing political participation and a new 

















This chapter develops the theoretical and analytical framework for the 
comparative analysis in the following chapters. In this chapter, prior thinking 
on the question of representation, party government model as well as the 
notion of crisis of representation will be clarified. Although the framework is 
developed on the basis of previous theories on representation and party 
government model, it aims to go beyond existing theories by focusing on the 
dynamics of representative crisis. So rather than analysing how 
representation works, this research is concerned with the question of how 
representation fails to work, leading to mass protest movements. The 
contention is that current mass protests both in Spain and Turkey that calls 
for “real democracy” are resulted from a crisis of representation that occurs 
not only when certain segments of society feel unrepresented, but also when 
citizens do not feel represented or are dissatisfied with the representatives 
and/or when they believe that their representatives fails to act responsively 
and responsibly at the same time. 
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 Within three sections, this chapter will develop and justify the 
conceptions, questions and hypotheses that inform the subsequent case 
studies on Turkey and Spain. First of all, it discusses the notion of 
representation looking at the sequences and the functions of representative 
government. In this section, the historical process within which political 
parties emerge as the key agents of representation is briefly analysed. 
Secondly, the key role of political parties in the processes of representation 
will be defined within the framework of party government model. Herein, the 
relationship between responsibility and responsiveness as one of the major 
issues of representation based on party government model will be clarified. 
Finally, we delve into the dynamics of current disaffection with the party 
democracy both in terms of demand and supply sides, creating a crisis of 
representation. In this section, contemporary debate on the failure of political 
parties to function as a linkage between citizens and state will be provided. In 
the concluding part, we discuss how this research will employ the theories of 
representation, party government and party decline and define what is 
meant by representative democracy and its crisis.  
 
 
2.1. Representation and Democracy 
 
Today, there is a widespread agreement that representative democracy 
established in the wake of mass parties is in a state of crisis (Manin, 1997: 
196). Before discussing how representative democracies are being 
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challenged due to a myriad of certain macro-political and socio-economic 
developments, it is important, first, to elaborate on the concept of 
representation, referring to forms and functions of representative 
government as well as the definition of the concept and then to look at the 
ways in which political parties have become the major agents of the 
processes of representation.  
 
 
2.1.1. The Notion of Representative Government 
 
The idea of representation is based on a relationship between a principal and 
an agent in which the principal delegates its rights to an agent in order to 
undertake a clearly defined task. In a similar vein, representative government 
refers to a system of governance in which citizens explicitly delegate elites to 
represent them in government deliberations.  In other words, rather than 
participating in decision-making processes directly as was the case in Greek 
polis, the Swiss canton or in the New England town meetings (Dalton, Farrell 
and McAllister, 2011: 22), the public in representative systems chooses 
legislators to represent their interest in the processes of political decision-
making. Particularly with the shift of decision-making to legislatures and the 
expansion of the electorate, representative government had become an 
obvious necessity. Furthermore, the limited skills and knowledge of average 
citizens have also created need for professional politicians who are assumed 
to be better equipped for governing (Dalton, 2006: 223).  
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 However, at the level of practical politics, the concept of 
representation has given rise to several disputes predominantly over the 
questions of which groups should have right to be represented, and how 
representatives should be chosen (by simple plurality or by proportional 
representation), and most importantly how representatives should behave 
(Birch, 2007: 133). While the first question had been resolved by 
democratization of suffrage and expansion of franchise to previously 
excluded groups such as working class and women, the latter two questions 
are still in dispute (2007: 134). Leaving aside the question of electoral 
system, and rules and regulations, the issue as to whether representatives 
should favour the policies supported by their constituents or whether they 
should act in line with general public interest is likely to remain as a major 
subject of controversy in the literature on representative democracy. Indeed, 
Pitkin calls this controversy “the paradox of representation” (Pitkin, 1967: 
38).  Before discussing the intricate paradox of representation and how 
political parties as the major representatives tackle with this critical issue, 
the forms and functions of representative government should be identified.  
 
 According to Manin (1997), there is a sequence of three forms of 
representative government. He examines the change in representative 
government in the light of four major principles identified: “election of 
representatives at regular intervals,2 the partial independence of 
                                                            
2 Here, it is important to highlight that the status of representatives under any form of 
representation is established by a certain process of elections. According to Dalton et al, 
elections perform two critical functions: ensuring accountability and reflection of different 
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representatives, freedom of public opinion and making of decisions after trial 
by discussion.” (1997: 197) Comparing the ways in which these principles 
were implemented, he argues that there are three types of representative 
government emerged in the history of political representation: 
parliamentarianism, party democracy and audience democracy (1997: 198). 
 
  Parliamentarianism as a form of representative government was a 
dominant paradigm in the 19th century wherein elections were devised to 
select a particular type of elite: the notables (1997: 203). Under 
parliamentarianism the representatives (notables) had direct relationship 
with their constituents; as they were not part of a group or a faction they 
were free to vote according to their personal judgements; they were more or 
less free from public opinion since cleavages cut across party lines and finally 
decisions were taken without any discussion as they were bound by the 
wishes of their constituents (1997: 202-206). Since there were no party-like 
institutions, representatives could act individually. Although under this form 
of representation there has been the risk of representative being more 
concerned with his own re-election rather than with governing in the interest 
of the country, the representatives legitimised their positions by claiming to 
serve for all or for public good (Graham 1993).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
opinions existent in the electorate (See R.J. Dalton, D. Farrell & I. McAllister (2011) ‘The 
Dynamics of Political Representation’ in M.Rosema, B. Dentes and K. Aarts (eds) How 
Democracy Works?: Political Representation and Policy Congruence in Modern Societies, 
Amsterdam: Pallas Publications: 34). 
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 Party democracy, on the other hand, which will be discussed more in 
detail in the next section, refers to a type of representative government that 
had become dominant in the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th 
century wherein political parties emerged as the key agents of 
representation. Due to mobilisation of enlarged electorate with the 
enfranchisement and mass suffrage, public started vote for a party rather 
than a person, representatives are bound by the party, electoral competition 
is organised around partisan cleavages and representatives lost their 
independence in decision-making as they have to follow strict voting 
discipline (1997: 206-218). Under party democracy, parties rather than 
individuals have become actors of representation and they emerge as the 
representative of the relevant segment of society who delegates its rights to 
political parties in order to represent their particular interest in decision-
making processes. 
 
 The concept of “audience democracy”, conversely, is introduced by 
Manin, and he argues that it is the most recent type of representation in 
which people tend to change their votes from one election to another 
indicating high volatility and low party identification; personal image is 
valued over party organization; channels of public communication have 
become non-partisan and parties turn into leader-dominated organizations 
(1997: 219-231). He suggests that this type of representative government is 
quite different from that of party democracy in which people identify 
themselves with a certain political party and vote for that party in each and 
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every election, party organization has a stronger say in policy-making and 
parties as organizations were given utmost importance rather than the 
leaders. He asserts that since mass party loses its viability, we are facing with 
a crisis of a particular form of representation rather than a crisis of political 
representation as a whole (1997: 196).  
 
 With regard to the functions of representation, Birch (2007: 140-141) 
suggests that there are four major functions of representation: political 
recruitment, providing a series of public competition, ensuring 
accountability, and working for both responsiveness and responsibility in the 
conduct of government. Indeed, the functions identified by Birch, highly 
corresponds to the functions of political parties themselves. Accordingly, his 
definition of representation is based on party democracy model. The last task 
of balancing the demands of responsiveness and responsibility is a defining 
function of representation that also lies at the core of this research’s 
understanding of representation. According to Birch, representatives have to 
be both responsive to the wishes and the interest of the electorate and 
responsible at the same time. Responsibility, to Birch, means that even if 
certain policies are popular at the time they are shaped, in case they are 
imprudent and inconsistent in the long-run for the interests of the public, 
representatives (herein parties) have to avoid implementing them (2007: 
140). Actually, as mentioned before, Manin, Przeworski and Stokes (1999) 
also adopts an idealist approach to representation in that they describe 
representation as “acting in the interest of the represented” or as “acting in 
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the best interest of the public.” (1999: 2) Likewise, according to Pitkin, 
representing requires “acting in the interest of the represented in a manner 
responsive to them.”(Pitkin, 1967: 209)  
 
 Although Mainwaring et al argue that defining representation on the 
basis of “acting in the best interest of the public” is problematic since it 
involves wide range of actions undertaken on behalf of public good 
(Mainwaring et al., 2006), they overlook the fact that what makes political 
parties unique agents of representation is their ability to balance the 
demands of responsiveness and responsibility at the same time (see Mair, 
2008). Therefore, discussing a crisis of representative democracy based on 
party government model requires adapting a broader definition of 
democratic representation.  
  
 From this perspective, this research defines representative democracy 
as a democratic form of representation in which voter chooses agents (political 
parties) to represent their interests in a democratic regime (Mainwaring et al., 
2006: 12) and in return parties as representatives (whether to be in 
government or in opposition) provide for both responsiveness and 
responsibility. In other words, this research also adopts a broader definition 
of representation based on party democracy model. This definition allows 
accounting for not only the demand side (voters’ involvement in the process) 




2.1.2. Emergence of Political Parties as Key Agents of Representation 
 
Not until the 19th century political parties have emerged as “central 
organising features of many countries politics” (Scarrow , 2006: 16). 
Throughout the 18th century and well into the 19th century, the term “party” 
has itself had a pejorative meaning in that legislatures avoided using the label 
claiming that “the moral high of pursuing the best path for the nation, while 
deriding their opponents for being ‘partisan’.” (2006: 16)  
 
The infamous status of parties was rooted in the belief that the role of 
legislators should be to serve the interest of the whole rather than a 
particular group in society since this would run the risk of pursuing private 
ends at the expense of the general good. In other words, equating parties 
with factions that represent particularised interests, partisan struggles were 
considered to be antithetical to public interest in the beginning of the 19th 
century. Burke’s definition of party actually reflects these disputes in that he 
struggled to find a compromise between particularised interests and national 
ones in defining what party is: “Party is a body of men united for promoting 
by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some particular 
principle in which they are all agreed.” (cited in Scarrow, 2006: 16) 
 
However, two interrelated developments by the mid-19th century had 
brought parties into a prominent position: “the transfer of political power to 
legislatures and the expansion of the electorate.” (2006: 17) Needless to say 
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parliamentarization had played a key role in this process as many scholars 
underline when defining the sequence of party development. According to 
Duverger (1954: xxiv):  
First there is the creation of parliamentary groups, then the 
appearance of electoral committees and finally the establishment of a 
permanent connection between these two elements.   
 
Sartori also identifies a similar sequence in which first legislatures become 
more important and responsible than parties emerge which is followed up by 
the enfranchisement, finally parties need to develop formal organisation to 
mobilise larger electorate (Sartori, 1976: 23). However, Scarrow (2006) 
maintains that although both Duverger and Sartori’s sequences correspond 
to the British case, the order of changes in legislative and electoral realms 
that brought parties into prominent position in legislative and executive 
around Western Europe have varied broadly. Whether first to be through the 
transfer of political power or through the enlargement of the electorate, both 
the enfranchisement and universal suffrage played critical role in the 
development of modern parties (Epstein, 1980: 23). 
 
 Actually, the early development of parties can be better explicated 
through analysing two historical stages of party organisation: elite parties 
and mass parties. In the late 19th and the early 20th century the dominant 
form of party model was elite or cadre parties. Since there was restricted 
suffrage and party competition was based on ascribed status rather than 
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representative capacity, parties had small and elitist membership and much 
more importantly within this era politics was regarded as the process by 
which government finds and implements so called single national interest 
(Katz and Mair, 1995: 9). Due to restricted suffrage and highly restricted 
nature of distribution of politically related resources, parties were composed 
of elites with limited or no link to civil society; therefore formal and 
structured organisations were also irrelevant for cadre parties.  
 
However, with industrialisation and urbanisation the amount of 
people meeting requirement of suffrage had increased and the restrictions on 
working-class organisation started to be seen inconsistent with the liberal 
rationale of bourgeois state (1995: 9). So with enfranchisement and mass 
suffrage, party competition began to take place on the basis of representative 
capacity, thereby the trustee style of representation is replaced by the 
delegate model (1995: 18). This is wherein mass parties begun to emerge 
towards the end of 19th century as the major representative of the 
disenfranchised segments of civil society whose existence relied on the 
quantity of its supporters which required a structured and well-based 
organisation. Under mass party model of democracy, parties have become 
representative of certain segments of society, creating a clear principal-agent 
model in representation.  
 
Indeed, elite and mass parties coexisted for a long period of time and 
in their response to mass party model elite parties had to restructure their 
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party organisation in order to survive in an electoral environment wherein 
their constituency is limited to permanent minorities of industrialists, 
farmers and etc. This search for restructuration led to the development of 
catch-all style party organisations (1995: 11). Under catchall style party 
organisation model which begun to emerge after 1945, policy effectiveness 
turned into the basis of party competition and heterogeneous membership 
has characterised party organisation (1995: 12-13). This development has 
been further followed by the emergence of cartel party model after 1970s in 
which representative style has totally changed, parties turning into agents of 
state, rather than representatives of people (1995: 13).  
 
Leaving aside all the implications these changes had over the voter-
party relationship which will be discussed in the following sections, in sum 
thanks to several socio-economic developments, political parties, whatever 
model they sustain, have emerged as the major agents of representation 
under democratic form of government. According to Bryce (cited in Müller 
and Narud, 2013: 1); “parties are inevitable. No free large country has been 
without them. No one has shown how representative government could be 
worked without them.” Similarly, Kelsen (cited in Sartori 1987: 148) 
expressed that “Modern democracy is founded entirely on political parties; 
the greater the application of the democratic principle the more important 




Consequently, as Scarrow argues “the emergence of party-organised 
politics was an unanticipated and even unwanted side-effect of liberalization 
and democratisation of politics” (Scarrow 2006: 23) in the 19th century and 
they have emerged as the major agents of representation, although with 




2.2. The Role of Political Parties in Representation 
 
As clarified in the previous section, this research is concerned with 
representation model based on party democracy in which political parties 
are the key agents of representation. Before defining crisis of representation 
leading to mass protests in Turkey and Spain, first and foremost, the 
expectations from parties under party government model have to be 
explicated. In other words, aiming to provide a party politics account of 
contemporary protests in two countries, first, the requirements of a party 
government model need to be discussed and then we will look into 
discussions around “the paradox of representation”,(Pitkin 1967) acting 





2.2.1. Party Government Model 
 
The central theme in this study is that political parties are significantly 
important for the proper functioning of representative democracy. Although 
their centrality has been much discussed in recent decades, they continue to 
play critical roles in the workings of modern democracy. Therefore, 
understanding the dynamics of current mass protests requires a careful 
analysis of the degree to which political parties fulfil their functions.  In other 
words, if as Schattschneider (1942: 1) argues that “the modern democracy is 
unthinkable save in terms of parties”, then the current unrest with the modern 
democracies should be comprehended by examining the ways in which the 
most important agent of modern democracy, political parties, function. But 
what are the functions of political parties and the conditions for party 
government? 
 
 One of the major scholars of party research King (1969) identifies six 
core functions of political parties. The first one is structuring the vote which 
refers to the process by which political parties run in elections. Katz (1980: 
1) argues that elections are only meaningful when parties run the campaign, 
come up with candidates for different offices. The argument here is that by 
structuring elections parties simplify the alternatives (Schattschneider, 1942: 
50), they organise dispersed public views into coherent programmes 
(Neuman, 1956: 397), and aggregate different proposals into consistent 
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competition between factions rather than between individual candidates 
(Ware, 1987: 58), making the process much more efficient.  
 
 The second function, according to King, is integration and mobilisation 
which refer to a process by which parties integrate different demands among 
population into coherent set of policy proposals in search of mobilising 
people. The remaining functions actually speak for themselves. While the 
third function is recruitment of political leaders, the other ones are the 
organisation of government, policy formation and interest aggregation. 
Herein, it can be argued that some functions identified by King (1969) 
overlap with one another such as integration and mobilisation is highly in 
line with interest aggregation. All in all, according to King, the control of 
government, through training politicians, deciding public policy and linking 
citizenry to state (by aggregating interest and mobilising people), is the key 
function of political parties (King, 1969). 
 
Basedau (2007), conversely, argues that there are two major functions 
of political parties: efficiency and inclusion. While inclusion refers to the 
representation of societal groups and their demands as well as the 
organization of opposition, efficiency involves structuring inter-party 
competition and elite recruitment. The study of Randall and Svasand (2002) 
is particularly important since they more or less summarise most of the 
previous studies on party functions (see for example Dalton and Wattenberg, 
2000; von Beyme, 1985) and come up with an all-encompassing account. 
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They identified functions of political parties as representation and 
integration (oriented towards the electorate), aggregation, recruitment and 
training (linkage-related) and making government accountable and 
organising opposition (government-related) (Randall and Svasand, 2002: 4). 
They argued that as political parties’ ability to meet these difficult functions 
increase their ability to contribute three important pillars of democratic 
consolidation also grows: conflict resolution, the institutionalisation of 
democracy and regime legitimacy (2002: 7). In line with Key’s famous 
conceptualisation of party faces; party in the electorate, party as an 
organisation and party in government (Key, 1964), Randall and Svasand 
(2002) discussed the functions of parties on three major levels: on the level 
of society, government and on the level of party organisation as providing 
linkage between the former two. Similarly, Dalton and Wattenberg (2000: 6-
7) also list party functions using Key’s tripartite framework. The role of 
parties in the electorate are listed as “simplifying choices of voters, educating 
citizens, generating symbols of identification and loyalty and mobilising 
people to participate”. The functions of parties as organisations are to recruit 
political leadership, train political elites, articulate and aggregate political 
interests. Parties in government, on the other hand, are required “to create 
majorities in government, organise the government, implement policy 
objectives, organise dissent and opposition, ensure responsibility for 
government actions, control government administration and foster stability 




Indeed the functions of political parties constitute the basis of 
discussions around party government model (see for instance Ranney, 1954; 
Rose, 1974; Katz, 1987; Harmel and Janda, 1982; Rose, 1969; Thomassen, 
1994) according to which the core role of parties in a representative 
democracy is to provide a linkage between the public and the political 
decision-makers (Dalton et al., 2011 ). In the words of Sartori, “citizens in 
Western democracies are represented through and by parties. This is 
inevitable.” (Sartori, 1968: 471) However, the concept of party government 
has not been used in European context until the late 1960s though it has been 
a central theme within the discussions around the US politics. In 1950 APSA 
(1950) prepared a report on US politics entitled ‘Towards a More Responsible 
Two-Party Model’. This report represents an important landmark for political 
party research basically because in debating American political and 
institutional reform it defines the parties as the leading actors in governing 
(1950). The report put great emphasis on the need for political parties in 
modern democracies as they are the ones that can produce policy 
programmes through providing policy choices to citizens and that can 
implement these programmes by being disciplined and cohesive (Dalton et 
al., 2012: 5). Although this report has been criticised by many due to its 
overemphasis on the role of political parties in governing (see Ranney, 1954), 
since it summarises the ways in which government by parties should 




In the European context, conversely, Rose has been one of the first 
scholars who elaborated on the notion. Rose (1974: 3) defines political party 
as “an organization concerned with the expression of popular preferences 
and contesting control of the chief policy-making offices of government.” 
According to this definition, there are three critical elements that are central 
to political parties. First, they have organisations so can be differentiated 
from groups that share same views; second they are concerned with the 
“expression of popular preferences” so linked to society and the state at the 
same time; and finally they govern so they have direct access to state power 
which differentiates them from other organisations such as pressure groups, 
civil society organisation and etc. (1974: 3). He maintains that party 
government pertains to the capacity of parties to “translate possession of 
highest formal offices of a regime into operational control of government” 
(1969: 413). According to Rose (1974; 1969) the conditions of party 
government require parties first to come up with clear policy goals and then 
to have the organisational ability to implement these policies through 
appointing people for required tasks (Mair 2008: 223). In other words, his 
understanding of party government focuses on the importance of clearly 
defined policy proposals provided by parties and to parties’ capacity to 
implement them. 
 
 Katz (1989: 43-44), on the other hand, identifies three conditions of 
party government: first, all main governmental decisions should be taken by 
the individuals who are chosen through electoral competition conducted 
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along party lines; second policies are to be determined by the party in the 
government or if it is a coalition government among the parties that form the 
coalition; and third, “the highest officials (ministers, prime ministers) were to 
be selected within parties and to be held responsible for their actions and 
policies through parties”(Mair, 2008: 224). Clearly, according to Katz, party 
government requires that parties play central role in each and every step of 
governmental decision-making by not only controlling the key positions in 
the government but also by leading the process of policy-making through 
designing programmes.  
 
Both Rose and Katz have listed alternative forms of government in 
relation to party government model. Rose identifies other forms as 
“government by charismatic leadership, traditional government, military 
government, government by ‘inertia’ and in particular ‘administrative 
government’” in which “civil servants not only maintain routine services of 
government, but also try to formulate new policies” (cited in Mair, 2008: 
224). Katz, on the other hand, defines other alternatives such as “corporatist 
or neo-corporatist government, in which policies are set through 
negotiations between interests,… pluralist democracy, in which each 
individual candidate and elected official is responsible to his or her own 
constituency… and direct democracy, in which policies are determined by 
referendum…” (cited in Mair 2008: 224). For both scholars party government 
model represents a unique form which is differentiated from all others in 
which parties provide a linkage between society and governing processes.  
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Thomassen (1994; see also Thomassen 1976), on the other hand, 
underlines the electoral component of party government, emphasising on the 
ways in which elections link citizenry to state as the major mechanism for 
representation. However, as Mair (2008: 225) correctly argues, Thomassen’s 
party government model is highly in line with that of Katz and Rose. 
Synthesising all three, Mair (2008: 225) lists five conditions of party 
government as follows:  
Party government in democratic polities will prevail when a party or 
parties wins control of the executive as a result of competitive 
elections, when the political leaders in the polity are recruited by and 
through parties, when the (main) parties or alternatives in 
competition offer voters clear policy alternatives, when public policy 
is determined by the party or parties holding executive office, and 
when that executive is held accountable through parties. 
 
In other words, under party government model, political parties are 
considered to be the only legitimate agents with direct means to state power 
in a democratic polity. There are three major reasons behind this assertion 
(Mainwaring et al., 2006: 30). First, political parties provide voters with 
information shortcuts which make electoral judgment much easier (Downs, 
1957). Secondly, they are crucial for accountability in the sense that political 
parties are responsible from the successes and/or failures in governing, and 
therefore they provide more institutionalised mechanism in comparison to a 
system in which transient individual officeholders would govern. Finally, 
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distinguished from interest groups, civil society organisations or trade 
unions, political parties are the only institutions that offer direct means to 
state power (Mainwaring et al., 2006: 31). From this perspective, a rational 
citizen tends to give autonomy in decision-making to representatives 
(parties) on the grounds that representatives have greater expertise on 
specific issues (Dahl, 1970: 145) in exchange for responsiveness, 
responsibility and accountability (see Cox et al., 1999; Ferejohn, 1999; 
Maravall,1999). So although the conditions of party government mainly focus 
on the ways in which the processes of governmental decision-making 
function, what makes governing by parties legitimate is conditioned by the 
extent to which they manage to sustain the demands of responsiveness, 
responsibility and accountability. While how accountability works has 
implication on the inclination of parties to be representative and responsible, 
since it pertains to the fixed intervals through which parties held accountable 
(Bardi et al., 2014: 237),  this research is more concerned with the question 
of responsiveness and responsibility. 
 
 
2.2.2. Responsiveness vs. Responsibility 
 
The discussions around responsibility and responsiveness have been one of 
the dominant themes of representation studies as the major paradox of party 
government model.  Indeed, in responding to the question of how 
representatives should behave, there has been a dispute over whether 
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representatives should favour the policies supported by their own specific 
constituents or whether they should act in line with general public interests. 
Within this perspective, the general agreement has been that political parties 
as the agents of representation should balance the demands of both 
responsibility and responsiveness. Fundamentally, political party is 
considered to be the only agent capable of aggregating, representing and 
governing at the same time. Much more importantly, party government is 
considered legitimate only if it serves responsively and responsibly at the 
same time. In this section the notions of responsiveness and responsibility 
will be clarified and a brief look into historical evaluation of how different 
party organisation models face the challenge of balancing the gap between 
two requirements will be discussed.  
 
 Though what is meant by responsibility and responsiveness have been 
briefly discussed in the previous sections, here it is important to be clear 
about both notions. Responsiveness refers to the tendency of political leaders 
or governments first to listen and then to respond the demands and wishes of 
citizens and groups (Mair, 2009: 140). Bardi et al. (2014: 237) also suggests 
that responsiveness can be identified as political parties’ and leaders’ 
responding to immediate expectations of voters either for “re-election, 
organisational discipline, and ideological commitment”. Accordingly, 
responsiveness stipulates policy-makers to meet the demands of citizens. 
Although responsiveness might be comprehended in a broader perspective in 
that it might refer to responding to the will of general public, here it is 
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understood as the process by which political parties respond to the demands 
of their own constituency or to a specific segment/cleavage of society in 
order to be re-elected and/or to fulfil their political premises.  
 
The term responsibility, on the other hand, has been much more 
controversial and used differently by various scholars. For instance, 
according to Sartori (1976: 18-20) and for APSA’s famous report, “Towards a 
More Responsible Two-Party Model”, responsible party model refers more to 
the accountability in that they argued governments being accountable to 
parliament and to people can be considered responsible (Mair, 2009). 
According to Downs (1957: 105), conversely, responsibility involves 
predictability and consistency at the same time. In his words, a party is 
responsible “if its policies in one period are consistent with its actions (or 
statements) in the preceding period” and so “the absence of responsibility 
means party behaviour cannot be predicted by consistently projecting what 
parties have done previously” (cited in Mair, 2009). Rieselbach (1977: 8-10), 
on the other hand, argues that responsibility involves both efficiency and 
effectiveness and he expects from a responsible institution to provide 
successful policies that respond to the problems at hand quickly, efficiently 
and effectively.  
 
Listing the functions of representation, Birch (2007: 140) claimed that 
one of the major functions is “providing for both responsibility and 
responsiveness.” Here, he defines responsible government as the 
55 
 
governments acting in prudence and consistency when making decisions. 
According to Birch, responsibility requires that “those in charge of policy 
making shall be responsible to the wishes and interest of the general public” 
(2007: 140). He goes on to argue that “…a government will be regarded as 
irresponsible if its policies, however popular at the time they are formulated, 
proved to be imprudent or inconsistent in the long-run”(2007: 140). 
 
This research also adapts a similar approach to the concept and 
maintains a broader understanding of responsibility in that responsible 
government here refers to the one that acts in a consistent and prudent 
fashion in public policymaking so responds not only to the demands of their 
own constituency but also to the needs and demands of general public.  
 
 The important question here is how do these two notions interact?  As 
aforementioned discussion on representation has clarified, citizens would 
delegate their rights to a representative on the condition that representatives 
act in a manner responsive to their own demands. However, if 
representatives only meet the demands of their own constituency, this would 
run the risk of disregarding long-term public interest at the expense of short-
term group interests. On the other hand, if political parties act responsibly 
with clear policy goals serving to general public without responding to their 
constituency’s demand then they might turn into “public utilities” (see van 
Biezen, 2003) with limited or no link to civil society. As Mair argues this 
might lead to a democracy without demos wherein political parties become 
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state apparatus (Mair, 2005). This is why from the very beginning party 
democracy or party government model of representation is legitimised on 
the premise that political parties links society to the state, providing for both 
responsiveness and responsibility. However, balancing the demands of two 
has been a challenging task for political parties.  
 
 According to Bardi et al. (2014) although political parties’ role has 
readopted over time under different periods, the strain between 
responsiveness and responsibility has remained persistent. Indeed, the 
phases defined by them correspond to the phases of party organisation that 
we discussed early. So it can be argued that within the period when elite 
parties were dominant, responsibility –acting in the interest of all- was 
underlying theme that shaped party politics, with the emergence of mass 
parties the emphasis had shifted towards responsiveness in that the extent to 
which parties respond to certain segment of society determined the terms of 
representation. Although catch-all party model might be considered most 
successful one in balancing the demands of both, with increasing dominance 
of cartel parties in Western Europe “the role of parties has stretched toward 
the extremes of high responsibility with limited responsiveness” (2014: 244). 
This is why Mair (2008; 2013) suggests that party government model faces a 
crisis in Western Europe wherein political parties, though act responsibly, 
acting in prudence and consistency, fail to engage the ordinary citizen and in 
turn citizens withdraw from conventional ways of political involvement. 
However, focusing on European cases predominantly Mair provides one side 
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of the story wherein responsiveness is sacrificed at the expense of 
responsibility. The opposite also might lead to a crisis of representation 
wherein political parties only enhance their representative role at the 
expense of responsibility.  
 
 The contention here is that since representative government based on 
party government model can only be justified when parties provide for both 
responsibility and responsiveness, a crisis of representation might occur if 
parties fail to maintain balance between the two, either leaning towards 
responsiveness or responsibility. Before discussing the ways in which this 
research will operationalise the notion of a crisis of representation and how 
mass protests in Turkey and Spain can be comprehended within this 
perspective, it is critical first to analyse the dynamics of party decline and the 
extent of the challenge to party government both in European and non-
European contexts, and then to define what is meant by a crisis of 
representation.  
 
2.3. Decline of Political Parties  
 
Several studies in the literature suggest that a certain level of distrust 
towards political parties and partisan politics have been present among 
citizens and political elites alike (Gray and Caul, 2000; Blais, 2000). These 
studies argue that party decline is being experienced, particularly in 
advanced industrial democracies, and this decline is resulted from changes 
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that take place not only on the level of citizens (demand side) but also on the 
level of political parties (supply side). Studying current protests in Turkey and 
Spain from party politics view, this research also maintains that party 
democracy model is experiencing a crisis, leading to mass protests in each 
case. On the one hand, each country’s major parties fail to balance the 
demands of responsiveness and responsibility creating mass disaffection 
from party democracy. The major force behind these demonstrations, on the 
other hand, has been sophisticated voters that are end products of social and 
political modernisation experienced in each case, leading to citizens’ 
withdrawal from the conventional processes of representation.  
 
 Needless to say, drawing clear-cut boundaries between two processes 
– demand and supply sides of party decline- is hardly possible in that most 
often citizens and parties construct and reconstruct one another. In this 
section, first, the ways in which the literature on advanced industrial 
democracies approach party decline will be analysed from citizens’ side. Here 
we will also try to delineate whether similar processes experienced in cases 
under examination, and then the notion of crisis of representation will be 
clarified on the basis of party side. In the second part, the ways in which this 






2.3.1. Citizen Disaffection with Party Government  
 
As turnout in elections, party membership, party identification, and trust in 
parties have all experienced steady decline, several studies argue that there 
is a widespread disaffection with the processes of representation based on 
party democracy model and partisan decline is apparent in most of advanced 
industrial democracies (see Dalton, 2003). The argument is that particularly 
at the individual level, citizens have clearly demonstrated their disaffection 
with and expressed their doubts about parties and the party government 
(Poguntke and Scarrow, 1996). In line with these developments, not only 
trusts in political parties but also satisfaction with the democratic processes 
have decreased extensively in almost all advanced industrial democracies 
(Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Norris, 1999).  
 
 According to Dalton (2000), the concept of partisanship or party 
identification has been one of the most important determinants of political 
behaviour. This is so mainly because citizens tend to associate themselves 
psychologically with a political party and this association and/or 
identification in return determines their perceptions about, evaluations of 
and actions towards political parties and party system (Campbell et al., 
1954). Therefore, there are critical functions of partisanship in the working 
of democratic politics: Partisanship organises mechanism for the voter’s 
political evaluations (see Borre and Katz, 1973, Miller, 1976), provides voters 
with information short-cuts in understanding functioning of politics (Downs, 
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1957), mobilises voters and makes it easier for voters to understand political 
issues and make political judgements (Dalton, 2000).  
 
However, since 1970s the decline in partisanship has started to be 
observed both among publics of the US and several European countries (see 
Abramson, 1976; Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Beck & Jennings, 1991; Craig, 
1985; Crewe& Denver, 1985; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995; Nie et al., 1993; 
Wattenberg, 1981). Although in the beginning this trend was associated with 
specific circumstances of the nation that experiences partisan decline, 
towards the mid-1980s and in the 1990s it has become clear that partisan 
dealignment in advanced industrial democracies can be generalised and this 
development mainly results from social and political modernisation that take 
place in these democracies (Dalton, 2000; see also Dalton, 1984; Dalton et al., 
1984). According to Dalton (2000: 23), “we are witnessing a broad and 
ongoing decline in the role of political parties for contemporary publics.” He 
maintains that rising education levels, the growth of mass media, and 
proliferation of non-governmental organisations and interest groups have all 
challenged the dominant position of parties in democratic politics (2000: 22).  
While increased education levels have created much sophisticated voters that 
do not need information short-cuts provided by political parties, mass media 
has replaced parties as sources of political information. As asserted by Dalton 
(2000: 29), contemporary electorate has access to all sorts of information 
and therefore now they are much capable of managing “the complexities of 
politics on their own, without recourse to the political cues that partisanship 
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provides.” In other words, he claims that cognitive mobilisation which refers 
to the process by which citizens acquire skills and resources necessary to 
engage in politics without external cues has replaced party mobilisation 
(Dalton, 1984). On the other hand, rising number of social and political 
groups provide new avenues of participation and citizens in advanced 
industrial democracies find it much easier to engage with non-governmental 
organisations and/or interests groups that are better equipped to respond 
diversified and individualised demands of public. Due to the individual and 
cultural transformations (Warren, 2003: 225), in these societies the 
individuals have become more reflexive meaning that they are more 
concerned with life-choices all of which makes demands much more 
individualised in contrast to collective demands (Beck, 1997; Giddens, 1991; 
Habermas, 1990). Particularly in the OECD countries, for instance, on 
average, the citizens are;   
more interested in controlling their futures, more attentive to and 
critical of government performance, less deferential to authority, and 
more likely to participate in the domains most salient to their life-
chances (Warren, 2003: 225; see also Inglehart 1997; Norris 1999). 
 
Therefore, not only in the US but also in Europe non-party social and political 
organisations representing particularised interests such as women’s 
movement, consumer groups, environmental movements, and human rights 
movements have all challenged the prioritised position of political parties in 
the processes of political participation (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000).  
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Indeed, several studies track trends in party decline among citizenry 
through looking at data on party identification, the party membership scores, 
turnout levels and the levels of trust in political parties all of which 
experiencing decline in advanced industrial democracies (see 2000). 
However, although these scores might be useful for measuring partisan 
disaffection in these democracies such as Britain, Denmark, Germany, the US 
or Canada, wherein socio-economic development has started to take place 
much earlier, downward trend in these scores might not be experienced at 
the same pace in relatively new democracies such as Turkey and Spain. 
Accordingly, when we analyse the same data on Turkey and Spain what is 
observed is that contrary to advanced industrial democracies, these scores 
remains to be relatively high. For instance, party membership scores are still 
moderately high in that the membership density, indicating parties’ capacity 
to penetrate its own electorate, in both countries is around 7% and the party 
identification scores are on average higher than 60% (Yardimci-Geyikci, 
2015).  Moreover, turnout in elections is on average around 70% in Spain and 
more than 80% in Turkey for the last ten years (2015). 
 
However, though there is certain level of persistent interest in party 
politics, at the subjective and behavioural levels citizenry has started to 
demonstrate their dissatisfaction from representative politics. Similar 
processes of social and political modernisation together with cognitive 
mobilisation also take place in newer democracies. In both cases, for 
instance, trust in political parties is very low and majority of people have low 
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trust in political parties (64% in Turkey and 52% in Spain).3 Much more 
importantly, in each case widespread protests and popular mobilisations 
throughout the country leading to the occupation of public spaces calling for 
direct democracy have indicated at the behavioural level that there is a clear 
disaffection with the conventional processes of representative politics. In 
these protests majority of protestors are actually better-educated and 
politically sophisticated as it is the case in advanced industrial democracies. 
Therefore, it can be argued that though the data on party identification or 
party membership remains high, there are sufficient subjective and 
behavioural indicators that give first signs of citizen disaffection from 
politics. However, the contention here is that although cognitive mobilisation 
has played a role in creating dissatisfied public with politics, major factor 
behind disaffection, according to this research, is the crisis of representation 
resulted from party failures rather than partisan dealignment which is not 
experienced at the same pace with that of advanced industrial democracies in 
cases under examination.  
 
 
2.3.2. Crisis of Representation 
 
As is discussed above, the decline of partisanship has also been related to 
party failures to fulfil their critical functions. Providing the party-side of the 
                                                            
3 In the survey, the respondents were asked ‘How much do you personally trust in political 
parties?’ Low trust refers to the total percentage of respondents who chose from 0 to 3 on a 
scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (complete trust). 
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story, Mair argues that the failings of political parties play the key role in the 
process of citizens’ withdrawal from political processes (Mair, 2005; 2002; 
2013). Here we will first look at the ways in which party failings are 
explicated in the literature and then this conceptualisation will be readapted 
in order to account for the rising mass disaffection among publics of Turkey 
and Spain.  
 
 Several studies have argued that the rising levels of 
professionalization in contemporary parties (see Katz and Mair, 1995; 
Scarrow, 1999) have detached parties from civil society turning them into a 
state apparatus. Actually, tracing historical stages of party organisational 
change and its implications on party democracy, Katz and Mair (1995) 
argued that after 1970s cartel parties emerged as the key model of party 
organisation and this model have had detrimental effects on the functioning 
of party democracy. Cartel party, different from its predecessors, is 
characterised by the interpenetration of party and state in that parties are 
extremely reliant on public funding. Moreover, party competition is based on 
managerial skills and efficiency, election campaigns are capital-intensive and 
professionalised and much importantly party membership has lost its 
privileged status: members and non-members have similar rights with 
limited or no obligations, and party members are considered individuals 
rather than organised body with only function of legitimation (1995). They 
define representation style under cartel parties as “agents of states”. Katz and 
Mair (1995) argue that the problem with cartel party model is that the 
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parties have lost their link with society and therefore decisions are taken by 
elites with limited or no public involvement in policy-making processes. 
Consequently, 
…democracy ceases to be seen as a process by which limitations or 
controls are imposed on the state by civil society, becoming instead a 
service provided by the state for civil society (1995: 22 ). 
 
As discussed in the previous sections, the major function of political parties is 
to link society to state and to carry society’s demands to governmental 
decision-making and their representative role is legitimised as long as they 
fulfil this function. When they turn into agents of state, they fail to perform 
their core role in the functioning of democracy.  
 
 Mair maintains that the problem goes beyond cartel party model in 
that in contemporary Europe the party government model as a whole is 
under challenge (Mair, 2008). He suggests that due to convergence of 
political parties in ideological terms, declining electoral cohesion and failure 
of parties to bridge the gap between responsiveness and responsibility, 
citizens have withdrawn from traditional forms of representation (Mair, 
2005; 2008; 2013). The ideological polarisation has decreased and parties 
have reached a kind of centrist consensus since more or less they start to 
realise that they are bound by the same parameters of policy-making and 
they have similar commitments in government (Mair, 2008: 216). In other 
words, the difference between left and right has lost its salience in terms of 
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policy proposals with the end of embedded liberalism (Scharpf, 2000) and 
more importantly governments lost their control over the economy with a 
view of redistribution (Scharphf, 1997). Therefore, political parties 
converged in the ideological spectrum and they all become alike with almost 
no difference with regards to policy proposals. This is particularly 
problematic in today’s world wherein citizen demands are highly 
individualised and fragmented (Franklin et al., 1992).  
 
Under these circumstances, when citizens look at the party system, 
they could not see any alternatives which could transfer their demands to 
policy-making processes. Moreover, since traditional cleavages that are 
based on class divisions lost their salience, political preferences have 
experienced further diversification, leading to decline in class voting around 
Western Europe (Knutsen, 2006). According to Mair (2008), subsequently 
decline in electoral cohesion has also made it much difficult for parties to 
aggregate and mobilise different interests in society.  
 
 All these developments in return have meant that parties today are 
unable to balance the demands of responsiveness and responsibility. 
Although they might be considered responsible in the sense that they are 
extremely professionalised and try to govern under constrained 
circumstances thanks to globalisation and Europeanisation processes, they 
lost their responsiveness. In other words, as responsibility has become much 
complicated thanks to the commitment of governments to international and 
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global constraints, acting responsive to public opinion has become all the 
more challenging (Mair, 2009). As Mair (2009: 16) suggests, 
…the constraints on government have become much greater, the 
ability to respond to voters has been much curtailed, and the parties’ 
capacity to use their political and organisational resources to bridge or 
even manage the resulting gap [between responsiveness and 
responsibility] has become severely limited.  
 
Analysing only Western European party systems, Mair provides only one-
side of the story. So he problematizes party failures to act responsively to the 
demands of population in advanced industrial democracies which in turn 
results in a democracy lacking popular component. However, he disregards 
that crisis of representation might occur not only when parties cease to be 
responsive but also when they fail to act responsible.  
 
 Accordingly, defining representative democracy as a democratic form 
of representation in which voter chooses agents (political parties) to 
represent their interests in a democratic regime and in return parties as 
representatives (whether to be in government or in opposition) provide for 
both responsiveness and responsibility, the contention is that crisis of 
representation occurs when  
1. Certain segments of society feel unrepresented and lose their trust in 
agents (political parties) in representing their interests  
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2. They do not believe that their representatives are acting responsive 
and responsible at the same time.  
 
Therefore, they negate the role of intermediates in policy-making processes 
and search for new ways of political participation such as mass 
demonstrations. This is what has happened in both cases under examination. 
On the one hand, in Spain according to the majority of the population, 
elections have failed to function as a mechanism for inclusive democratic 
representation which in turn has made people search for other ways of 
making their voices heard (Kselman, 2013). The disaffection with party 
system is mainly resulted from the prevalent two-party system in the country 
in which the PSOE and the PP are the key political players since the end of 
1980s (see Hanley and Loughlin, 2006). Converging in the ideological 
spectrum towards the centre, it has become very difficult to distinguish the 
socialist PSOE from that of the right wing PP, and thus according to 
population at large two parties are alike (see Torcal et al., 2002), and 
therefore are unable to come up with alternative policy proposals. Moreover, 
due to accelerating processes of globalisation and Europeanisation, 
particularly after mid-1980s Spanish party governments failed to act 
responsive to public opinion but to broader commitments in global world. So 
parties enhance their responsible role neglecting responsiveness.  
 
 The case of Turkey, conversely, is profoundly different from that of 
Spain. The current structure of the party system suffers from high levels of 
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party system polarization. The ideological distance between the governing 
and the main opposition parties has been considerably wide, and since 2002 
this gap has increased dramatically (Kalaycioglu, 2012; see also Baslevent 
2009). In other words, voters systematically locate the CHP on the left of the 
spectrum and the AKP on the right and the gap between two parties are 
continuously expanding, creating an ‘ideological abyss’ in the party system 
(Kalaycioglu, 2012). In highly polarised party systems the electoral choices 
are limited to two poles of the political spectrum. When certain segments of 
the electorate are located at the centre or when they do not conform to 
existing parameters of party competition, they feel unrepresented and start 
to search for alternative ways of making their voices heard. Moreover, 
particularly in its third term, the AKP government has ceased to act 
responsible disregarding the demands of significant portion of population.  
 
 Consequently, while in Spain convergence of parties in ideological 
spectrum together with parties’ enhancement of their responsible role at the 
expense of responsiveness have created a crisis of representation, in Turkey 
it is the opposite in that divergence of parties in ideological spectrum and 
enhancement of responsiveness led to a crisis. The argument here is that the 
popular protests in Turkey and Spain can be explicated within the framework 
of party failures. In both cases under examination a crisis of representation is 
experienced wherein important segment of society feel unrepresented, lose 
trust in political parties and cease to believe that parties are able to meet the 
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demands of responsiveness and responsibility at the same time so they 
search for new ways of making their voice heard at the governmental level. 
 
 
2.4. Concluding remarks: 
 
Throughout this chapter, the analytic framework of this research has been 
outlined. The research primarily deals with the question of why popular 
protests that received the support of significant portions of society both in 
Turkey and Spain take place. It conceives that the failure of political parties to 
meet the demands of democratic representation has made people search for 
other ways of making their voices heard and claims that crisis of 
representation is the major, if not the only, factor behind mass protests. 
 
 First of all, this chapter discussed the relationship between 
representation and democracy, referring to the notion of representation and 
the ways in which political parties are emerged as the key agents of 
representation. Herein, the forms and sequences of representation are 
identified as well as the processes of party domination over representative 
government have clarified. What is meant by democratic representation is 
clearly defined. Then, what kind of roles parties play in representative 
democracy is delineated and most importantly the paradox of representation 
under party government model is discussed through notions of responsibility 
and responsiveness. Following that, the processes of party decline both from 
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demand (citizens) and supply (political parties) sides are examined, referring 
to the literature on advanced industrial democracies. Here, a discussion on 
the extent to which same processes are experienced in newer democracies is 
also provided. Finally, the way this research conceptualises the concept of 
crisis of representation has been presented, suggesting that crisis of 
representation occurs not only when citizens feel unrepresented and lose 
their trust in parties but also when they do not believe that parties act in 
accordance with the demands of their constituents and/or on behalf of the 
general public interest.  
 
 To sum up, this research aims to provide a party politics account of 
mass protests in Turkey and Spain. Since I aim at analysing two dissimilar 
cases experiencing same political phenomenon, this research employ ‘most-
different systems design’. In the following chapters, first two cases will be 
examined separately providing a party politics’ account of protests in each 
case and then we analyse two cases concurrently, discussing the implications 















The widespread protests that shook Turkey in summer 2013 have prompted 
one central question: why did such small protests against the building of a 
shopping mall on Gezi Park in the centre of İstanbul turn into the biggest 
example of mass civil movement in the republic’s history? There are several 
possible explanations behind these demonstrations. Some scholars have 
underlined Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authoritarian policies, 
which aim at reshaping Turkish society on Islamic values and beliefs: such 
fears were further stoked by Erdoğan’s election to the newly created 
presidency in August 2014 (Acemoglu, 2013; Eligur, 2013; İdem, 2013). 
Others have provided a post-Marxist view, arguing that the communal life 
created in “Gezi Park” has threatened not only the very neoliberal identity of 
the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) but also 
the government’s heavy emphasis on “development” at the expense of 
                                                            
4 An earlier version of this chapter has been published in The Political Quarterly Vol. 85(4), 




everything else; consequently, the protests should be seen as part of a global 
revolt against commodification and authoritarianism (Gambetti, 2013; Igsız, 
2013; Tugal, 2013). Less elaborate accounts, which have received 
widespread recognition among government circles, have approached the 
protests as an “international plot” against Erdoğan’s government, whose 
economic successes are envied by foreign actors.  
 
As it has been clarified in the previous chapter, this research links 
popular discontent to party failures, therefore, we suggest that following an 
analysis of the last decade of the Turkish party system, one can easily detect 
the signals of instability and social unrest in the country – long before these 
mass demonstrations took place. The contention is that the current political 
upheaval in the country results mainly from a crisis of representation 
experienced at two levels: on the one hand, a high degree of polarisation has 
left certain segments of society unrepresented, while on the other, since the 
AKP government has ceased to maintain the balance between responsiveness 
and responsibility, citizens lost their belief the government acts on behalf of 
the common or public good. In other words, this chapter is the first empirical 
chapter which not only provides a historical picture that led to a crisis of 
representation in the country but also applies the theoretical and analytical 
framework designed in the second chapter to the case of Turkey, 
demonstrating how this crisis experienced at two different levels actually 




A Brief Look into Gezi Park Protests 
 
Everything started with small “sit-in at the park” protests organised by a 
group of environmentalists against a plan to demolish Gezi Park, one of the 
few remaining green areas in the city centre of İstanbul. On May 31st, 2013 
the heavy-handed police pre-dawn crackdown on the protestors, deploying 
tear gas and water cannon as well as setting fire to the protestors’ 
encampment, created huge popular outrage. In just a few hours the pictures 
and scenes of the police’s excessive use of force against peaceful protestors 
were spread to the world through social media. In the following morning, 
thousands of people marched to Taksim Square to protest against the AKP-
backed police violence, and these groups also faced brutal repression meted 
out by the police, who once again employed tear gas and water cannon.  
 
 Following these developments, on June 1st, millions of people 
throughout the country, including in major cities such as Ankara, İzmir, Bursa 
and Eskişehir, spontaneously gathered to protest not only against police 
violence but also against the AKP government’s rising authoritarianism, 
which found expression through the prime minister’s statement regarding 
his commitment to demolishing the park: “Whatever you do, we’ve made our 
decision and we will implement it”. In the following days protestors took to 
the streets and called on the government to resign. From the 31st May several 
mass demonstrations took place in most of Turkey’s 81 provinces which have 
involved more than two and a half million people. The police have continued 
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to use excessive force, which has led to the deaths of six civilians and one 
police officer, over 8,000 injuries and more than 3,000 arrests since the 
protests began (Amnesty International, 2013). After the protests, protestors 
continued to meet in parks to organise public forums through which they can 
discuss the way forward for these mass demonstrations.  
 
 The Gezi Park protests represent the most widespread spontaneous 
civil movement in the history of the country, and therefore analysing the 
major dynamics behind the protests is warranted, particularly because 
Turkey is portrayed as a model for democratic development in the region 
(see Aydınlı, 2013) and the troubles relating to this democracy illustrate the 
prospects and challenges for democracy in the Middle East as a whole. 
Moreover, placing aspects of this civil movement into a framework which 
suggests links between the protests and party politics has the potential to 
hint about the intricate relationship between old and new forms of political 
participation or between “normal and extraordinary forms of political 
action.” (Isaac, 2013)  
 
 
3.1. Party System in Turkey 
3.1.1. The Last Decade under AKP Rule 
 
In order to locate these protests in the context of party politics, it is first 
helpful to provide a brief synopsis of AKP rule over the last decade. The 
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elections of 2002, which marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish 
politics, created a political earthquake in the country (Carkoglu, 2002; 
Cagaptay, 2013). Turkish society at large punished the poor performance of 
the previous ruling and opposition parties by leaving them out of the game. 
Three parties in the coalition government, together with two opposition 
parties in Parliament, failed to pass the 10% threshold. As such, only two 
parties managed to enter Parliament: the AKP (see Tepe, 2005 for an analysis 
of the AKP) and the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). 
While the AKP, under the leadership of Erdoğan, benefited from having a new 
and cleaner name aligned with a strong will to solve the problems of Turkey, 
the CHP made the most of its failure to pass the threshold in the previous 
General Election, as it turned out to be a chance for the party to escape 
responsibility for the 2001 economic crisis that affected all established 
political parties adversely.  
 
Owing to the election threshold, the AKP managed to gain 66% of 
seats in Parliament with only 34% of the votes, and the CHP had 32% of seats 
with 19% of the total votes. Notwithstanding the election threshold, the 
results clarified that people were in search of new political options. 
Moreover, it became obvious that the electorate held centre-right parties, 
which more or less had ruled the country during the 1980s and ‘90s, 
responsible for political incompetence, social unrest and economic failure (se 
Carkoglu, 2002). Furthermore, the people at large believed in and were 
impressed by the transformation of political Islam into a conservative 
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democracy. Henceforth, while the AKP filled the vacuum that emerged in 
centre-right political practice, the CHP reserved the secular and leftist vote. 
 
 Following the election of the AKP, the European integration process 
gained fresh momentum. The new government managed to take advantage of 
windows of opportunity opened by the European integration process in two 
ways. First of all, there were high levels of public support for EU membership, 
so sustaining the pace of the reform process, the party succeeded in 
satisfying its electoral constituency and guaranteed staying in power. 
Secondly, a commitment to EU membership was more or less the survival 
strategy of the party in a hostile secular environment. Due to its Islamist 
background, the party had to prove that it did not have any covert agenda 
and support the further democratisation of the country in line with the long-
lasting ‘Westernisation’ aspirations emanating from within Kemalist circles. 
In other words, the AKP government worked hard on the country’s EU 
project, in order to secure its position domestically – and at pretty much any 
cost (Avcı, 2011; see also Cınar, 2006). 
 
 In order to fulfil EU requirements, from 2002 to 2005 the AKP 
government adopted various political reform packages which increased legal 
protection of the social, cultural and political rights of all Turkish citizens, 
irrespective of religious and ethnic origin, decreased the role of the military 
in Turkish politics and increased respect for the freedom of expression in the 
country (Muftuler-Bac, 2005; see also Gursoy, 2012). Accordingly, in 2004 
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the Commission recommended preliminary negotiations with Turkey, and in 
October 2005 official entry talks were finally launched between the EU and 
Turkey. However, after 2005 it became apparent that the AKP government 
had lost its initial enthusiasm and reformist zeal. Both endogenous and 
exogenous factors have triggered this shift in government’s approach to the 
EU (see Avci, 2011; Duran, 2007; Ugur, 2010). Moreover, the legal reforms 
passed by the government stayed on paper and backup clauses remained in 
effect, limiting particularly the freedom of expression. This is why the major 
democracy reports still underline certain violations in Turkey of the freedom 
of expression, leading to self-censorship both within the media and academic 
world (Policy IV, 2010; Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2012; Freedom 
House, 2012).  
 
 In the early elections of 2007, the AKP enjoyed another landslide 
victory by garnering 47% of the entire vote. The CHP, on the other hand, 
received 21% of the vote, but this time two other parties also managed to 
enter Parliament: the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, 
MHP), with 14% of the vote, and the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik 
Toplum Partisi, DTP), which bypassed the election threshold by nominating 
its candidates as independents.  
 
 In its second term, the AKP government became less concerned about 
the democratisation of the country and, according to Kalaycıoğlu (2011: 274), 
its focus turned inwards and towards consolidating its power via 
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“establishing full-scale control of all the autonomous agencies of the state, 
from the Central Bank, Radio and Television Supreme Council to the Council 
of Higher of Education and the rectors of public universities.” Moreover, 
some have also argued that as the membership perspective lost its viability, 
the AKP government, which lacked a practical democratisation agenda 
independent of EU membership requirements, lost direction (Cinar, 2007). 
 
 In the 2011 General Election, defying the incumbency curse, the AKP 
once again managed to garner almost 50% of the vote, winning the elections 
for a third time in a row. Nevertheless, in its third term, and leaving aside any 
democratisation prospects, the AKP is now increasingly focused on 
consolidating its power, silencing any opposition and becoming extremely 
intolerant to any kind of dissent. According to many observers, Erdogan has a 
majoritarian understanding of democracy, in that he regards it solely in 
terms of an electoral mechanism which, he believes, gives him the right to 
rule in the name of the majority and do anything he likes, without any checks 
or balances (The Economist, 2013a). This is the reason why, since winning a 
third term in office, Erdogan has become much more authoritarian and 
autocratic – traits manifested in his explicit search for a way to redesign 
Turkish society in line with his Sunni Islamic beliefs (Jenkins, 2013).  
 
For instance, within this period the government has introduced Koran 
classes for primary school pupils, revitalised Islamic clerical education in 
high schools and most recently restricted the sale of alcoholic beverages in 
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shops between 10pm and 6am and the advertisement of these products. 
Moreover, through his domination of the political landscape, Erdogan has 
indicated on several occasions his intentions to change the parliamentary 
system and replace it with a presidential model, in which he will become the 
president. Today, not only does the party, thanks to several constitutional 
changes, manage to monopolise executive and legislative functions but AKP 
nominees also fill the judiciary, the provinces are run by AKP people, big 
state contracts are given to close AKP friends and associates and the media is 
either controlled by obvious friends of the party or is too scared to express 
independent views,5 the result of which is pervasive self-censorship (The 
Economist, 2013b). According to the most recent Committee to Protect 
Journalists report, there are more correspondents in jail in Turkey than in 
Iran and China, respectively (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2013).   
 
 Conversely, within this period of time, the opposition party has been 
relatively ineffectual. Since the 2002 General Election the CHP has been the 
main opposition party (see Ayata and Ayata, 2011 for a detailed analysis of 
the CHP), coming second after the AKP in three consecutive elections. 
Particularly from 2002 to 2010, suspecting the AKP’s Islamist pedigree and 
as the founder of the republic, the CHP assumed a kind of guardianship role 
and throughout this time sided with the forces of the establishment, namely 
the military, the president and the Constitutional Court. Concerned with 
                                                            
5 Most recently, leaked voice records between Erdogan and a top manager of a news channel 
showed “the reality of cencorship calls from the prime minister’s office”. See Gursel 
“Erdogan’s Heavy Hand” 
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keeping the problem-ridden principle of “assertive secularism” (Kuru, 2006) 
intact, the party predicated its opposition on the regime question. Thus, the 
leader of the party, Deniz Baykal, did not refrain from siding with the military 
at critical junctures. Baykal’s attitude played a critical role in polarising 
society between secularists and AKP supporters, particularly because he 
preferred to play identity politics. However, in 2010 the ultra-Kemalist 
Baykal was ousted and replaced by a social democratic figure, Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu. Although Kılıçdaroğlu has also failed to combine the existing 
dissent from AKP rule into any form of united and effective opposition, under 
his leadership several changes have been experienced inside the party. For 
instance, most of the significant social democratic figures that were excluded 
under Baykal have returned to the CHP, and many important personalities 
that have the trust of the population have also joined the ranks.6 Moreover, 
according to Finkel (2012), Kılıçdaroğlu has been struggling to change the 
CHP from a party that preoccupied with internal power struggles into one 
that now seeks to become a government through formulating practical 
policies and programs as well as addressing to the socio-economic problems 
county is facing.  However, although the social-democratic strand headed by 
Kılıçdaroğlu himself currently controls the leadership of the party, the CHP 
still appears chaotic thanks to the persistence of several different factions 
within the party, including Kemalists, social democrats and liberals.  
 
                                                            
6 Among these figures we can name Safak Pavey, İlhan Cihaner, Rıza Türmen, Sezgin 
Tanrıkulu as examples. 
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 The other two opposition parties that found representation in 
Parliament in the second and third periods of AKP rule are the MHP (the 
Turkish Nationalist Party) and the Peace and Democracy Party (Baris ve 
Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), the Kurdish Nationalist Party. For the last two 
elections, the vote share between the MHP and BDP has more or less 
stabilised, forcing them to play mainly a balancing role in relation to one 
another. Whilst the MHP appeals to anti-EU and anti-Kurdish nationalist 
sentiments, the BDP has turned into the major representative of the Kurdish 
population in the country.7 However, since both parties’ support is based on 
the nationalist votes, they have also fallen short of moulding social dissent 
into vigorous opposition to the government through effective alternative 
policy proposals.  
 
 In short, on the opposition front, while the CHP could not go beyond 
defending the nationalist secularist ideology of the Turkish state particularly 
from 2002 to 2010, the MHP and the BDP have been trapped into ethnic 
politics. Accordingly, the failure of opposition parties to provide reliable 
alternatives has turned the AKP into the major political force within the 
country. Although this trend has started to reverse in the presidential 
elections of 2014 and general elections of 2015 as the People’s Democratic 
Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), a sprinter of Kurdish movement 
                                                            
7 Although the AKP also manages to appeal to the Kurdish population, receiving a 
considerable amount of votes from the southeast region (Polat, 2008), in both the 2009 local 
elections and the 2011 General Elections, the BDP succeeded in surpassing the votes of the 
AKP. Particularly in 2011, the BDP received 50.8% of the votes cast in 12 southeast 
provinces, whereas the AKP only garnered 37.37% of the vote in the same region (Satana, 
2012).    
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with national focus, has increased its appeal,  the party was not a critical 
actor of the political opposition before the Gezi protests.  
 
 Before analysing how high levels of polarisation, together with a lack 
of a plausible opposition and the government’s inability to act responsibly, 
created the crisis of representation in the country, which has been one of the 
central reasons behind the recent upheaval, it is necessary to delineate the 
Turkish party system in the 2000s.  
 
 
3.1.2. Turkish Party System in the 2000s 
 
Since the 2002 elections, the moderate pluralism of the 1980s and ‘90s, in 
which each major tendency was represented by two parties, has shifted into 
a predominant party system in which the AKP is stronger than all other 
parties. Sartori defines dominant party systems as those in which one party is 
capable of winning three consecutive elections with a 10 percentage point 
spread between the leading and the other parties in the system (Sartori, 
1976). Winning the last three elections in a row by outscoring all the other 
parties, the AKP qualifies as the dominant party and makes the country’s 
political landscape a predominant party system (see Carkoglu, 2012; 
Gumuscu, 2013). Within this system, each ideological grouping is 
represented only by one party – the centre-right is represented by the AKP, 
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the centre-left by the CHP, the extreme right by the MHP and the extreme left 
by the BDP.  
 
 High volatility and high fragmentation have been the major features of 
electoral politics in Turkey since the 1970s (Tursan, 2004). Particularly 
during the 1990s, according to Sayari (2007: 204), party system 
fragmentation, unstable electoral bases and power struggles between and 
within parties, together with incapable coalitional governments, created a 
more or less scattered party system wherein political power was significantly 
dispersed. In this sense, the landslide election victory of the one-year-old 
AKP in 2002 gave the first sign of the crystallisation of ideological groupings. 
 
Table 3.1: Programmatic/ Policy Platforms (2002-2011)* 
 











for the EU 
Qualified 
Support for the 
EU 
Qualified Support 











*This classification is based on Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu (2007)’s 
work but has  been readapted.  
 
Since then, these four political parties have consolidated their positions in 
the political system in terms of both programmatic/policy platforms and 
electoral support (Table 3.1). Analysing the election results from 2002 
onwards, this trend can clearly be observed. Table 3.2 shows the main 
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indicators of election results for the four parties8 for the last three elections. 
Looking at sheer numbers, three conclusions can be drawn: increasing 
turnout levels, a rise in the AKP and CHP’s number of votes, together with 
vote shares, and the stabilisation of votes for the MHP and the BDP, especially 
in the last two elections. The first remarkable observation is the relatively 
high turnout levels, which dropped to 79% in 2002 but gradually rose to 
83%, which points to the resilient interest in politics, even in times of 
disaffection in European democracies. Another striking point is the steady 
increase in the raw number of votes for the AKP and the CHP, both of which 
have almost doubled their vote counts. One of the reasons behind this 
development is the natural increase in the number of registered voters; 
however, much more importantly, as Carkoglu (2012: 48) correctly argues, 
this rise can be attributed to the steady meltdown of electoral support for the 
previous centre-right parties. Finally, for the last two elections the vote share 
for both the MHP and BDP has more or less stabilised in the sense that both 






                                                            
8 For the case of the BDP, votes won by independents refer to the party’s votes, since in order 
to escape the high 10% election threshold level in the 2007 and 2011 General Elections, the 
party nominated its candidates as independents. Whilst for the 1999 elections we provide 
the HADEP’s votes, for the 2002 elections independents refer to the DTP’s votes, both of 
which were predecessors of the BDP.  
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Table 3.2: Results of the General Election of Representatives 1999-2011 
 
    1999 2002 2007 2011 
 Participation rate (%)   87.1 79.1 84.2 83.2 







Justice and Development 
Party B - 34.3 46.6 49.8 
  C -   363   341   327 









Republican People's Party B 8.7 19.4 20.9 26.0 
  C -   178   112   135 









Nationalist Movement Party B 18.0 8.4 14.3 13.0 










Independents B 4.7 6.2 5.2 6.6 
  C - - 26 35 
A. Votes received         B. Rate of vote         C. Number of representatives  
Source: Turkish Statistical Institution (TUIK) 
 
Accordingly, in the past decade, all four main parties have more or less 
stabilised their positions. Although one may argue that 10 years is hardly 
sufficient time to come to the conclusion that these parties have managed to 
entrench their places in the system, keeping in mind the fact that they 
represent the major socio-cultural and political tendencies rooted in the 
1960s, and that they are the end results of enduring political experiences, the 
implications are clear. Looking at the results of the last three General 
Elections, the AKP managed to win three consecutive times by increasing its 
vote share extensively. The CHP, on the other hand, has strengthened its 
position as the main opposition party. Whilst the MHP has Turkish 
nationalist sentiments, the BDP has been the major representative of the 
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Kurdish population. Consequently, each faction in the longstanding socio-
cultural cleavages of Turkish politics has finally found representation via a 
single political party for the first time in Turkish political history.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Fractionalization and Volatility of Electoral Support in 
Turkey Source: Author’s calculation; for measuring fractionalisation we use 
Rae’s (1967) fractionalisation index; for electoral volatility Pedersen’s (1979) 
index has been employed; and for the effective number of parliamentary 
parties are measured by using Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) method in 
which the proportion of seats for each party is squared and then summed, 
and the inverse of this provides the effective number of parties. 
 
Needless to say, this development has served to diminish the high levels of 
fragmentation in the system. Moreover, since 2002, electoral volatility scores, 
which show the electorate’s tendency to stick with the same party or move to 
another (Pedersen, 1979), have also experienced a steady decline, together 
with fractionalisation (Figure 3,1). Besides these factors, especially for the 
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Accordingly, two of “the three maladies of the Turkish party system”, 
(Ozbudun, 1981: 74; see also Ozbudun, 2000) namely volatility and 
fragmentation, have finally been cured, which has assisted the stabilisation of 
the parties in the system but not the system as a whole.  
 
There are two major reasons behind this result; on the one hand, as 
political parties have entrenched their position as representatives of 
particular social groups with a focus on particular issue dimension, the third 
malady, polarisation, has deepened significantly and has ultimately created a 
huge gap in the party system. On the other hand, particularly from 2002 to 
2010, the party leadership preferred to follow a political strategy based on 
ossifying constituencies through polarising discourse and by delegitimising 
the opposition. Both factors have led to unprecedented levels of polarisation.  
 
 
3.2. Crisis of Representation in Turkey and Gezi Protests 
3.2.1. Identifying the Gap in Turkish Politics: Polarised Competition  
 
From the early years of the republic, the major socio-cultural cleavages of 
Turkish politics have been determined by attitudes towards religion (Sunni-
Islam versus secularism) and ethnicity (Kurdish versus Turkish ethnicity), 
which in turn have also described left-right self-placements (Kalaycioglu, 
2010 :31). Whilst secularists tend to place themselves on the left, Sunnis have 
placed themselves on the right of the political spectrum (Kalaycioglu, 2008:  
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308-312). On the other hand, Kurdish ethnic nationalists tend to place 
themselves on the extreme left and Turkish nationalists on the extreme right 
(2008: 309). In other words, not only economic divisions but also socio-
cultural cleavages determined by attitudes towards religion and ethnicity 
tend to determine the self-placement of the voters on a left-right dimension. 
Therefore, the left-right continuum denotes more than economic cleavages 
and has strong explanatory power in understanding the nature of party 
system competition in Turkey. Figure 3.2 presents the overall left-right self-
placement of the voters between 2002 and 2010. 
  
 
Figure 3.2: Placement of the Political Parties on the Left-Right Spectrum 
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As can be seen from Figure 3.2, the ideological distance between the 
governing and the main opposition party, CHP, is noticeably wide, and since 
2002 this gap has increased dramatically 3.8 to 5.8, indicating a rising level of 
polarisation. In other words, voters systematically locate the CHP on the left 
of the spectrum and the AKP on the right and the gap between the two 
parties is continuously expanding, creating an “ideological abyss” in the party 
system (Kalaycioglu, 2012).  Similarly, although it is more stable, even the 
distance between the MHP and the BDP is widening. This data can also be 
supported by a recent study which has also indicated that high levels of 
polarisation has been the defining characteristic of Turkish electorate (see 
Baslevent, 2009), and there is a highly polarised and widening ideological 
spread along both religious and ethnic dimensions in the Turkish party 
system. Consequently, although after 2002 the fragmentation of the party 
system diminished, owing to enduring structural problems within the 
regime, the crystallisation of party politics did not end polarisation but 






Figure 3.3: Placement on Turkey’s Left-Right Spectrum, World Values 
Survey 1990-2007 
Source: Tepe 2013, World Values Survey 1990-2007 
 
Although polarisation between parties has always been a facet of Turkish 
politics, never before the 2002 elections had the boundaries between 
different ideological groups been so sharp and severe. A closer look at overall 
trends in the 1990-2007 World Values Survey Data also demonstrates the 
peculiarity of Turkey’s current polarisation levels (Figure 3.3). While in 1990, 
40% of respondents placed themselves at the political centre, this score 
dropped to as low as 13% in 2007, while the percentage of those who placed 
themselves to the right increased from 16% to 36% (Tepe, 2013). Much more 
interestingly, World Values Survey shows that total percentage of those who 
chose 1 and 10, the most extreme positions, has increased from 12% in 1990 
to 24% in 2007, so almost one fourth of the electorate is located at the 
extremes (World Values Survey, 1990-2007). Moreover, with the exception of 


















the brink of civil war, the party leadership had always found ways of 
reconciliation under critical circumstances – the DYP-SHP coalition in 1991, 
the DYP-RP coalition in 1996 and the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition after the 
1999 general elections exemplify this trend. In other words, the centrifugal 
driver that defines mass population was never reflected at the elite level as 
much as today. This is mainly because both Erdoğan and Baykal had a 
political strategy based on ossifying their constituency through polarising 
and dividing the electorate based on political expediency.  
 
 High levels of party system polarisation have already been 
problematised in the literature, arguing that polarisation might intensify 
ideological debates, impair the legitimacy of the regime and destabilise the 
party system (Dalton, 2008: 902). Moreover, high polarisation might also 
increase further radicalisation over time among leaders and supporters alike, 
which is detrimental to democratic consolidation (Morlino, 1998: 349; 
Yardimci-Geyikci, 2015). However, although the negative effects of extreme 
polarisation for party systems – and thus for democracy – have been 
underlined, limited attention has been paid to the problems that arise as a 
result of the electorate losing faith in processes of representation in polarised 






3.2.2. Unrepresented Citizens: Responsiveness Overriding 
Responsibility 
 
As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, the party government model 
suggests that political parties are the key agents of representation which 
provide a linkage between public and political decision-makers (Dalton et al., 
2011; see also Katz, 1987; Ranney, 1954); therefore, representation is one of 
the most critical functions of political parties oriented towards the electorate, 
and it is the key way through which people’s demands find expression 
(Randall and Svasand, 2002). However, as clarified in the theoretical 
framework, representation involves not only popular control of the 
government through periodic and competitive elections but also requires 
providing “for both responsiveness and responsibility in the conduct of 
government” (Birch, 2007: 140). In other words, defined as “acting in the 
best interest of the public” (Manin et al., 1999: 2) or as “acting in the interests 
of the represented in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin, 1967), political 
representation involves the requirement not only to satisfy supporters of the 
party in government but also to act in a consistent and prudent fashion in 
public policymaking. As a result, ensuring responsible government requires 
addressing the wishes and interests of the general public (Birch, 2007: 140). 
Essentially, according to Mair, the key to legitimising a representative 
government in a democratic political system is that the representative and 
governing functions should develop within one agency, namely a political 
party (Mair, 2008). In other words, in order to legitimise their position, 
parties are required to balance the demands of responsiveness and 
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responsibility. Therefore, as argued before, when assessing whether 
representative democracy works properly, it is important to analyse both 
voter-party congruence looking at whether parties provide policy 
alternatives in a wider ideological spectrum and the extent to which all 
groups in society are represented and to discuss whether the government is 
acting both responsively and responsibly in its approach to public policy-
making. Only then can the viability of representative politics be judged. 
 
 However, particularly in unconsolidated democracies, high levels of 
polarisation among elites and masses alike can lead to a crisis of 
representation on two levels. On the one hand, in highly polarised party 
systems the electoral choices are limited to two poles of the political 
spectrum, creating a huge gap in the ideological spectrum. From this 
perspective, a high degree of party system polarisation might leave 
unrepresented certain segments of the electorate that are located at the 
centre and conform to neither pole of the party system, or the ones that are 
not satisfied with the existing parameters of politics. Conversely, when 
polarisation among the general public is manifested at the elite level leading 
to uncompromising attitudes, the divisions in society also become more 
pronounced, which in turn forces political parties – whether in office or in 
opposition – to respond only to their own constituencies. However, it should 
be the role of party government to preserve a balance between the demands 
of responsiveness and responsibility (2008: 10). As clarified before, the 
contention of this research is that crisis of representation occurs not only 
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when certain segments of society feel unrepresented, but also when citizens 
do not believe that their representatives are acting on behalf of the common 
or public good.  
 
 Fundamentally, this is what has happened in Turkey. On the one hand, 
severe polarisation has created a huge gap in the party system, and this gap 
has left unrepresented certain segments of society some of which identify 
themselves with centre politics while others are not satisfied at all with the 
ethnically and religiously defined parameters of left-right spectrum, 
particularly better-educated, politically sophisticated and economically 
sustainable voters. In other words, recent economic growth and development 
over the last eleven years have created new electoral constituencies, the 
urban middle-class, which cut across existing ethnic and religious cleavage 
structures. The major characteristics of this group are high educational 
status, relative economic security and stable employment, and they do not 
anymore feel to be represented by politics based on ethnicity and religiosity.  
 
 The preponderance of Gezi activists sharing these characteristics was 
well-documented by a research project conducted among the protesters 
during the early days of demonstrations.9 According to this research, 35% of 
the protestors were high school graduates, 43% had university degrees and 
13% had post-graduate degrees, while the population averages for Turkey 
                                                            
9 Although the KONDA survey is by no means a perfect data, it is still one of the very few 
research conducted during the protests. Therefore it provides an important instrument to 
understand the profile and demands of the protestors.  
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are 25%, 13% and 1%, respectively. Moreover, 52% of the protestors 
enjoyed stable employment. Here it has to be acknowledged that the Gezi 
protests were first initiated by students along with elements from other 
groups with which the middle classes form alliances. Most important among 
them are university students (37%), retired people (3%), housewives (2%) 
and unemployed youth (6%), who are identified as “peripheral or 
decommodified groups” (Offe, 1985: 834). According to an online survey 
conducted by two academics from Bilgi University, 81.2% of protestors 
define themselves as “libertarian” and 64.5 % as “secular” (Taraf, 2013). 
Similar to new social movements of the late 1960s,10 this new middle class is 
concerned more with individual autonomy, freedom of expression, pluralism, 
respect and basic rights and liberties than with economic development. 
According to the KONDA survey, when the protestors were asked what their 
demands were, 34.1% stated freedom, 18.4% suggested that they were there 
for their rights, 9.7% were against dictatorship and 8% wished for 
democracy and peace.  
 
 Accordingly, their political alternatives conform neither to the 
Kemalist strand of the CHP nor to the Islamic AKP or nationalist MHP but 
instead link to individual autonomy. In other words, this new urban educated 
mass is simultaneously fed up with the AKP’s authoritarianism and with 
inefficient opposition forces. Ethnic and religious politics do not respond to 
the demands of this new constituency, which falls in the centre of the party 
                                                            
10 See Offe “New Social Movements”   
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system both in terms of economic and socio-cultural cleavages, and therefore 
none of the existing parties are capable of representing it accordingly.  
 
 Conversely, particularly since the 2011 General Election, the focus of 
government in its third term has turned inwards and it appears to be 
preoccupied with satisfying its Islamic constituency at the expense of the 
general public. Although in its first term the government’s 
representativeness was questionable (after the 2002 General Election the 
AKP controlled 66% of seats in Parliament with only a 34% share of the 
vote), by acting responsibly – namely by maintaining the EU process at pace, 
achieving macroeconomic stability with low inflation, a low budget deficit 
and stable exchange rates, and by sustaining economic development – the 
AKP government managed to appeal to a broader segment of society, the 
centre-right, the centre and the Islamic constituency. Within this period, by 
applying prudent and consistent political and economic policies,11 the AKP 
government managed to balance the demands of responsiveness and 
responsibility. This was one of the major reasons behind the consolidation of 
AKP’s predominant position (Gumuscu, 2013). 
  
                                                            
11 Here it has to be acknowledged that several scholars argue that the AKP government’s 
democratization agenda was more of a survival strategy against hostile secular 
establishment, lacking genuine commitment to democratization (Cizre “Understand 
Erdogan”). This also applies to the economy. According to Gurkaynak and Boke (2013) the 
AKP government’s success in economic policy was related to government’s strict 
commitment to IMF programme and there is no consistent economic policy developed by the 
AKP independent of the IMF programme.  
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 However, in its current third term, the government has started to 
show signs of losing its command over the cross-ideological coalition. 
Relations with the EU have reached stalemate, and almost no progress has 
been made since the opening of accession negotiations (see Ugur, 2010). As 
for the economy, the average growth rate of Turkish output, which had been 
7.2% in the 2002-2006 periods, decreased to 3.5% between 2007 and 2012, 
thus highlighting a serious shortcoming (Gurkaynak and Boke, 2013). Much 
more importantly, Prime Minister Erdogan’s statements and the policies 
followed by the government have clearly demonstrated the government’s 
intentions toward Islamic social engineering. For instance, at the beginning of 
2012, Erdogan stated clearly that “we want to raise a religious youth” 
(Hurriyet, 2012).  
 
During this period, he has asked families to have at least three 
children, spoken out against abortion, reprimanded TV series for insulting 
Ottoman history and publically announced that anyone who drinks alcohol is 
a “drunkard” (Karaveli, 2013). In practice, the AKP government under 
Erdoğan has not refrained from introducing policies that invade people’s 
privacy, such as prohibiting the sale of alcohol, introducing Koran classes for 
primary school pupils and the revitalisation of Islamic clerical education in 
high schools. Even after the Gezi protests, during which social disaffection 
with the government’s social engineering became apparent, Erdoğan made a 
statement about his distaste for student homes where male and female 
students live together, instructing authorities to inspect these houses 
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(Radikal, 2013). Aiming to enhance his vote share, Erdoğan has also 
continued to use a polarising discourse, referring to his own constituency as 
“we” and others as “they”, the most apparent example of which is his 
statement during the Gezi Park protests directed at the protestors and 
warning them against taking political dispute onto the streets: “There is 50 
per cent and we can barely keep them at home. But we have called on them to 
calm down” (The Guardian, 2013b). All in all, the government has started to 
ignore the demands of an important segment of society which tends to define 
itself as libertarian and secular, not only by attacking lifestyles and 
impoverishing social life but also by neglecting these demands when making 
policy. In other words, by excluding the “other” half of the population who do 
not vote for the AKP, the government has moved from its responsible 
governing role and instead enhanced its representative role, particularly for 
the Islamic community. This also explains why the protests happened then 
and not earlier. 
 
 Although very little is known about how protestors approach political 
parties, a few surveys hint at the crisis of representation – or at least signs 
heading in that direction – and a demand for new politics. According to the 
results of polls conducted by Konda and the Istanbul Bilgi University with 
Gezi Park protesters, more than half of the respondents are either indecisive 
regarding which party to vote for or do not intend to vote (KONDA, 2013) 
and 70% of protestors do not feel close to any political party (Taraf, 2013). A 
significant proportion of respondents (37%) indicate their demands for the 
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establishment of a new political party. Moreover, the protests have spawned 
a new party: the Gezi Party (Kazim, 2013). Although the success of the party 
has no stake in the political structure whatsoever, attempts to establish a 
new political party clearly indicated strong disaffection with the existing 
parties. The long-term impact of the movement on Turkish politics at large, in 
particular on electoral politics, will be discussed in the fourth chapter. But 
here it is sufficient to note that before the Gezi Park protests there had been 
growing dissatisfaction from the ways in which politics function in Turkey, 
particularly among the educated, politically sophisticated and economically 
sustainable voters. And this disaffection found expression in the Gezi Park 
protests. 
 
 Subsequently, the contention is that accounting for the sources of the 
Gezi protests also requires a careful analysis of the party system of the last 
decade, which has significant explanatory power. From this perspective, one 
of the root causes of recent events is the current structure of the party 
system, which suffers from a high degree of polarisation which in turn leads 
to a crisis of representation at two levels. On the one hand, no party is 
capable of filling the acutely growing gap in the Turkish party system, thus 
leaving an important segment of society unrepresented. Conversely, by 
responding to only one pole of the political spectrum in its third term, the 
AKP government has failed to maintain the balance between responsiveness 
and responsibility, therefore losing prudence and consistency in governing 
the country.  
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3.3. Implications for Party System and Democracy in Turkey  
 
The Gezi protests, in which individuals from different backgrounds – anti-
capitalist Muslims, hard-line secularists, Kurdish nationalists, Turkish 
nationalists, Alevis, environmentalists, gay and lesbian groups – stood against 
the government, side by side and regardless of their identity, have 
highlighted the first signs of the transformation of Turkish politics formerly 
shaped dominantly by ethnic and religious cleavages. These groups, 
composed mostly of the urban educated masses, are no longer satisfied with 
an ethnically and religiously polarised party system and they demand new 
politics that evolve around greater democratisation of the country with 
respect to individual freedoms and civil rights rather than identity. 
Furthermore, they ask for a government that is capable of maintaining 
‘responsibility’ in governing. Even just after the protests it has become clear 
that Gezi will have significant repercussions for the future of both the party 
system and democratic politics at large. In this section rather than focusing 
on the actual impact of Gezi on Turkish party system and politics at large 
which will be examined in chapter four, we provide a picture of Turkish party 
system back then and discuss the direction that Gezi movement has pointed 






3.3.1. Turkish Party System  
 
First of all, the inability of political parties to represent the urban educated 
mass, and the failure of government to act responsibly, have signified the 
urgent need either for a new opposition party or effective policy changes in 
the existing ones. Clearly, existing parameters of Turkish politics do not 
respond to the demands of this politically sophisticated, economically 
sustainable urban group. The prospects of a new political party seemed to be 
low thanks to strict electoral rules and regulations, most important of which 
is the 10% electoral threshold.  
 
On the other hand, just after the protests the prospects of change in 
the existing parties also had very low probability. First, the AKP’s reaction 
was extremely harsh and the party denied any link with the movement. The 
reaction of Erdogan to the Gezi protestors, insisting that their actions were 
instigated by foreign forces that envy the “Turkish economic miracle,” and 
naming them as terrorists and/or traitors (Bloomberg, 2013), demonstrated 
the clear inability of the AKP to hear the voices of the disaffected population, 
let alone respond to their demands. As for the MHP and the BDP, both parties 
were stuck in ethnic politics. In the first days of the protests, the leader of the 
MHP, Bahceli, did not refrain from forming a direct link between the Gezi 
protests, the PKK and the Kurdish opening process (Haber 7, 2013). Although 
later he changed his tone and criticised the government for not hearing the 
demands of the masses and for using excessive police force, he continued to 
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express his disapproval of the demonstrations, claiming that MHP youth did 
not participate in the protests and will not do so (Milliyet, 2013a). The 
reaction of the party clearly indicates the limits of the MHP in going beyond 
ethnicity-based politics (see Onis, 2003 for a detailed analysis of the MHP). 
The BDP, on the other hand, is ostensibly the representative of the Kurdish 
population in Turkey and is concerned more with the civil and political rights 
of Kurdish people. Although a prominent figure from the party, Sırrı Süreyya 
Önder, played a leading role in the first days of the Gezi Park protests by 
publicising the issue, as they became nationwide and attracted millions of 
people, the BDP preferred to remain aloof from the protests, suspecting that 
they would jeopardise peace talks launched between Abdullah Öcalan and 
the government. From this perspective, the BDP was also unable to respond 
the Gezi protests. The CHP’s major predicament, on the other hand, was the 
strong hold of Kemalists, some of whom insist on old-style politics based on 
the regime question.  
 
Although this was the general picture of political environment back 
then, things have changed in time. Particularly, the sprinter of the BDP, the 
HDP has turned into one of the main actors that try to capitalise the Gezi Park 
protests in that the party has built the foundation of its presidential and 
general election campaigns on the demands and expectations of Gezi 
movement. With the aim of turning into a party of Turkey and widening their 
electorate, the HDP has targeted disaffected voters of the Gezi protests and in 
doing so they adapted the discourse of Gezi which provided the HDP with 
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perfect means to become more than a regional actor. Conversely, the CHP has 
also interacted with the movement in that the party tried to go beyond 
ethnically and religiously polarised politics and also increase the 
participatory mechanisms in decision-making procedures inside the party. 
The ways in which Gezi movement has interacted with electoral politics will 
be discussed more in detail in chapter four.  
 
3.3.2. Future of Democracy  
 
Conversely, although many commentators have been rather quick to question 
the viability of Turkish democracy and the portrayal of the country as a 
model for the Middle East (see Al Arabiya, 2013; Sallam, 2013), it can be 
argued that the Gezi protests have marked a new threshold for democratic 
politics in the country (see also Gole, 2013). First of all, the emergence of a 
new generation of political activists, who take the initiative to express 
discontent and frustration with the government, is a highly favourable 
development for Turkish democracy which has been punctuated previously 
by several military interventions. Essentially, this has been a call for new 
forms of active citizenship and participatory democracy. Accordingly, the 
organisation of forums in the parks all around the country after the protests 
indicates very ably the inadequacy of electoral democracy in meeting the 
demands of a population which calls for greater participation. Secondly, the 
Turkish party system has suffered for a long period of time from ethnic and 
religious politics as a result of deep-seated socio-cultural divisions within 
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society. For the first time in republican history, society has clearly 
demonstrated its distaste for old-style politics, and this call from the 
population has the ability to heal the long-lasting malady of the Turkish party 
system: polarisation. Overall, although in the beginning the government’s 
response to the protests has increased qualms about the quality of 
democracy in the country, just in two years of time Gezi protests have already 
started to redefine the parameters of Turkish politics. The very fact that the 
population at large has finally discovered active citizenship and is ready to 
question, oppose and criticise their political elites – both of which are major 
attributes of an advanced democracy- has gave positive signs about the 





This chapter has provided the first case study analysis of the research in that 
it accounted for Gezi Park protests in Turkey within the framework of party 
politics. In the first section, the dynamics of party system in Turkey has been 
discussed. Herein, a picture of Turkish party system in the last decade was 
delineated, arguing that party system has reached certain level of 
entrenchment. However, thanks to high levels of polarisation party system 
leaves certain segments of society unrepresented. Then, the nature of crisis 
of representation that takes place in Turkey is clarified. The large gap in 
Turkish politics leaving important portion of society unrepresented and the 
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ways in which the AKP government fails to meet the demands of 
responsibility were discussed, referring to the major events happened in 
recent years. Finally, the implications of the protest movement on Turkish 
party system and democracy have been discussed. The contention is that 
population at large tried to make their voices heard through unconventional 
means not only because they lost trust in representatives – political parties- 
and feel unrepresented but also because party in government has failed to 
fulfil its major function of providing for both responsiveness and 
responsibility in public policy-making, creating a crisis of representation in 
the country. The detailed analysis of the ways in which the Gezi movement 























The Indignados movement or better known as 15M movement12 in Spain has 
been one of the first occupy-style mobilizations in Europe that has gained 
global visibility. Though several studies focused on the 15M movement as the 
leading protests that initiated many others, they tend to comprehend these 
protests within the confines of global economic crisis of 2008 which had 
significant repercussions on Spanish economy.  
 
 However, this research seeks to locate these protests within a wider 
party politics’ view and to provide a political account of the protests. We 
argue that, as was the case in Turkey, in Spain the failure of parties to fulfil 
their role of balancing the demands of responsiveness and responsibility at 
the same time has been one of the major factors, if not the only one, behind 
the emergence of mass protests in the country. Following the general 
premises of this research, the contention is that political unrest and 
                                                            
12 Name 15M comes from the date of first mass demonstrations, 15th of May 2011, which 
was followed up by occupation of Puerto del Sol.   
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widespread protests in Spain result mainly from a crisis of representation 
experienced at two different levels: on the one hand, convergence of political 
parties in the ideological spectrum has turned political contenders alike 
which in turn reduced their ability to respond wider segments of society, 
while on the other due to the pressures of globalization the governments’ 
space of manoeuvre, whether to be led by the PSOE or the PP, has become 
limited, and therefore they lost touch with the electorate and become 
incapable of giving voice to the people, thus failing to fulfil their fundamental 
function of representation. This second empirical chapter also, first, provides 
the historical background and then demonstrates how crisis of 
representation occurs in actual case of Spain. 
 
 
A Brief Look into 15M Movement    
 
The Indignados movement or better known as 15M movement in Spain has 
had important implications on the ways in which Spanish politics develop 
since then. Before discussing the factors behind these mass protests, a brief 
account of what happened in Spain will make it easier to comprehend the 




In Spain particularly after 2008 global financial crisis, the population 
were largely affected by the housing bubble (Knight, 2012).13 Suffering from 
a highly indebted banking sector, huge unemployment rate (rising up to 
51.5% among youth), and high level of total deficit corresponding to 8.5% of 
the GDP (BBC, 2012) together with the failure of party system to respond the 
economic crisis effectively have created widespread popular disaffection in 
the country. In February 2011, university collectives were organised around 
a forum called “Youth without Future” (Juventud Sin Futuro) through social 
media outlets. On the other hand, in March 2011 an organization named 
“Real Democracy Now” (Democracia Real Ya) was founded by young people, 
who have proper jobs but also not sure about their future. Unsatisfied with 
the failure of democratic politics in including wider segments of population 
in decision-making processes, these two groups have organized a mass 
demonstration on 15th of May 2011 against the ineffective two party system, 
the corruption in the banking sector, and incapable trade unions (El Pais, 
2011).  
 
 With the slogans “Real Democracy Now!” (¡Democracia Real Ya!), 
“They don’t represent us!” (¡Que No Nos Representan!)  and “We are not the 
puppets of politicians and bankers” (No somos marionetas / mercancía en 
manos de políticos y banqueros), the demonstrations received widespread 
popular support. The protests took place in several cities all around Spain 
                                                            
13 Housing bubble refers to massive growth of real estate prices observed. Between 1996 and 
2007, the prices of property tripled and after the bubble was popped they experienced 
steady decline leaving millions of over-indebted home-owners.  
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and more than six million people joined demonstrations (RTVE, 2011). 
Although the triggering factor behind the demonstrations seems to be the 
economic turbulence the country has been experiencing for the last couple of 
years and many analyses approach the question on the basis of the economic 
crisis, the underlying motive of protestors is also related to the long-lasting 
disaffection with the electoral politics. Basically, according to the majority of 
the population, elections have failed to function as a mechanism for inclusive 
democratic representation which in turn has made people search for other 
ways of making their voices heard (Kselman, 2013). Therefore, as the slogans 
of these protests such as ‘no nos representa’ (‘you don’t represent us’), ‘la 
lucha esta en la calle’ (‘the struggle is in the street’) and ‘democracia real 
ya’ (‘real democracy now’) point, the political roots of the protests needs to 
be contextualised. 
 
4.1. Party System in Spain 
4.1.1. Politics in Spain since Transition 
 
In order to understand the process by which mainstream political parties fail 
to fulfil their role of responding the demands of population at large, it is 
important to provide a brief look into the development of Spanish politics 
from democratic transition onwards.  
 
 With the end of the period of the Franco dictatorship in 1975, the 
process of democratic transition began in Spain. The process of democratic 
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transition in the country is defined as an elite-led transition which is mostly 
shaped by negotiation and consensus rather than intense competition and 
conflict (see Chari and Heywood, 2008; McLaren, 2008).  The wide 
agreement on the rules of the game among different groups in Spain and high 
levels of political consensus in the absence of anti-system parties made 
constitutional settlement a smooth process (Pridham, 1990). Although the 
role of Juan Carlos, the King of Spain, should not be underestimated who has 
been an ardent supporter of the development of constitutional monarchy, the 
key actor of settlement was the governing party, the Union of Democratic 
Centre (Union de Centro Democratico, UCD) who led the country from 1977 to 
1982. In the beginning, the UCD was an electoral coalition of the Christian 
democratic, social democratic, and liberal parties which in time evolved into 
a political party in the eve of 1977 elections. The UCD was led by Adolfo 
Suarez, a political figure with high levels of popularity among Spanish voters, 
who successfully managed to dismantle Franco’s authoritarian regime. The 
UCD was “ideologically heterogeneous: its leaders included social democrats 
of the centre-left, Christian democrats of the centre-right and right, liberals 
advocating free-market economics and liberal social values, as well as others 
with more eclectic ideological predispositions” (Gunther and Hopkin, 2002: 
201). 
  
 Suarez’s major strategy for transition process was to form a broadest 
coalition possible and to pursue reform process by a centrist party. Besides 
the UCD, there were three other parties in the system: Spanish Socialist 
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Worker’s Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol, PSOE), Communist Party 
of Spain (Partido Comunista Espanol, PCE), and Popular Alliance (Alianza 
Popular, AP). However, the UCD managed to lead the system thanks to its 
ability to appeal different segments of population at the same time until its 
demise in 1982. Throughout this process, the UCD played a major role in 
designing the constitution on the basis of a national reconciliation between 
left and right. According to Eddles (1998), the major goal for political elites 
was to avoid the recurrence of a Civil War experienced in 1930s wherein high 
levels of polarization had created massive radicalization over time and led to 
one of the worst civil wars in the European continent. 
 
 However, following the outstanding electoral defeat in 1982 general 
elections, the UCD collapsed and the party was disbanded in 1983. According 
to Gunther and Hopkin, the failure of party can be explained on the basis of 
two fundamental problems that were inherent to the UCD from the very 
beginning (Gunther and Hopkin, 2002: 202-203). First, aiming to appeal 
broader segments of the electorate, they failed to form their own electoral 
constituency and to create a political identity for the party. Accordingly, in 
time it became more and more difficult for the party organization to keep 
different factions under a vaguely defined identity (Gunther et al., 1988). 
Secondly, the UCD was a leader-dominated one and Suarez himself was keen 
to create a highly centralized party but this in turn hampered party’s ability 




Another important development in the Spanish party system that 
challenged the dominant position of the UCD was the shift in the PSOE’s 
ideological position from rigid Marxism into moderate centre-left thanks to 
which the PSOE managed to attract the UCD electorate, centre-oriented 
voters, as well as leftist ones in 1982 general elections (Pollack, 1983; 
Bernardo, 1984).  
 
Winning absolute majority in parliament in 1982 and 1986 and half of 
the seats in 1989, the PSOE managed to occupy central place in Spanish 
political landscape for more than a decade. Accordingly, the PSOE led the 
country from 1982 to 1996 until when they were defeated to the PP. 
Throughout this period of time, Spain entered the European Economic 
Community in 1986 and Spanish democracy consolidated due to stability 
achieved under single-party government of the PSOE for relatively long 
period of time (Holman, 1996). Although the PSOE portrayed itself as a 
centre-left party, they mainly followed a neoliberal path in that the PSOE 
governments adopted austerity measures and monetarist policies which are 
mostly followed by parties of the centre-right (McLaren, 2008). 
  
The People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP), the forerunner of the 
People’s Alliance (Alianza Popular, AP), managed to win 1996 elections and 
formed a minority government. In the process of the democratic transition, 
the AP was one of the major forces in Spanish political landscape. However, 
since leading figures of Francoist regime were members of the party, it was 
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generally perceived as the representative of former authoritarian regime 
(Pollack and Hunter, 1987). Fed up with dictatorship under Franco, the 
electoral support of the AP in the first democratic elections of 1977 and 1979 
was 8.8% and 9% respectively. However, in 1979 the party had entered a 
process of change and transformation. The demise of the UCD was also a 
positive development for the AP since in the absence of the UCD, the political 
landscape suffered from a lack of viable alternative in the centre-right of the 
political spectrum.  
 
With the rise of a new leader, Jose Maria Aznar, after some trials and 
mergers, the party’s name was changed and became the People’s Party (PP) 
in 1989. The major success of Aznar was to transform the PP from a party of 
former authoritarian regime into a catch-all centre-right party which would 
offer a credible alternative to the already discredited Socialist government 
led by the PSOE (Woodworth, 2004). Starting from 1989 elections the PP has 
moderated its tone on advocating a unitary conception of Spain, introduced a 
programme with a better welfare approach, and even respected the de-
penalisation of abortion which was a critical move for a strongly conservative 
party like the PP (Magone, 2009). Although the party managed to win the 
1996 elections (see Balfour, 1996 for a detailed analysis of 1996 elections), it 
could not get absolute majority and this forced Aznar to moderate party’s 
stance further, particularly with regards to its position on the state of 
autonomies (Magone, 2009). This was also because in order to form a 
government, the PP “had to rely on parliamentary support from Catalan, 
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Canary and (for a while) the Basque nationalist parties” (Colomer, 2001: 490) 
which in turn automatically forced party to follow a moderate position. 
According to Tussell, from 1993 to 2000 the PP has moved from an almost 
extreme right wing political party into a democratic, centrist and Christian 
democratic one and this was a great achievement for a political force that 
represented rigid conservative subculture of Spain (cited in Colomer 2001: 
153). Moreover, within the same period of time the PP has also become an 
integral part of European People’s Party in the European Parliament which 
also manifests the degree of transformation the party has experienced. 
 
Table 4.1: General Election Results and Distribution of Seats in Spain 
 
  1977 1979 1982 1986 1989 1993 1996 2000 2004 2008 
UCD Vote 34,6 35 6,5 - - - - - - - 
  Seat 166 168 12 - - - - - - - 
PSOE Vote 29,3 30,5 48,4 44,1 39,9 38,7 37,5 34,1 42,6 43,5 
  Seat 118 121 202 184 175 175 141 125 164 169 
AP/PP Vote 8,8 6,1 26,5 26 25,9 34,8 38,9 44,6 37,6 40,1 
  Seat 16 9 106 105 107 157 157 183 148 153 
PCE/IU/IU-
ICV 
Vote 9,4 10,8 4 4,61 9,1 9,57 10,6 5,5 5,0 3,8 
  Seat 20 23 4 7 17 18 21 8 5 2 
 
 
From 1996 until the historical elections of 2000 when the PP won the 
absolute majority, the PP enjoyed a successful governing period due to “the 
positive management of the economy, the restoration of social dialogue and 
the further development of the state of autonomies” all of which 
demonstrated that the PP is a trustworthy political alternative that can 
respond centrist electoral constituency in Spain (2001: 154). Under the PP 
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government, Spain was further liberalized and the country managed to enter 
the Economic and Monetary Union of the EU in 1999 which was a significant 
step for further integration of Spain to the club of developed countries 
(Magone, 2003). Gilmour (2005) argues that the success of the PP lies in its 
ability to combine centrist ideology as well as Christian overtones with that 
of economic liberalism. Accordingly, the party has entered 2000 general 
elections within this positive environment and under the leadership of Aznar 
it has also become a party which can appeal young voters, and therefore were 
confident to use the slogan “Espana va bien!” (Spain is doing well!) (Roller, 
2001: 220).  
 
From the first elections onwards, the only significant party in the 
system, besides two major parties of the PSOE and the PP, was the United 
Left (Izquierda Unida, IU) which was established as an electoral coalition of 
the PCE and smaller leftist factions. But later on particularly with the fall of 
communism in 1990s, the IU emerged as a separate political identity. From 
the end of 1970s to the beginning of 2000s the party’s vote share on average 
remained around 6-7%, reaching up to a maximum of 10% in 1996. 
Analysing the distribution of the votes, it is observed that the IU has 
increased its vote share particularly when the popularity of the PSOE 
decreases and vice versa. However, the party never managed to stand as a 
viable alternative for the centrist voters; therefore besides their success in 
2000 elections to form an electoral coalition with the PSOE, the IU was 
mainly left in margins of Spanish political landscape. 
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 The major political actors of the process of democratic consolidation 
from 1986 to 2000s have been the PSOE and the PP, and throughout this 
period party system in Spain is stabilised and consolidated as a moderate 
two-party system wherein the political competition is mostly centripetal. 
Here, the position of regionalist-nationalist parties also needs to be clarified. 
One of the greatest achievements of Spanish democracy has been its ability to 
contain regionalist-nationalist parties in the political system (Pallares and 
Keaten, 2003). Although total vote share of two major parties is around 75-
80% in general elections, around 10 to 12% of total vote is received by 
several regionalist parties whose votes are concentrated in regional 
strongholds (Magone, 2009: 149).  
 
All that is said, smooth transition to democracy has facilitated 
consolidation process in Spain and party system which was previously 
defined by extremism and polarization has become a symbol of political 
moderation in the post-Franco period. According to Encarnacion (2008: 51), 
three factors account for the transformation of Spanish party system from 
contention to moderation. First, past experiences of extreme polarization 
made party leaders from both left and right stay away from ideological 
rigidity. Secondly, the transformation of Spanish left from rigid Marxism into 
what is called Euro-communism or social democracy made it easier for 
socialist party to appeal wider segments of population. Finally, troubled by 
the civil war and its devastating consequences, from the very beginning of 
democratic transition Spanish electorate has demanded the moderation in 
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4.1.2. Spanish Party System in the 2000s                   
 
In this section, the last decade of Spanish politics will be discussed briefly and 
we depict the major dynamics of political competition in Spain. 
Understanding the maladies of Spanish politics require a careful examination 
of the 2000s when the seeds of social and political unrest have been planted 
and the inability of two major parties in responding the demands of 
population became evident leading to mass public withdrawal from 
conventional political structures.  
 
As briefly discussed above, the 2000s began with the PP’s electoral 
success who managed to gain absolute majority of seats in the parliament in 
the 2000 general elections. According to Colomer, three major factors 
account for the PP’s success: “the governing record of the PP, the 
disproportionality in representation produced by the electoral system,14 and 
strategic mistakes by the main opposition party, the PSOE” (Colomer, 2001: 
490). First, as discussed in the previous section, following an economic policy 
of liberalization, under the PP government, Spain enjoyed sustainable growth 
levels together with lower unemployment rates all of which facilitated the 
                                                            
14 The electoral system in Spain will be discussed more in detail in the following sections.  
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process of joining the euro in 1999 (see Powell, 2003). Accordingly, the 
macroeconomic success achieved under Aznar paid off with substantial 
electoral support for the PP.  Moreover, despite its vigorous nationalist 
identity, the PP government also formed better relations with regionalist-
nationalist parties and particularly the tense relations with ETA were 
appeased and ETA “maintained a cease-fire lasting fourteen months, the 
longest period without political killings in recent Spanish history” (Colomer, 
2001: 491). This in return demonstrated that the PP denied its Francoist past 
and adopted a moderate centre right position.  
 
Conversely, two major issues challenged the position of the PSOE as a 
credible alternative in the 2000 elections. First, the party failed to select a 
widely supported and credible leader (2001: 491). Although Joaquin Almunia 
failed to win primary elections, he became the PSOE’s prime ministerial 
candidate due to corruption scandal that forced Jose Borrell, winner of 
primaries, to resign (2001: 491). Secondly and much importantly, just before 
the elections the PSOE formed an electoral coalition with the IU that affected 
the PSOE’s electoral fortunes adversely. Coalition with the IU was regarded as 
a shift in PSOE’s ideological position from centre, centre-left towards radical 
left and this in turn alienated centrist voters who voted for the PSOE in the 
previous elections and these voters switched to the PP (Magone, 2009).  
 
However, all these votes and even more returned to the PSOE in 2004 
general elections. According to elections results the PSOE emerged victorious 
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receiving 42.59% of the votes and the PP garnered 37.71% of total votes. 
Although many claims that the major factor behind the historic electoral 
defeat of the PP in 2004 was the Madrid bombings occurred on the 11 March 
just three days before the elections, Blakeley (2006) rightfully argues that the 
change of government was resulted from a myriad of political developments 
though the bombings acted as a catalyst. He relates the PP’s electoral defeat 
to two factors: “a growing disdain for public opinion and an increase in 
manipulation” by the PP government (2006: 332). While “by disdain for 
public opinion” Blakeley points to the PP government’s disregard of popular 
opposition particularly to the Spanish involvement in Iraq War, manipulation 
refers to the ways in which the government manipulated information about 
certain events (such as the Iraq War and Madrid bombings) and instead 
preferred to follow a strategy of providing disinformation in order to 
delegitimize opposition by using state television channel (2006: 332).  
 
Here, the impact of Aznar’s decision to join Iraq War next to American 
forces, in particular, played a significant role (see Rigo, 2005; Chari, 2004). 
While population at large (around 90%) was against military intervention in 
Iraq and sending of Spanish troops to Iraq (Blakeley, 2006), Aznar insisted on 
Atlanticist foreign policy and sided with the US, leaving aside traditional 
European Union foreign policy stance of Spain (Woodworth, 2004). 
Essentially, this was one of the major points upon which the PSOE built its 
electoral campaign. With a new programme named ‘Spain in the world’, “a 
key pledge of the PSOE, which was popular amongst voters, was to withdraw 
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Spanish troops from Iraq” (Blakeley, 2006: 338). Needless to say, the role of 
Madrid bombings should not be underestimated which reinforced and 
intensified already existent uneasiness with Spanish intervention in Iraq and 
therefore had enormous impact on the election results (Colomer, 2005: 152). 
Moreover, the PP government’s way of dealing with bombings, which insisted 
that the ETA was behind the disaster without any evidence that points to that 
direction, also created further outrage and decreased credibility of the PP 
government in the eyes of people (Blakeley, 2006). The outcome was a clear 
electoral victory for the PSOE led by a new leader, Jose Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero. 
 




The first striking move of the PSOE government was to withdraw Spanish 
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first term, Zapatero initiated an ambitious progressive reform programme 
(Field and Botti, 2013). First, the government introduced a gender equality 
act, same-sex marriages are legalized (Encarnacion, 2009), autonomy of 
political regions has been expanded (Field and Botti, 2013), historical 
memory of Republican side during the Civil War was acknowledged (Martín 
and Urquizu-Sancho, 2012), and various social policies were introduced 
(Field, 2009). All these developments received substantive support from 
population at large. Several commentators have argued that Spain has 
experienced ‘second transition’ under Zapatero (see Encarnacion, 2009; see 
Field, 2009 for opposite view). But with regards to economy, though 
Zapatero government was aware of the problems with Spanish economy 
which is mainly based on consumption and construction, the Socialist 
government was reluctant to act on these problems and rather “preferred to 
prolong the period of economic expansion” (Field and Botti, 2013: 2). 
Accordingly, economic success together with better social policies increased 
government’s approval rates.  
 
Within this positive environment, the PSOE enjoyed another election 
victory in 2008 and managed to form a minority government once again. The 
results of 2008 elections were particularly important in the sense that both 
the PSOE and the PP increased their vote share, and therefore highest vote 
concentration was achieved since transition to democracy (2013: 3; see also 
Torcal and Lago, 2008). This suggests that two-party system in Spain was 
further entrenched by the 2008 elections and two centrist parties have 
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dominated Spanish political landscape which demonstrates the extent to 
which Spanish politics is cartelized. In its second term the PSOE government 
faced with the worst economic crisis of last 80 years which adversely affected 
international economy as a whole. Spanish economy was one of those 
economies that have been challenged most because of the country’s 
structural economic weaknesses, such as low productivity and 
competitiveness, and also because of the economic model followed for the 
last decades mainly based on construction and consumption (see Royo, 2009; 
Molina and Godino, 2013). All in all, Spanish economy has almost collapsed 
leading to high levels of unemployment and economic recession. Most 
strikingly, youth unemployment rate in Spain has increased enormously 
since 2008 reaching up to 56.40% in 2013 (Ottaviani, 2014).  
 
Though the PSOE was in power during the economic crisis and 
Zapatero has been criticized for his failure to respond the crisis on time and 
for underestimating its impact, Field and Botti suggest that Spain’s economic 
model was not the invention of the PSOE only but both the PP and the PSOE 
were behind this policy and therefore have equal responsibility (Field and 
Botti, 2013: 5). This was also general sentiment among population that 
started to perceive two major parties as incompetent and incapable of 
representing public’s interests. The best behavioural demonstration of 
disaffection with politics was the emergence of 15M movement in March 
2011, four months before the general elections. Normally elections were 
planned to occur in March 2012 but Zapatero decided to call for an early 
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elections in July 2011 not only because economic problems forced 
government to take an action, but also because the decreasing popularity of 
Zapatero extremely harmed the PSOE therefore the best move for the party 
was to enter the elections as soon as possible with a new and more popular 
party leader, Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba – the Interior Minister of the PSOE 
government (Chari, 2013). 
 
Table 4.3: 2011 Election Results 
Party  
Votes  Seats 
Number of Votes  %  ± % Won  +/- 
PP 10.866.566 44,6 +4.69 186 +32 
PSOE 7.003.511 28,8 -15.11 110 -69 
IU-LV 1.686.040 6,92 +3.15 11 +9 
UpyD 1.143.225 4,7 +3.51 5 +4 
Amaiur 334.498 1,37 New 7 +7 
Compromís-
Q 125.306 0,51 +0.39 1 +1 
 
Needless to say, the key issue that dominated 2011 elections was the severe 
economic crisis the country has been experiencing.  Although after two 
elections losses in 2004 and 2008 the PP under Mariona Rajoy was the 
favourite, starting from 2011 high levels of distrust and disaffection with 
both parties were apparent among general public. However, leading the 
country for the last 7 years the PSOE was the major actor at the forefront of 
criticisms and electorate lost their confidence to the party. The PP, on the 
other hand, was seen as a relatively credible alternative having side-lined 
from governing in the previous period. Nevertheless, it has to be underlined 
that though Rajoy built his electoral campaign on the promise of solving the 
125 
 
problem of economic crisis, he was also unable to state how the PP would 
manage to do this and preferred not to respond important issues such as 
“how the PP was going to attain its promised levels of public spending 
without raising taxes” (2013: 378). The PSOE, conversely, focused on 
defending government’s take on the crisis and accused the PP for having a 
secret agenda aimed at cutting social spending (2013: 379).  
 
In the elections the PP received 44.6% of votes while the PSOE’s vote 
share decreased down to 28.7%, the worst result the party has experienced 
since transition to democracy. Although looking at results one might suggest 
that electorate continued to rely on mainstream parties in the sense that the 
PP, one of two major parties, managed to win majority, the very fact that 
smaller parties such as the IU, Union Progress and Democracy (Union 
Progreso y Democracia, UPyD), Amaiur, and Commitment Coalition (Coalicio 
Compromis, COMPROMIS-Q) also received unexpected support indicates that 
electorate started to search for other alternatives. Accordingly, the decrease 
in vote concentration also manifests dissatisfaction with two-party system. 
While the rise of the IU is not so unexpected keeping in mind that the party 
has always increased its vote share whenever the PSOE’s vote percentage 
decreases, the UPyD’s success, a progressive party which denied to place 
itself on either left or right, particularly points to electorate’s cry for different 
actors.  Moreover, the turnout level was 71.7% which also suggests that an 




Accordingly, several scholars suggested that the PP did not win the 
elections but the PSOE lost in that the PP managed to get around 500.000 
more votes than previous elections while the PSOE lost half of its votes 
corresponding to approximately 4.300.000 votes (Martin and Urquizu 
Sancho, 2012). In other words, while one of the major parties is rejected, the 
other one could not receive all of the gains (Chari, 2013: 378) and this 
signifies that two-party system is not able to respond the demands of 
population anymore. Even the PP’s success should be analysed by keeping in 
mind the electoral rules and regulations in Spain which favour larger parties 
and were designed to prevent fragmentation with closed D’Hondt, low 
district magnitude and 3% electoral threshold and thereby limit the role of 
new actors in political landscape. 
 
The major actors of Spanish political scene were the PP and the PSOE 
which led the processes of social and economic change throughout 2000s. 
However, the failure of two parties to respond one of the worst economic 
crises the country has experienced created popular unrest and disaffection 
with mainstream politics.  
 
 
4.2. Crisis of Representation: No Los Representan 
 
The focus of this research is to reveal party-related factors behind mass 
protests in Turkey and Spain and to understand party failures which created 
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a crisis of representation. As discussed in the previous section, towards the 
end of 2000s, in Spain both subjective and behavioural components of citizen 
disaffection from politics has become apparent, on the one hand, large 
number of citizens were unhappy with the existing political parties and they 
lost their belief that representatives are acting on behalf of their constituents 
(Mainwaring et al., 2006: 33), and on the other, they started to withdraw 
from participation, voted for new parties (for instance UPyD or Podemos in 
European elections), and organised popular mobilisation.  
 
The contention here is that the major factor, if not the only one, behind 
citizen disaffection and follow-up mass protests is crisis of representation 
experienced in Spanish politics at two levels: first, convergence of political 
parties in the ideological spectrum left individualized voters with diversified 
and complex demands unrepresented, and second as parties lost their 
control over policy-making due to the forces of globalisation they lost contact 
with the electorate further and have failed to act responsive.  
 
Essentially, the case of Spain is the opposite of Turkey in the sense 
that although both cases suffer from a crisis of representation, in Turkey 
divergence of parties together with the lack of responsibility on the side of 
government led to a crisis. As follows, first, the gradual convergence of 
political parties in the ideological spectrum in Spain and the difficulty parties 
face in responding diversified electorate will be discussed, and then we will 
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examine the dynamics of party failures in balancing the demands of 
responsibility and responsiveness at the same time.  
 
 
4.2.1. Identifying the Gap in Spanish Politics: All Parties Alike  
 
From the early years of democratic transition onwards, Spanish politics is 
largely shaped by politics of consensus wherein the centripetal competition 
has been a defining feature of party system. Gunther et.al. (1988: 390) argue 
that six factors characterise the Spanish party system:  
(1) the interaction of voters’ attitudinal predispositions with their 
perceptions of each parties’ ideological stance; (2) voters feelings 
towards party leaders; (3) the effects of electoral laws; (4) the effects 
of each party’s infrastructural organization; (5) the nature of the post-
Franco transition to democracy; and (6) the advantages of 
incumbency and the politics of consensus.  
 
Particularly, voters’ attitudinal predispositions, the effects of electoral laws 
and the nature of the post-Franco transition to democracy seem be the major 
factors behind high levels of centrism in Spanish politics. Keeping in mind 
that the electoral laws are designed during transition, we can analyse three 
factors under two major headings: institutional design and public demands. 
On the one hand, during the transition to democracy, with horrors of the Civil 
War in mind elites aimed to create a system based on compromise and 
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consensus. Conversely, the Spanish public has always yearned for consensual 
politics, supported centre politics and denied any form of radicalism.  
 
The process of democratic transition in Spain was particularly 
important to understand current outcome. After all, the founding moments of 
the party system formation have been critically important for the type of 
party system to emerge (Van Biezen, 2005).  
  
 Several scholars of democratization also argue that institutional 
design constitutes the most appropriate tool for managing existing social 
divisions (see Bastian and Luckham, 2003; Lijphart and Waisman, 1996; 
Robinson and White, 1998; Power and Gasiorowski, 1997). As discussed 
previously, in the case of Spain elites played the key role in the democratic 
transition and they were determined to consolidate the power of executive in 
order to prevent any possibility of fractionalisation (Blakeley, 2006: 331). 
Therefore, in the process of transition designers of the electoral system 
sought to prevent fraction and contention in society by limiting 
proportionality of the system. As d’Hondt system becomes less proportional 
the smaller the constituency, they managed to decrease proportionality of the 
system through creating smaller electoral constituencies based on fifty 
provinces of Spain plus North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla (Magone, 
2009: 134). Accordingly, although the electoral system of the new Spanish 
democracy is based on proportional representation, thanks to low district 
magnitude, closed list d’Hondt, high levels of over-representation of rural 
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provinces and 3% threshold for each magnitude, it is “one of less 
proportional electoral systems in Europe” (Chari, 2013: 378). Needless to 
say, while this electoral system favours larger parties such as the PSOE and 
the PP as well as regionalist-nationalist ones, it adversely affects smaller 
nation-wide parties like the IU (Magone, 2009). In other words, the 
institutional system itself has reinforced less fragmented system and 
therefore played a key role in the creation of two-party system. 
 
Table 4.4: Distribution of the PP and the PSOE Voters on a Left-
Right Scale in 2000 
 
Source: J.M. Magone (2009) Contemporary Spanish Politics 
 
However, this institutional explanation needs to be supported with 
sociological approach mainly because movement toward the centre among 
the PSOE and the PP cannot only be understood by looking at the 






















European continent, Spanish public has always been apprehensive of any 
kind of extremism and this embraced consensual politics. That is why high 
levels of centre tendency among the population have also pushed parties 
towards centrism. Accordingly, when we look at the data on the distribution 
of the PP voters together with the data on the distribution of the PSOE voters, 
what we see is that in 2000 almost 90% of the PP voters are centre-centre 
right and more than 85% of the PSOE voters belong to centre-centre left of 
the political spectrum. This data can also be supported by the European 
Social Survey data according to which average ideological position among 
Spanish public is 4.55 (on a scale from 1 to 10) in 2008 (ESS 2008). 
Furthermore, as Figure 4.1 demonstrates, according to Latinobarometer from 
1996 to 2010 on average more than 40% of Spanish electorate can be defined 
as centre voters. All these data demonstrate that the demand for centrism 
was quite strong among Spanish public and this fact has also played a key 
role in the emergence of centripetal political competition in the country. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Placement of Voters on Spain’s Left-Right Spectrum 














Here it is also important to refer the limited impact of social cleavages on 
voting behaviour in Spain (see Barnes et al., 1985; Gunther et al., 1986). 
Although Chhibber and Torcal (1997) argued that this has changed and the 
PSOE managed to turn social class into a salient political division towards the 
end of 1980s, when we analyse the general trend in Spanish politics 
throughout 1990s and 2000s what we see is that social cleavages do not have 
significant effect on party politics and both the PP and the PSOE managed to 
attract voters across social divisions (Magone, 2009: 47-48). Accordingly, 
within this period of time, centre turned into a position where most voters 
stand and both parties compete for (2009: 181). 
  
As aforementioned discussion clarified, both institutional and 
sociological factors account for the PSOE’s and the PP’s race to the centre 
wherein it becomes more and more difficult to differentiate main contenders 
from one another. However, this type of politics which is named as 
“adulterated party system” by Hopkin (2005: 13) leads to two major 
problems. On the one hand, since they consider all parties alike voters 
systematically drift apart from political parties and political processes 
(Torcal et al., 2002). On the other hand, as this trend has further entrenched 
due to cognitive mobilisation, parties become less capable of responding 
diverse demands and expectations of population.  
 
According to Dalton (1984) cognitive mobilisation involves two 
developments: first, the abilities of individual citizens in processing political 
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information increases thanks to higher levels of education and political 
sophistication, and second the cost of political information decreases. Both 
developments create individualised society whose demands and expectations 
are much complex than before and therefore it becomes extremely difficult 
for parties to respond population. Magone (2009) argues that Spain actually 
constitutes a perfect example wherein high levels of cognitive mobilisation 
led to growing individualisation of society as well as growing dissatisfaction 
from politics, and therefore one stagnant point on conventional left-right 
ideological spectrum is not capable of responding this diversified electorate. 
The words of one of the 15M activists, interviewed by the Centre for 
Sociological Investigations (Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, CIS) in 
Spain, affirm the situation:  
Well I think that politicians should be trustworthy... and I wish that any 
party would be brave enough to analyse what we are asking for and that 
they would realize that many of the things we are asking are feasible... 
political parties nowadays have a new public to nurture and besides it is 
very clear to them what they want. (Male 25-35 years, 15M activist, 





Table 4.5: Confidence in political parties (15M Participants and General 
Public) 
 
Source: CIS 2012, cited in J.M. Sarciat Marcia (2013) 15M, Made in Spain: El 




Looking at the most widely used placards in the 15M protests, discomfort 
with convergence of parties becomes explicit: “PPSOE= PP + PSOE”, “None, 
neither PP nor PSOE” “[Nini (Ni PP, ni PSOE)]” and “Neither A nor B we want 
to change the platform” “[Ni cara A, ni cara B, queremos cambiar de disco]”. 
These slogans clearly manifest dissatisfaction with two-party system. 
Moreover, comparing the data on trust in party among 15M participants with 
population averages also shows that 15M protestors have greater disdain 
from existent political contenders: 72% of protestors gave less than 5 to 
political parties (Table 4.5). Likewise, confidence in Spanish parliament is 
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Table 4.6: Confidence in Spanish parliament (15M Participants and 
General Public) 
 
Source: CIS 2012, cited in J.M. Sarciat Marcia (2013) 15M, Made in Spain: El 




Interviews with protestors conducted by CIS, renowned research institution 
in Spain, also point to similar direction:  
Politicians... well I don't know because I have no idea, but from what I 
see, I don't know what they do because I don't see it. They fight against 
each other. I know they are fighting against each other but afterwards 
they are good friends and they go together for a drink in one's or the 
other’s place. I don't know what they do but this is the situation (he is 
referring to the budget cuts in health and education services) (Male 
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Needless to say, he is not happy with the fact that although in front of public 
several discussions between the PP and the PSOE occur on certain policy 
issues such as budget cuts in health and in education services, these 
discussions do not seem to be real. Actually, he tries to point to cartelisation 
of political parties in Spain which is characterised by “the interpenetration of 
political parties and state and also by a pattern of interparty collusion” (Katz 
and Mair, 1995: 17). Katz and Mair (1995) argue that particularly in party 
systems wherein a tradition of inter-party competition goes hand in hand 
with state support for political parties, the emergence of cartel parties is 
more likely.  
 
This is also the case in Spain where party competition, since 
transition, has been characterised by high levels of inter-party cooperation 
and accommodation and also where state subvention has been the major 
source of party funding (van Biezen, 2003). In these party systems party 
programmes becomes dissimilar so voters are forced to elect from a list of 
similar political factions; and as parties turn into partnership of 
professionals, politicians start to see “their political opponents as fellow 
professionals” (Katz and Mair, 1995: 23). The problem with the cartelisation 
of politics is that in cartel model “democracy ceases to be seen as a process 
by which limitations or controls are imposed on the state by civil society, 
becoming instead a service provided by the state for civil society”(1995: 22). 
Since the act of representation and the role of political parties as 
representatives is legitimized only when political parties link state to civil 
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society, the extent of crisis of representation under these circumstances 
becomes palpable.  
 
 However, it is particularly important to note that the convergence and 
cartelisation of political parties are not peculiar to Spain. In most of the 
advanced democracies the forces of globalisation have limited parties’ space 
of manoeuvre; and therefore party failures also needs to be contextualised 
within the framework of globalisation which has also curbed party’s ability to 
meet the demands of responsibility and responsiveness at the same time. 
 
 
4.2.2. Responsible but not Responsive 
 
While discussing the case of Turkey, it was observed that as the AKP 
government fail to act responsible in governing, the crisis of representation 
has deepened, in the case of Spain, it seems to be the other way around in 
that as a member of the European Union, Spanish politics has become less 
and less capable of responding electorate though certain level of consistence 
in policy making exists. Constrained by the demands of globalisation and 
Europeanisation the Spanish political parties have lost their control over 
public policy-making which is largely designed and forced by global actors 
and in that sense the policy differences between political parties particularly 
with regards to economy have disappeared. This situation, common to most 
advanced democracies, is described by Mair (2008: 227) as follows: 
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Whether circumscribed by global and European constraints, or 
whether limited by the inability to identify any clear constituency 
within the electorate that is sufficiently large and cohesive to offer a 
mandate for action, parties increasingly tend to echo one another and 
to blur what might otherwise be clear policy choices… [so] there is less 
and less choice in policy terms, suggesting that political competition is 
drifting towards an opposition of form rather than of content. 
 
Essentially, as the process of European integration has accelerated and 
deepened the policy-making processes have started to operate within the 
framework of ‘multi-level governance’ (see Hooghe and Marks, 2001) which 
means that now in the EU policy-making is determined through cooperation 
between distinct governmental levels  (local, subnational/regional, national, 
European, transnational) (Papadopoulos, 2007). However, within this 
complex network of public-policy making, the national governments’ 
capability to shape policies has declined extremely which in turn had 
detrimental effects on democratic accountability and responsiveness. 
Accordingly, the question of who is to blame or reward for policy-outcomes is 
not easy to answer anymore as parties or party governments are not the only 
actors of decision-making procedures even though they are the only ones 
who are authorised by people as such (Papadopoulos, 2010).  
 
Therefore, although multi-level governance through policy networks 
can enhance inclusiveness and pluralism, it certainly creates an 
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accountability gap and according to Papadopoulos leads to a divorce between 
“the sphere of ‘politique des problemes’ (dominated by problem-solving 
governance arrangements) and the sphere of ‘politique d’opinion’ (the arena 
of party competition)” (2010: 1034). This is wherein the root causes of 
problem lies: as discussed in the first chapter the party government model 
requires that parties to be the only actors behind public-policy making and 
political parties’ representativeness is legitimised only when they provide for 
responsiveness and responsibility at the same time.  
 
Under these circumstances, though parties might be considered 
responsible, if responsibility is defined as acting in prudence and consistency 
over time, they certainly cannot be responsive to national public demands as 
various other (local, regional, international transnational as well as public 
and private) actors involve in policy-making processes and their control over 
decision-making is limited. Needless to say, this leads to a “loosening grip of 
representative democracy on acts of governing” (Bekkers et al., 2007: 308) 
and thereby citizens/principals withdraw from conventional political 
practice as parties/agents are not representing them anymore; thus the 
contract of representation between citizens and political parties which 
constitutes the basis of representative democracy is dissolved, thereby 
creating a crisis of representation.  
 
 Likewise, in Spain since the country integrated in the EU more and 
more, governments’ ability to shape public policy has decreased. Although 
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with regards to social and cultural policies, member states’ capabilities are 
not exhausted and they still have certain degree of control over them, 
economic policies are largely shaped and imposed by the EU particularly in 
times of crisis.  
 
Accordingly, when the economic crisis erupted, the Zapatero 
government was slow to respond but in time the government began to take 
action and initially came up with Keynesian policies, trying to adapt 
moderate counter-cyclical fiscal stimulus measures (Field and Botti, 2013: 5). 
However, in 2010 the crisis was deepened with detrimental effects on 
European and international markets as a whole and the fears of default led to 
the euro sovereign debt crisis (see Aleksi and McBride, 2015). This 
development in turn forced European institutions to take action and impose 
certain policies to countries with problematic fiscal positions (Field and Botti, 
2013). Accordingly, in May 2010, in the Eurogroup and Ecofin meetings, as 
one of the most affected member states Spanish government was forced to 
implement strict austerity-based adjustment measures such as “a 5 % 
reduction of the salaries of civil servants and a freeze on wage increases in 
the forthcoming years; non-application of the cost-of-living indexation of 
pensions; the ending of the cheque bebe (an allowance of 2500 euros to 
families with newborn children), and a significant reduction of public works 
and investment” (Molino and Godina, 2013: 112). These changes have 
created high levels of resentment among population, particularly among the 
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disadvantaged ones and young people who now have to struggle with 
enormous levels of unemployment.  
 
In short, in an era of neoliberalism as a member of the EU, Spain was 
under extreme pressure from the European institutions and international 
markets to adopt austerity measures based on social spending cuts and the 
decrease of public employees’ salaries (Field and Botti, 2013: 6). Needless to 
say, the very fact that the EU and international organisations were behind 
these reforms has demonstrated the incapability of national governments in 
shaping public policy and intensified the view that executives are not 
accounted to people but to some kind of international or supranational 
interests. Although the Spanish population at large have always been 
supportive of the European integration, they were irritated by the fact that 
national executive is overseen and monitored by supranational institutions 
(Molina and Godino, 2013: 113-114). Particularly the idea that Spanish 
economic policy is run by Germany and France who have been the leading 
powers of the Union, or the so-called Mercozy,15 was unacceptable to Spanish 
public (Field and Botti, 2013: 9). This, in turn, has deepened already existent 
disaffection with party politics and led to the questioning of Spanish 
government’s democratic legitimacy.  
 
The 15M Movement emerged under these circumstances and 
protestors were also reacting to the limited responsiveness of government to 
                                                            
15 The term Merkozy refers to the duo of Angela Merkel, chancellor of Germany, and Nicholas 
Sarkozy, the president of France until 2012. 
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public demands as they observed that Zapatero government accepted all 
policy changes designed by unaccountable technocrats of the EU at the 
expense of people. Several scholars also argue that the emergence of the 
Indignados or 15M movement was a response to this context. In other words, 
the economic crisis has revealed incompetence of the governments and 
signified that party democracy is not working anymore since constrained by 
broader commitments parties fail to act responsive to public demands, 
leading to a crisis of representation. 
 
 
4.3. Implications for Party System and Democracy in Spain 
4.3.1. A New Actor in the Party System? 
 
The convergence of the PSOE and the PP and the failure of the government to 
act responsive have led to a crisis of representation in Spain and this has 
been one of the major reasons, if not the only one, behind the emergence of 
mass protests. Therefore, needless to say, these protests have also called for a 
change in the party system.  
 
The fact that even after the economic crisis, the PP, one of the two 
major parties in the system managed to garner significant amount of vote 
indicates that the Spanish population still possesses high levels of trust 
towards mainstream parties. Therefore, if the mainstream parties of the 
PSOE and the PP manage to respond diversified demands of the population 
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and increase people’s involvement through guaranteeing internal party 
democracy, there is still a high probability that they will continue to play 
major role in the functioning of the party system. However, one possible 
challenge to two parties is the emergence of new political parties that can 
replace their position in the party system.  
 
Actually, the PSOE has already been challenged by a brand new 
political party “Podemos” (We can) which was spawned by the protests. As 
party appeals to the left and centre-left voters, it mainly targets the PSOE’s 
constituency.  In 2014 European elections the Podemos received unexpected 
support attracting 1.2 million votes and won five seats in the European 
parliament. The party continue to appeal Spanish population and in the next 
general elections it stands as a viable alternative to existing mainstream 
political parties and even more the latest polls suggest that the party would 
emerge as one of the major parties in the upcoming elections (Buck, 2014).  
 
So the Indignados or the 15M movement in Spain have already started 
to affect the functioning of the party system by triggering foundation of a new 
political party that challenges the existing positions of major parties in the 
system. The fortunes of Podemos still remain to be seen but recent successes 
of the party signal a likely change in the direction of Spanish politics. The 
impact of Podemos will be discussed further in the following chapter when 
we analyse what happened after the protest movements and how movement 
politics have interacted with electoral politics. 
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4.3.2. The Implications on Democracy 
 
The first signs of change in the functioning of the party politics in Spain may 
have significant repercussions for the future of democracy. Actually, as 
discussed before, the problem is not unique to Spain but several other 
advanced democracies are also facing with distrust towards the principles of 
representative democracy as well as the political parties (Blais, 2000; Gray 
and Miki, 2000). Therefore, the solutions also need to be all-encompassing in 
that the EU as a supranational institution that limits national governments’ 
space for policy manoeuvre has a duty to come up with tools that would fill 
the gap between policy-makers and people. Although there are several 
initiatives that try to link European population to the European institutions, 
they are still unable to respond this challenging issue. If the involvement of 
European people in the decision-making procedures could be enhanced, then 
it might also be possible to increase the legitimacy of decision-making 
processes at the European level.  
 
Conversely, the mainstream parties of advanced democracies have to 
find ways to respond diversified demands in the age of cognitive 
mobilisation, if party democracy aims to survive. The major side-effect of 
party failures to respond people is the emergence of anti-system parties such 
as the UKIP in the UK, Die Alternative in Germany or Syriza in Greece.16 What 
                                                            
16 One can also name Podemos among these parties but different than all these parties the 
Podemos is a direct outcome of the protest movement and organised different than the 
above mentioned parties, using several participatory methods in order to enhance the 
internal democracy and increase the participation of members.   
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is common to all these niche parties is their ability to touch upon and 
respond societies’ demands through populist discourses even though none of 
them can be considered responsible as “to act responsibly means to effect 
changes according to accepted procedures and to avoid random, reckless, or 
illegal decision-making” (Mair, 2009: 11). In other words, although these 
parties can be responsive they cannot be considered responsible and this 
might have detrimental effects on the future of democracy. After all, it has to 
be noted that the failure of responsible political actors to respond people 
ended up with the rise of fascism during the inter-war years. The 
implications of these protest movements on the electoral politics of both 
countries will be further evaluated in the next chapter but here it has to be 
acknowledged that development of democracy has been a contingent 
outcome of contentious politics (Tilly, 2004) and therefore understanding the 


















In the previous two empirical chapters, the crisis of representation was 
discussed as the central factor behind the mass protests in Turkey and Spain 
and this was done by referring to the development of Turkish and Spanish 
political structures. Providing a party politics account of these protest 
movements, it is also critically important to analyse how these movements 
shape the party system of each country since then. The point is that as these 
movements are resulted from general disaffection from the way politics is 
conducted, to what extent they managed to influence conventional or 
electoral politics is particularly warranted as this would not only 
demonstrate whether the crisis of representation has been overcome or 
deepened in two countries but also highlight the link between the 
mobilisation of social movements and politics of parliamentary arenas of 




From this perspective, this chapter looks at the question of what 
happened after these mass protest movements and more specifically 
analyses the impact of Gezi protests and 15M movement on conventional 
politics in each context.  Although these two movements had peculiar 
demands, they also had common purposes in that they both mainly aimed at, 
first, redefining the terms of political arena in search of new ways of doing 
politics, and secondly, they asked for a greater say in decision-making 
processes. In this regard, although contexts and conjunctures are different 
both movements have similar demands with that of the new social 
movements of 1960s and 1970s such as “decentralised and participatory 
organisational structures, defence of interpersonal solidarity against great 
bureaucracies; and the reclamation of autonomous spaces rather than 
material advantages.”(Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 9).  Herein we will 
delineate the extent to which these movements manage to create issue 
salience with regards to new politics and what impact the movements had on 
electoral politics of each country. What is observed is that both movements 
have had a significant impact on the ways politics is conducted since then 
though different mechanisms were at work in each case. Therefore, it is also 
extremely important to understand and explain the cross-national variations 
regarding the terms of interaction between contentious and conventional 
politics and analysing the specific and dynamic factors that have resulted in 




This chapter is organised in four sections. In the first section, we 
provide a general overview of how contentious politics might interact with 
electoral politics by referring to the relevant literature on social movements 
and briefly discuss the cases at hand. In the second and third sections how 
the political structures of Turkey and Spain have responded to protest 
movements and whether new political actors have emerged as a result of 
these movements will be analysed, respectively. Finally, we look into the 
question of what accounts for the differences between the two cases. Here, 
we focus on both institutional and social factors in understanding the ways in 
which democratic politics adopt and change in order to respond the existing 
crises.    
 
 
5.1. Relationship between Contentious and Conventional Politics: Gezi 
and 15M in Comparative Perspective 
5.1.1. How Contentious Politics Interacts with Conventional Politics? 
 
In the literature on social movements, limited attention has been paid to the 
interaction between contentious and conventional politics (Malone and 
Frederiks, 2012).  Contrary to that the major focus of social movement 
studies has been on the factors whether to be social, cultural, psychological 
or political which trigger collective action. Within this perspective, the study 
of social movements has evolved in several phases of conceptual 
development. While before the 1970s the collective behaviour theory 
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dominated the literature (see Blumer, 1951; 1971; Smelser, 1962), in the 
post-1970s period resource mobilisation theory (see Jenkins and Perrow, 
1977; Jenkins, 1983) along with political process theory (see Goldstone and 
Tilly, 2001; McAdam,1982; Tarrow, 1998) and European new social 
movement theory (see Habermas, 1981; Touraine, 1981; Melucci, 1996) have 
challenged the previous accounts (Edwards 2014). In the 1980s and 1990s, 
framing and culture (see Eder, 1993), in other words constructivist 
approaches, have provided a new perspective on the emergence of social 
movements and protest.  
 
 Most recently, previous political process theorists have readapted 
their accounts which led to the critical development of contentious politics. 
Contentious politics approach has differentiated from preceding perspectives 
in two respects. First, it adopts a broader scope of social movements which 
includes not only social movements but also revolutions, strike waves, 
nationalism, democratization and so on (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2004). 
Secondly, in trying to identify recurrent mechanisms and processes that led 
to social movement mobilisation they combine structural, cognitive and 
political explanations and define contentious politics on the basis of 
environmental, relational and cognitive mechanisms (see McAdam, Tarrow 
and Tilly, 2004).  Although these approaches have differed from one another 
on several respects, according to Edwards (2014: 4-5), it is possible to define 




1. “Social movements are collective, organised efforts at social change, 
rather  than individual efforts at social change.” 
2. “Social movements exist over a ‘period of time’ by engaging in a 
‘conflictual issue’ with a ‘powerful opponent’, rather than being ‘one-
off’ events.” 
3. “The members of a social movement are not just working together, 
but share a ‘collective identity’” 
 4. “Social movements actively pursue a change by employing protest” 
 
The final point is the one that interests this study most, particularly in terms 
of the political change these movements have initiated. It has to be kept in 
mind that throughout history, social and political change has been mainly 
triggered by collective action of masses. In this sense, one of the key purposes 
in studying social movements should be to delineate the ways in which 
movements shape and redefine the conventional ways of doing politics. 
Although some changes can only be observed in the long-run, even in the 
short-run movements can introduce new actors, new issues, new methods, 
and new discourses to the disposal of conventional politics (Tilly, 2003). 
 
 However, as mentioned before, the relationship between contentious 
and conventional politics has been a neglected one in the literature on social 
movements, though there are some studies that tried to pin down the 




 Goldstone (2003: 2), for instance, argues that workings of not only 
party politics but also courts and legislatures cannot be analysed without 
referring to the constant impact of social movements. From this perspective, 
he tries to bridge the gap between what he calls institutionalised and 
noninstitutionalised politics, challenging conventional view which suggests 
that there are only two possible ways states might interact with social 
movements: repression or reluctant co-optation (2003: 20). Contrary to that 
he suggests that there are several ways states might respond to social 
movements: “repression with institutional change”, “repression without 
institutional change”, “toleration and encouragement”, “influence with 
institutional change”, “influence through ongoing alliance”, and “influence 
through movement spin-off political parties”. (2003: 21-23) However, with 
the exception of final mechanism Goldstone provides a general account of 
how states might respond to social movements rather than how movements 
might redefine the terms of routine politics. Accordingly, he seems to be 
missing short term impacts of movements on electoral politics and focusing 
too much on the state side of story.         
 
 At this point, McAdam and Tarrow’s (2010) study shows an important 
pathway to follow in order to discern the ways in which movement might 
shape electoral politics. They argue that movements can exert influence over 
political actors in several ways (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). First, they can 
“introduce new forms of collective action that influence election campaigns” 
(2010: 533). With the first mechanism they refer to the possibility that 
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certain parties can adapt the innovative methods used by movements in their 
campaign organisations. Secondly, protest movements might “join electoral 
coalitions or, in extreme cases, turn into parties themselves” (2010: 533). 
This second example occurs when movements take the electoral option, 
meaning that this is the point at which they decide to form a political party. 
According to McAdam and Tarrow, although this option happens in extreme 
cases, there are nevertheless several examples of movements following 
conventional forms of electoral mobilisation through party formation (2010: 
533). Conversely, they can either initiate “proactive electoral mobilisation” or 
“reactive electoral mobilisation” (2010: 533). Whilst proactive electoral 
mobilisation occurs when certain elements of movement groups take part in 
electoral campaigns, reactive electoral mobilisation means “escalating 
protest in the wake of an election” (2010: 554). The final mechanism works 
when discontented segments of the electorate separate from their parties 
and either form a new political movement or carry their message to other 
forms of politics.  
 
 Malone and Fredericks (2012) also discuss how movement politics 
might interact with electoral politics by analysing the Occupy Wall Street in 
relation to US electoral politics. They argue that the movement’s energy and 
attention have already transformed the political arena by generating a new 
market for political actors. They identify two major possibilities of how 
political elites might respond the movement: either they adapt the movement 
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and its message, or they might embrace the message without forming a 
relationship with movement (2012: 208).   
 
 Accordingly, the contention herein is that some form of adaption, 
change and co-optation in conventional forms of politics is expected to 
happen, one way or another – as the literature on social movements also 
suggests (Malone and Frederiks, 2012). Even in the short-run it is valid to 
discuss and observe how these demands from the wider population have 
unfolded and to establish whether there has been any interaction between 
these movements and democratic politics at large.  
 
 
5.1.2. What Changes Gezi and 15M brought in the Short-run?  
 
Following the premises of above mentioned discussion, here we concern with 
the question of how Gezi protests and 15M movement have interacted with 
their respective electoral arenas. Although it is still too soon to discuss the 
outcomes of these protests, looking at some follow-up trends we can come up 
with early observations about what changes these two protests have 
provided.  
 
 While it has only been two years since the Gezi Park protests, Turkey 
has since experienced three elections (local, presidential and general) in all of 
which, one way or another, the protest movement itself has remained on the 
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agenda. Keeping in mind that elections are major opportunities for observing 
the impact of social movements (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010: 533), the 
validity of discussing the changes, or lack thereof, made as a result of the Gezi 
movement still holds true. The 15M movement, conversely, occurred four 
years ago, and the political party that emerged out of the protests, Podemos, 
has turned into one of the major forces on the Spanish political scene. Most 
recent opinion polls suggest that Podemos is the third party behind the two 
mainstream parties, the PP and the PSOE, in Spain (NC Report, 2015). 
 
Here the goal is to define which mechanisms, if at all, were at work in 
the two cases under examination, which will be achieved by referring to 
major political events experienced in the light of protest movements. 
Although the degree of change differs, in both cases the national political 
structure was affected by these mass protests. In the case of Turkey, the Gezi 
Park protests were quite influential in providing a number of parties with a 
new discourse of politics as well as innovative methods of campaigning and 
in designing the content of these electoral campaigns.  Looking at the results 
of the 2015 general elections, one may also claim that the movement has 
played a role in shifting electoral loyalties through mobilising certain groups 
from one party to another. In the Spanish case particularly, the movement 
not only led to the establishment of a brand new political party, but also led 
to realignment along the lines of previous smaller political parties which 




5.2. Turkey: Interaction through Election Campaigns  
 
Since the Gezi Park protests Turkey has been through three critical elections: 
local, presidential and general. As the AKP emerged victorious in the local 
elections of March 2014, garnering around 43% of total votes, and in August 
2014 Erdoğan has won the first direct presidential elections, some observers 
argued that the protests were ineffective in shifting votes from the AKP to 
opposition parties (see Carkoglu, 2014). This line of argument follows that 
Gezi protestors were mainly composed of liberal and left-leaning social 
groups who are already part of opposition and therefore they do not 
represent a group of swing voters (Carkoglu, 2014). Consequently, they 
argued that the movement and protestors failed to change the electoral 
balance of power in the country and to introduce a new political actor. 
However, although the Gezi protests neither spawn the birth of a new 
political party, as was the case for the Spanish 15M movement, nor led to 
significant changes in electoral balance it has nevertheless influenced the 
way politics has conducted since.  
 
First, in all elections that have followed, the Gezi protests have 
remained on the agenda of main political contenders, and so as a result they 
shape the content of the electoral campaign (proactive electoral 
mobilisation). While some parties such as the CHP try to appeal to Gezi 
protestors, others like the AKP build its campaign by taking a stance against 
the movement, while others, for instance, the HDP, employed the discourse of 
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the protests in their electoral campaign, especially in Western part of the 
country. Secondly, some of the innovative methods like mobilisation through 
social media, or humorous language employed by the protests have been 
used in party campaigns in all three elections. Adaption of innovative 
methods introduced by social movements by political parties has been one of 
the central ways through which contentious politics affects and changes 
electoral politics. The energy and dynamism of movement find expression 
through these innovative methods and parties take advantage of already sold 
tactics. Moreover, particularly in the most recent general elections a certain 
degree of realignment has been observed in that a group of voters separated 
from their parties and voted for the party that formed its electoral campaign 
on the discourse and demands of Gezi movement. 
 
Accordingly, Gezi protests have interacted with electoral politics in 
several ways. In what follows, this section initially discusses the reactions of 
major political factions to the Gezi protests and how the major political 
parties prefer to frame the protest movement. Then, events in the 
background that shaped political processes after the movement will be 
discussed. Finally, in the light of three electoral campaigns, we will look into 






5.2.1. How did Political Parties Frame the Protests? 
 
As the AKP government was the major target of the protests, the party was 
extremely keen to distance itself and its constituency from the movement. 
Accordingly, although originally some leading figures in the party criticised 
the disproportionate and extreme use of force by police against the 
environmentalist protests (BBC, 2013), as support for the protests from 
national and international actors grew, they reset the tone and differentiated 
between the initial and the subsequent phases of the protests. The argument 
was that in the beginning the protestors mobilised themselves based on an 
environmental agenda, but later on it turned into a ‘political’ movement 
which aimed to “limit the authority of Erdoğan, to isolate and weaken him, to 
convince him to cooperate, to force him to negotiate; in brief, to exercise 
control over him prior to the Presidential elections” (Ete and Tastan, 2013). 
 
According to this reading, these were all done in order to harm 
Turkey’s economic performance and undermine its international credibility. 
Erdoğan himself also followed this line and claimed that his government was 
facing a trial coup, initiated by national and international enemies, which 
aimed at ousting the AKP government as well as him. In other words, for the 
AKP government the Gezi Park protests were an international conspiracy 
organised by a vaguely-defined “interest-rate lobby” and its national allies, 
and subsequently supported by international media corporations. This 
confrontational stance taken by Erdoğan aimed at consolidating the AKP’s 
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hold on power by demarcating lines between supporters of the AKP and its 
opponents, between friends and foes, and between us and them. Accordingly, 
since the protests mainly targeted the AKP government and its policies, the 
party defined itself as the opposite of the Gezi movement and preferred to 
remain aloof in relation to anything connected to the protests. Nonetheless, 
this very attitude of the party demonstrated how movements can shape the 
ways in which a party defines its position. So, though not positively, the 
party’s discourse has been highly affected from the protests leading to a 
change in party’s political messages. 
 
 The main opposition party, the CHP, conversely, took a totally 
different approach to the protests and considered these groups of protestors 
as being part of its own constituency. According to the party, the Gezi 
movement demonstrated that Turkey had developed a democratic culture 
and the protestors were struggling for a liberal, pluralistic and participatory 
democracy against the government’s rising authoritarianism. From this 
perspective, the CHP asserted that the Gezi movement and the CHP shared 
common values such as freedom, human rights, gender equality, pluralism, 
tolerance and democracy (CHP Gezi Report, 2014). Moreover, in the party’s 
report on the protests, it is suggested that the demands of the movement 
overlapped with the party’s policies and programmes, in that similar to the 
Gezi movement, the CHP also supported “the right to the city”, thereby 
increasing participatory mechanisms in decision-making processes, 
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particularly at the local level, and fighting against the government’s 
authoritarian practices (2014: 37).  
 
In general terms, the CHP sided with the movement. Accordingly, 
during the protests, the CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu visited Gezi Park, and CHP 
parliamentarians tried to negotiate with police in order to prevent the 
extreme use of force. In addition, they provided legal assistance to those who 
were detained, and the CHP as a political party took this issue on board as 
one of the most significant sociological developments in the country 
(Türmen, 2013), and therefore aimed at promoting these new demands. 
However, here it has to be noted that although the protests’ major target was 
the AKP government, as was also argued before, these protests manifested a 
general disaffection with all major political parties in Turkey, since they all 
seemingly failed to represent the electorate. From this perspective, the CHP 
was also part and parcel of the problem, though it preferred to stand by the 
Gezi movement. 
 
 In the initial phase of the protests, the MHP took a careful approach, in 
that the leader of the party, Bahçeli, referring to Sırrı Süreyya Önder, stated 
that the MHP would never involve itself in a protest which was led by the 
postman of the PKK (Vatan, 2013). Later on, though, as the protests expanded 
and the anti-government stance of the movement transpired, he changed his 
tone and stated that these protests, triggered by environmental concerns, 
were a cry for individual autonomy, democratic rights and freedom (Radikal, 
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2013a). He asserted that the Gezi protests were directed against the 
government’s increasing authoritarianism and Erdoğan’s continuous scorn 
for youth (Haberturk, 2013). However, Bahçeli also warned that illegal 
organisations, marginal groups and the PKK might capitalise and hijack the 
movement for their own ends; therefore, he asserted that the protestors had 
to be alerted to these groups (2013). Moreover, he also suggested that the 
right way to topple the AKP government passes from the ballot box not from 
the streets (Ersay, 2013). Clearly, the MHP’s statist approach also found 
expression in their perception of the Gezi protests. Although they supported 
the idea that the AKP government’s increasing authoritarianism was 
unacceptable – and therefore the protests had a point – the party was against 
taking the fight to the streets. 
 
 The BDP also approached protests cautiously in the beginning. 
Although one of the BDP parliamentarians, Önder, played a key role in 
publicising the protests in the very early days, as the protests grew the party 
withdrew its support and the leader of the BDP, Demirtas, stated that they 
would not act together with nationalists and fascists who were trying to 
hijack the protests in order to cease peace talks launched between Öcalan 
and the government (Milliyet, 2013b). From this point of view, he also 
suggested that the movement had the potential to turn into a coup against 
the government (Cumhuriyet, 2013a), though later on, as the protests spread 
throughout the country, he also reset his tone and first recapped on Önder’s 
role at the beginning of the protests, before then asserting that they were the 
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result of the government ignoring the 50% of the population which did not 
vote for the AKP (Radikal, 2013b). However, he was also attentive to the 
survival of peace talks and called for the protestors to adopt the discourse of 
peace and resolution (2013b).  
 
Although their motivations were different, both the MHP and the BDP, 
in the early days, framed the protests in relation to the Kurdish issue. Here, it 
has to be noted that although the MHP had never supported the idea of 
protesting in the streets, this method had been employed by elements of the 
BDP and its predecessors for several years. Consequently, the HDP, the party 
founded by constituents of the Kurdish movement and a fraternal party to 
the BDP, turned into the main political force into which the messages of the 
Gezi protests were received. 
 
In a nutshell, looking at immediate responses of major political 
factions, it can be suggested that the Gezi protests, one way or other, have 
affected all major political parties in the system forcing them first to respond 
the movement and then to readapt their positions in relation to the demands 






5.2.2. Political Developments in the Post-Gezi Process 
 
Just after the Gezi Park protests, Turkey was hit by a corruption scandal, 
known as the ‘17-25 December Operations’, which emerged due to the 
conflict between the government and the Gülen movement, one of the 
strongest religious communities in the country. The scandal occurred when 
draft allegations were disclosed in December 2013 involving important AKP 
Cabinet members. Prosecutors accused significant numbers of important 
figures from the government, including sons of three Cabinet members as 
well as the general manager of a state bank and a young Iranian business 
man, of bribery, fraud and corruption (Hurriyet , 2013a; Letsch, 
2013), and 14 of them, including sons of ministers, were arrested (Aydın, 
2013). This scandal was the worst crisis to hit the government since they 
came to power, and it was one of the biggest corruption scandals in the 
history of Turkey. Erdoğan, once again, related these allegations to the same 
“axis of evil” that had initiated the Gezi protests and was composed of 
internal and external enemies, but this time one culprit was clearly identified, 
namely the Gülen movement, which had been one of the collaborators of the 
AKP government since 2002 but with whom relations had started to 
deteriorate from 2012 onwards. The government was rather quick to put the 
blame on the Gülen movement, arguing that police officers and public 
prosecutors were all members of the movement, and Erdoğan named the 
movement as a “parallel state” with the aim of toppling the existing order by 
using deep state connections (Lowen, 2014). With the goal of covering draft 
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allegations, Erdoğan projected himself as the last man standing for the 
project of great Turkey.  
 
 At the same time, the AKP government also increased its control over 
all aspects of social and political life. Erdoğan claimed that the parallel state’s 
moves were an extension of the Gezi protests, in that they both had the same 
goal of preventing Turkey becoming an important world power. 
Consequently, he broadened the struggle and waged open war against the 
“axis of evil”. Several operations were conducted against both Gezi protestors 
and the Gülen movement by the government.  
 
The components of Gezi protests such as the Union of Chambers of 
Turkish Engineers and Architects (Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği, 
TMMOB), Turkish Medical Association (Türk Tabipler Birliği, TTB), football 
fan groups, and individual protestors as well as some business groups who 
were claimed to support movement were all faced with harsh government 
retaliation. For instance, through a motion, the TMMOB’s, a member of 
Taksim Solidarity Network which is one of the major groups that initiated the 
protests, powers and revenues were transferred to the Ministry of 
Environment and Urban Planning which meant the loss of group’s financial 
resources and autonomy (Pamuk, 2013). The Ministry of Health initiated an 
investigation against the TTB which provided Gezi participants with medical 
support during protests (Amnesty International, 2014); the Ministry of 
Education opened numerous investigations against high school teachers and 
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students (Hurriyet, 2013b); Koç group which owned Divan Hotel that 
provided protestors with safe haven during protests was faced with 
unannounced inspection from the Ministry of Finance (Cumhuriyet, 2013b); 
in the media significant number of journalists that supported the protests 
were fired or forced to resign; and several lawsuits were filed against football 
fan club, Çarşı on charges of “attempting to overthrow the government” 
(Hurriyet Daily, 2014) and against Gezi protestors on charges of “opposing 
the law on meetings and demonstrations,” “causing damage to public 
property,” “ignoring the security chief’s demand for dispersal” and “resisting 
to prevent one from doing his duty” (Benli, 2015).  Moreover, a new security 
law was passed by parliament that has increased the police powers, opened 
the way for the use of firearms against protestors by police forces, and 
stipulated five years of imprisonment for covering faces during protests 
(Hogg and Solaker, 2015). In other words, government has increased its grip 
on social and political opposition which also indicated rising 
authoritarianism in the country.  
 
All that said, it can be argued that the state’s response to movement 
was total “repression with institutional change” (see Goldstone, 2003). 
However the interaction streams between the movement, on the one hand, 
and the government and opposition on the other, go beyond the sole 
repression by state and observing other mechanisms requires a deeper look 




5.2.3. Elections and Gezi  
 
The March 2014 local elections took place against this backdrop. The central 
gist of the AKP’s local election campaign was that conservative groups and 
the AKP were under attack from liberal left-wing Gezi protestors allied with 
the West and the Gülen movement, in order to undermine the AKP 
government and to prevent Turkey’s rise on the international stage 
(Carkoglu, 2014b: 171). From this perspective, the AKP asked the electorate 
to back it against what it saw as its national and international enemies. 
Though the party’s share of the vote decreased in comparison to previous 
general elections, the AKP still won the election, garnering 42.89% of the 
vote. Looking at these results, it seems that Erdoğan was successful in 
convincing his electorate about foreign conspiracies and mobilising the 
party’s supporters against an outside attack. The election campaign of the 
AKP shows clearly the impact of the Gezi protests on electoral politics, albeit 
negatively, based on the fact that the foundation of the AKP’s electoral 
campaign was grounded on its response to the Gezi protests.   
 
 The interaction between the movement and electoral politics can be 
better described by analysing the presidential election campaign process. 
Following the local elections, in August 2014, for the first time Turkey went 
to the polls to elect its president. Although Erdoğan received 51.79% of the 
total vote, won the election and moved to the presidential office, one of the 
surprises was the success of Selahattin Demirtaş, the leader of the HDP, who 
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came third in the polling by garnering 9.76% of the vote which is way above 
the average votes received by precedent political parties of Kurdish 
movement.  Demirtaş was the rising star of the Kurdish political movement, 
and his decision to run for presidency was positively received by leftist and 
liberal groups in Turkey.  When his campaign organisation is analysed in 
terms of its proposals, slogans, campaign materials and collective action 
methods, the influence of the Gezi movement can be seen clearly.  
 
First of all, coming from the ranks of Kurdish movement, Demirtaş 
was very careful in appealing to the wider electorate, including leftists, social 
democrats and liberals, besides the Kurdish minority, and in this respect his 
campaign focused on the questions of democratisation, human rights and 
rule of law (Grigoriadis, 2015; see also Kalaycioglu, 2015). Although the 
HDP’s project of becoming a party goes back to times before the Gezi 
movement, Demirtaş’s presidential candidacy benefited from the discourse, 
messages and methods of the Gezi movement significantly. Clearly, Demirtaş 
recognised the gap in Turkish politics and aimed to go beyond the identity 
politics for which the Gezi protestors had shown disdain. Moreover, one of 
the major proposals of Demirtaş as a presidential candidate was to form 
“People’s Parliaments” (cumhur meclisleri), designed to increase the active 
participation of young people in decision-making procedures (Sozcu, 2014). 
Keeping in mind that one of the major demands of the Gezi movement was 
participatory democracy, which would increase the involvement of citizens in 
decision-making, Demirtaş seemed to receive the message. Furthermore, 
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throughout his campaign Demirtaş underlined the importance of radical 
democracy, by going beyond the liberal definition of democracy and 
including the concept of difference in terms of opinions, races, ethnicities, 
classes, genders, sexual orientations and worldviews (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985). Accordingly, his slogans were “Democratic Change and Peaceful 
Turkey” and “Imagine a president who does not discriminate, is a democrat to 
everyone, who unites and reconciles…”. He formed the foundation of his 
electoral campaign on the concept of a “call for a new life,” in which there 
would be no ethnic, religious, gender or class discrimination. The Gezi 
movement’s call for a new public culture respectful of the other (Gole, 2013), 
its pluralistic character and its plea for a new democracy evidently influenced 
Demirtaş’s election campaign.  
 
As mentioned before, one of the ways in which movements can 
interact with conventional politics transpires when the innovative methods 
of collective action are adopted within an electoral campaign. Here, social 
media, which was the main tool used to mobilise people during the Gezi 
protests, was widely used by Demirtaş. Likewise, one of the songs of the Gezi 
protests, “Sound of Pots and Pans” (Tencere Tava Havası) with lyrics “Enough 
with inconsistent remarks and bans; enough with headstrong decrees and 
commands; we’ve had enough; we’re really fed up; what arrogance what 
hatred”, was used as a campaign song for Demirtaş, albeit with a few minor 
changes. Moreover, some of his campaign pictures were taken in Gezi Park, 
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indicating the extent to which Demirtaş wanted to link its electoral campaign 
to the protests. 
 
The 2015 general election was also critical moment to trace the 
impact of the protest movement on electoral politics. Throughout the election 
campaign, the AKP continued to portray the Gezi movement as its opposite 
and to hold on to the international conspiracy discourse; albeit negatively, 
the movement was still influencing the content of the AKP’s electoral 
campaign. Conversely, the movement had a more aligning impact on both the 
CHP and the HDP’s campaigns.  
 
Though indirectly, one might claim that there were two ways in which 
the CHP interacted with the movement. First of all, for the first time in 34 
years, the CHP decided to determine a significant portion of its candidates 
(55 cities, including the major cities out of 81 provinces) through party 
primaries. More importantly, all party members – not only delegates – had 
the right to cast their votes in order to choose the candidates that would best 
represent the party in parliament (Benli, 2015). Although it is hardly possible 
to claim that the party’s adoption of party primaries was a direct impact of 
the Gezi protests, keeping in mind the CHP’s claim to represent its 
constituency, the influence of the movement should not be undermined. It 
can therefore be argued that this was an indirect response to the demands of 
the Gezi protestors, who asked for a more inclusive democracy wherein 
citizens would be part of the decision-making process. Secondly, the CHP 
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aimed to go beyond ethnic and religious politics through basing the 
foundation of its electoral campaign on economic questions. Here, once again, 
this move had deeper roots going back to 2010 and to the change of 
leadership, though the discovery of its constituency’s dislike of identity 
politics might have facilitated the process of reform in the party and forced it 
to redefine its position on the political spectrum. 
 
The movement’s influence is much more visible in the HDP’s election 
campaign. With the aim of becoming a national rather than a regional party in 
Turkey, which was a different approach to the previous elections, the HDP, 
the sprinter of the Kurdish movement, decided to contest the elections 
through party candidates rather than through independents. This move was 
also related to Demirtaş’s success in the presidential elections, which 
demonstrated that a pro-democracy and human rights alliance between the 
Kurdish movement and social democrats and liberals could pass the 10% 
election threshold (Grigoriadis, 2015: 109-110). From its emblem to its 
slogans and campaign methods, once again the HDP was the main party to 
capitalise on the Gezi movement, which was the best way to appeal to non-
Kurdish, disaffected leftist and liberal voters.  
 
The party’s foundation of the electoral campaign was based on the 
idea of radical democracy, which can be best observed from the campaign 
slogan “We are Alevites, we are environmentalists, we are disabled, we are 
youth, we are women, we are workers, we are for free world, we are LGBT…”. In 
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the HDP’s election manifesto, besides common political issues such as 
economic development, democratisation, a new constitution, the Kurdish 
question and democratic autonomy, the questions of ecology, the rights of 
women and LGBT, gender equality and animal rights were also included 
(HDP Manifesto, 2015). The underlying themes of the campaign, such as 
pluralism, radical democracy and participation as well as emphasis on post-
materialist rights, overlapped with those of the Gezi protesters.  
 
The success of the party, which received 13.1% of the total vote and 
secured 80 seats in parliament, highlights that the HDP managed to go 
beyond its original regional presence and managed to convince large cities 
that it was the right choice. Research on election results signifies that most of 
the new votes for the HDP came from previous AKP voters, so in that respect 
a part of the Kurdish electorate who had formerly supported the AKP turned 
to the HDP this time (KONDA, 2013). That said, around 1,000,000 votes and 
around 15% of HDP votes seemed to come from non-Kurdish and mostly 
previous CHP voters (KONDA, 2013; see also Cilekagaci, 2015). This number 
is particularly important, as it might indicate that the HDP’s focus on new 
politics and a new life, and its struggle to overcome the existing parameters 
of politics, found support amongst the disenfranchised segments of society, 
while the ideas and methods seen at Gezi Park provided the party with the 
perfect tools to reach these people. In this sense, it can also be claimed that 
the involvement of Gezi in the content of elections led to a realignment and a 
shift in the electoral regime.  
171 
 
However, it has to be noted that most of the significant figures of the 
HDP comes from the ranks of Kurdish movement and the core constituency 
of the party is composed of members of Kurdish ethnic minority. Therefore, 
although party’s connection to Kurdish political movement is advantageous 
for stabilising its vote share and its position in the political arena, it obstructs 
party’s ability to appeal broader segments of society, particularly non-
Kurdish left-wing liberal groups. After the elections with the relapse of the 
conflict between the PKK and the state this limitation has come to the fore. 
From this perspective, it still remains to be seen to what extent and how long 
the HDP will be able to hold on to radical democracy discourse and so to keep 
pro-democracy left-wing alliance under its roof. 
 
All in all, looking at election results from the Gezi movement onwards 
one might suggest that the protests have been ineffective in changing the 
electoral balance of power (see Carkoglu, 2014) and therefore the interaction 
between the movement and conventional politics has been rather limited in 
the case of Turkey. However, it still had an impact on institutionalised 
politics, as the Gezi movement not only provided parties with a discourse of 
new politics and with innovative methods of campaigning but also it gave 
some parties the courage to adopt this new discourse and made them aware 
of a different type of constituency. Needless to say, it also has to be kept in 
mind that it is still too early to assess the genuine impact of Gezi on electoral 
politics, as is a significant sociological development whose influence will be 
better observed over time.   
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The main contention of this research is that one of the major factors 
behind the Gezi movement was a crisis of representation experienced at two 
levels: on the one hand, the ideological abyss in the political spectrum and 
the politics solely based on ethnicity and religiosity left certain segments of 
society unrepresented; on the other hand the government ceased to 
maintained the balance between responsiveness and responsibility. While 
the first level is related to all major political parties in the system, the latter 
level mostly pertains to the act of governing. In the light of aforementioned 
discussions from the side of government the problem seems to be deepened 
as the AKP has continued to adapt exclusionary discourse aiming to 
consolidate its own constituency at the expense of larger public so the 
government still fails to act responsible thereby worsening the crisis. 
However, opposition forces, particularly the CHP and the HDP, have seemed 
to receive the message of the movement as both parties try to go beyond 
ethnic and religious politics which has potential to redefine the parameters of 
Turkish politics and so to attend the crisis. However, it has to be kept in mind 
that opposition parties’ ability to go beyond ethnic politics is highly 
dependent on how the Kurdish question will be resolved. Acceleration of 
conflict in the region might force these parties, particularly the HDP, to adopt 
ethnic political discourse which in turn would reinforce ethnic cleavages and 
make it extremely difficult for parties to hold on to the premises of Gezi Park 




5.3. Spain: the Rise of New Politics 
 
As the previous discussion clarified, there are several ways through which 
protest movements can interact with conventional politics. The most extreme 
or advanced type of interaction occurs when the movement itself turns into a 
political party, which is what happened in Spain. The Indignados movement 
that emerged out of a collective anger against the political class and its 
austerity measures evolved into a political party: Podemos (We can). 
Interestingly enough, since its foundation in January 2014, Podemos has 
become one of the central actors on the political scene and is trying to 
challenge and redefine the parameters of the Spanish two-party system, the 
roots of which go back to the 1970s.  
 
 In this section, in order to track the impact of the 15M movement on 
electoral politics of Spain, we look into the development of Podemos. As the 
Spanish case exemplifies evolution from a movement into a political party, 
looking at the process of party formation and the ways in which this new 
party challenged the existing political structure would better demonstrate 
the interaction between movement and electoral politics. First, we scrutinise 
the process that gave birth to the new political party. Here mobilisation, 
organisation and leadership of a political movement will be discussed. Next, 
how Podemos interacts with the political structure and how it tries to 
redefine Spanish politics will be analysed. Finally, we examine the party’s 
performance in the European and regional elections and what these results 
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say about the future of Spanish politics and here we also discuss how these 
changes relate to crisis of representation. The story of 15M and Podemos is 
one of the best cases for observing the relationship between contentious and 
conventional politics.  
 
 
5.3.1. Birth of a New Political Party 
 
The 2008 economic crisis brought to the fore the growing problems of 
European politics. In several European countries popular resentment against 
the political class’s failure to respond to the crisis effectively led to the 
strengthening of anti-establishment and anti-austerity parties against the 
established political order. Most of these parties were already in the system 
and had tried to capitalise on societal resentment. In Spain, conversely, an 
anti-austerity party was established from scratch, by turning widespread 
protests in May 2011 into a new body. Needless to say, this was a challenging 
process, and when Podemos was founded in January 2014 it was the end 
result of a well-thought political project. 
 
 As argued before, the 15M movement resulted from a crisis of 
representation in two respects. First, the convergence of political parties in 
the ideological spectrum left individualised voters with a number of 
unrepresented, diverse and complex demands, and second, as parties lost 
control over policymaking, due to the forces of globalisation, they lost contact 
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with the electorate and failed to react accordingly. In these circumstances, 
the most expected result was the emergence of a new political actor which 
would represent a disenchanted population. Podemos emerged within this 
context. Pablo Iglesias (2015: 10), the leader of the party, argues that 
economic crisis that entrapped Eurozone countries, particularly Spain, has 
led to a political crisis and in the case of Spain this crisis itself has exhausted 
the political and social system which dominated the post-Franco era. 
According to Iglesiad (2015: 10), the end-result of this crisis was the 
emergence of 15M movement which led to the formation of Podemos, the 
principal political expression of protest movement.  
 
 This concise story of Podemos begs the question as to how come, in 
such a short time, could a movement turn into one of the major political 
actors within a long-established and institutionalised Spanish party system? 
In order to answer this question, it is orderly to analyse the mobilisation 
process, the organisation, and party’s leadership. 
 
During and after the protests of 2011, as part of the 15M movement, 
neighbourhood assemblies were formed in towns and cities across Spain. The 
major goal of these assemblies, organised around certain issues, was to 
discuss the way ahead for the movement and to come up with proposals for 
political action (Salutin, 2012). Although over time participation in the 
assemblies decreased, this mode of organising support formed the 
cornerstone of the Podemos ethos (Tremlett, 2015), and these grassroots 
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assemblies played a key role in the establishment of “circles,” which were the 
central organisational units of Podemos. At the beginning of 2014, the 
common view shared by elements of the 15M movement was that they 
should organise themselves around a political movement.  
 
In January 2014, the political leadership of Podemos was composed of 
a group of academics from Complutense University of Madrid in association 
with activists from Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth without a Future), student 
associations, several other political and social organisations and notable 
members of 15M (Iglesias, 2015). Using social networks, TV shows, public 
events, propaganda and momentum gained within 15M, the group called for 
the establishment of “Podemos circles” throughout the country. In a very 
short time the participation rate in these circles increased extensively, and 
the leadership published a manifesto entitled “Making a Move: Turning 
Indignation into Political Change,” which called for taking the issue into the 
political arena (Seguin and Faber, 2015). With this manifesto, Iglesias, the 
leader of the movement who was a hands-on activist and a political scientist 
from Complutense, asked members to sign a petition if they agreed that this 
initiative would survive and turn into a political party; members voted ‘yes’, 
with more than 50,000 signatures received in less than a day (2015). As a 
result, they decided to take part in the European Parliament elections, in 




Besides these circles, the party also made active use of social 
networks, mass media and a charismatic leadership. It is a well-known 
phenomenon that most recent protest movements across the world have 
benefited from social media. In this respect, the 15M movement was not an 
exception, as the majority of the protestors mostly composed of younger 
generations were very experienced in the use of digital tools. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that Podemos as a political party effectively adopted social 
media tools in its campaigning and mobilisation. The numbers support this 
claim. As of today, while Podemos has 977,055 likes on Facebook, both the 
PSOE and the PP have 96,000 likes. Similarly, on Twitter, Podemos has 
635,000 followers while the PP has 349,000 and the PSOE 264,000. This also 
applies to the leaders of the parties: Pablo Iglesias has 1,120,000 followers 
while the leader of PSOE, Pedro Sanchez, has 166,000 and Rajoy (the PP) 
879,000. Although numbers alone do not say much about the extent of usage, 
they are suggestive. Moreover, in order to increase citizen participation, 
social media tools such as Reddit, Appgree and Loomio have also been 
actively used by the party as forums wherein members discuss certain issues. 
On the Subreddit platform, for instance, Podemos members propose, debate 
and amend political positions of the party, which led The New Yorker to name 
Podemos as “the world’s first Reddit Party” (2015; see also Blitzer, 2014). 
 
The fact that the party also used these tools in the process of political 
party formation indicates the extent to which the organisation embraces 
social media. In September 2014, it initiated a two-month Constituent 
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Congress, in which more than a thousand circle meetings, broad online 
debates and electronic elections took place (Seguin and Faber, 2015). A mass 
meeting in the Palacio Vistalegre in Madrid was also organised, and more 
than 100,000 people participated in the process, at the end of which the 
organisational structure and the principles of the party were designed. 
Iglesias was chosen as the secretary general of the party. All of these 
processes highlighted that Podemos as a political organisation was 
determined to embrace direct democracy at all levels of the decision-making 
process.  
 
In a similar vein, mass media is very professionally used by the 
Podemos, and television particularly has been conceived as one of the major 
means through which public opinion is shaped. Iglesias (2015: 93) suggests 
that television is one of the main means that conditions and shapes the way 
people think and it also constructs social values “at a much higher level of 
intensity than the traditional sites of ideological production: family, school 
and religio”. 
 
 Actually, Iglesias was very well aware of the importance of mass 
media before the formation of his political movement, as he and a group of 
academics from Complutense, on an alternative television channel, produced 
and directed the discussion programmes La Tuerka, Fort Apache and Tertulia 
Politica de Resistancia with the aim of gaining experience and also 
dominating television media in order develop tools for political 
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communication (Pavia et al., 2015). This experiment and experience opened 
the way for Iglesias to participate in discussion programmes on Spain’s 
mainstream channels, which needless to say increased his popularity. The TV 
appearances of Iglesias and other leading figures in Podemos were given the 
utmost importance and played a key role in the process of campaigning.  
 
 Iglesias, as a political figure, also widely benefited from his TV 
appearances, as he demonstrated his vision, skills and leadership. The image 
of a pony-tailed professor who was young, self-confident and assertive 
worked for Iglesias, who, in a very short time, turned into a media star with 
strong political ideas (Tremlett, 2015). His popularity and charisma were 
employed by the party effectively, in that it decided to print his image on the 
ballot papers for the European elections, as his face was better known than 
the party emblem (Pavia et al., 2015).  
 
 While most of the ‘Occupy’ mobilisations have defined themselves as 
leaderless and have opposed conventional politics, the 15M movement’s 
story of party formation involved a strong leader and someone who played a 
key role in publicising the movement, increasing its popularity and 
convincing voters to vote for Podemos. However, although the leadership, as 
a conventional method, has been used effectively in order to increase party’s 
appeal, the party also benefited from 21st century tools. Particularly, the 
extreme use of social media tools in order to increase participants and 
members’ say in decision-making procedures has not only attended the 15M 
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movement’s demands for greater participation and new ways of doing 
politics but also constituted a good example of how political parties in 
advanced democracies suffering from high levels of disaffection and distrust 
might respond to cognitively mobilised voters. 
 
 
5.3.2. Interactions with the Political Structure 
 
Here we will examine the ways in which Podemos, through a new discourse 
based on radical democracy, tries to redefine existing parameters of Spanish 
party system and discuss how the party interacts with other political actors 
in the system. Actually, the story of the development of Podemos’s political 
ideology goes back to the early 2000s so years before the 15M movement, 
when a group of young academics from Universidad Complutense de Madrid 
and from the Centro de Estudios Politicos y Sociales (CEPS) started to question 
the established rules of the Spanish political system (Reyes, 2012). Long 
before the mass protests that followed the global economic crisis and 
subsequent disillusionment in 2008, this group, influenced by Gramsci, 
acknowledged the centrality of discourse in the formation of political identity 
and started to challenge the hegemonic discourse in Spain which was 
inherited mainly from transition and reproduced by two main parties (Pavia 
et al., 2015). Their contention was that there was a need to develop a new 
collective vision for Spanish politics which would put people in the centre, 
not the political elites and their global allies. 
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From this point of view, they followed Laclau and Mouffe’s post-
Marxist views and their concept of radical democracy, according to which 
there are multiple identities and therefore multiple grievances in modern 
societies, and so this requires democracy to be built around difference and 
dissent (Mouffe, 1996). The role of socialists within this picture was to bring 
together disgruntled groups such as LGBT, the unemployed, feminists and 
environmentalists against the establishment (Trenlett, 2015). More 
importantly, Laclau’s views on populism particularly influenced the political 
ideas of Iglesias and his friends. Laclau suggested that populism should be 
understood through its form, not its content, because only then will its ability 
to differentiate the social between “people” and “the dominant ideology” or 
“the dominant bloc” transpire – a notion critical to developing a vision for the 
people (Laclau, 1977).  In other words, Laclau considered populism as an 
important way to redefine the terms of democracy and for radical democracy 
to prevail within the established political system. Iglesias himself also wrote 
years before the advent of 15M that when citizens are not satisfied with the 
ways in which democracy functions, then it is time for a form of populism 
that provides a new and dichotomous division within society: the people 
against the elite, the poor against the rich, the radical democracy against the 
liberal democracy (cited in Pavia et al, 2015; see also Iglesias, 2005). In other 
words, Iglesias and this group of young academics as well as activists have 
discussed and wrote heavily on how Spanish politics should be redesigned on 




 The same group also played an active role in the 15M movement and 
tried to translate these political ideas into collective political action in the 
process of party formation. Accordingly, Podemos was affected considerably 
by Laclau’s views and the party was very successful in building its political 
vision on the ideals of radical democracy. From the very beginning, Iglesias 
used the concept of “la casta” when referring to corrupt political elites from 
the two major parties (PSOE and PP) as well as business elites who were 
responsible for the current ills of Spanish politics, the economy and society at 
large. By employing the degrading notion of “la casta” he aimed at developing 
a new populist discourse and introducing a new division in Spanish politics 
between “la gente” (the people), represented by Podemos, and “la casta,” 
represented by the mainstream parties, particularly the PSOE and the PP 
(Pavia et al., 2015). This discourse adopted by Podemos was a very strategic 
move aiming at reframing Spanish politics previously shaped by left-right 
and centre-periphery cleavages along the lines of populism. What is more 
interesting here is that both the PSOE and the PP blamed Podemos for acting 
in a populist manner, but the party up to that point had managed to define 
the terms of populism in its own right.  
 
Besides introducing a new way forward, Podemos also affected other 
political parties and the political system as a whole, in that it forced other 
factions to change their discourse, tactics and even leadership (Seguin and 
Faber, 2015). The IU, for instance, changed its leader with Alberto Garzon, a 
young economist who had a positive relationship with Iglesias, while the 
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governing party, PP, was forced to introduce anti-corruption laws and the 
PSOE also replaced its old secretary general with Pedro Sanchez, a young and 
charismatic figure who dressed like Iglesias (2015). In other words, although 
the success of Podemos in general elections remained to be seen, it had 
already shattered the parameters of the established system by reframing the 
dynamics of political practice. 
 
5.3.3. Elections and Podemos: A New Party System? 
 
Since its inception, Podemos has taken part in the European elections in May 
2014, the Andalusian parliamentary elections in January 2015 and regional 
elections in May 2015. After its surprising success in the European elections, 
in which it gained around 8% of the national vote and won five seats out of 
54 Spanish seats in the European Parliament, the party continued to spread 
its appeal to wider segments of society. In the European election manifesto, 
Podemos’s pledges included nationalising the private banking sector, decent 
wages and pensions, the right to decent housing, the rejection of privatising 
public services and common goods, ecological reconversion of the economy, 
food sovereignty, a rejection of international military interventions and the 
introduction of an open participatory process for citizens (The Socialist 
Network, 2015). All in all, Podemos’s manifesto was in line with the concerns 
and demands of the 15M movement, and as such it aimed at responding not 
only to immediate economic issues, but also to the diverse expectations of a 
diversified electorate with alternative policy proposals. Needless to say, most 
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of the promises were products of populism, and the question of how to put 
these into practice was left unanswered, but nevertheless the party managed 
to reach disaffected segments of society and in its first elections became the 
third most popular faction in the country. 
 
 In the Andalusian parliamentary elections, it once again came third, 
behind the PSOE and the PP, but this time it received 15% of the vote in a 
region which had been a stronghold of the PSOE since 1977 (Kassam, 2015). 
Winning 15 seats in parliament, for the first time Podemos started to turn 
into a genuine political force in regional politics, and many therefore 
interpreted this development as a sign of change in the Spanish party system. 
Another important result of the election was the rise of Ciudadanos 
(Citizens), a liberal faction founded in 2006 in the Catalan region, which 
received 9.3% of the vote and gained nine seats in the Andalusian elections. 
The Ciudadanos also aimed at capitalising on the existing dissent thrown at 
mainstream parties and to that end frame itself as a national party. However, 
different to Podemos, the Ciudadanos was a liberal party in that rather than 
challenging the existing system as a whole, they proposed revisions and 
reforms in economic and social policy, thereby providing a safe haven for 
those scared by Podemos’s radical stance (Ciudadanos, 2015).  
 
 In May 2015, Podemos had its first experience of regional elections, 
which are considered a good marker for the upcoming general elections. 
Once again Podemos came third, this time winning 119 seats in total in 
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regional parliaments. Although the party did not perform as well as foreseen 
by the opinion polls, it still managed to challenge the position of the PP, 
which lost 2,500,000 votes, and the PSOE, which lost 700,000 votes 
compared to the municipal elections four years previously (Hedgecoe, 2015). 
As a result of the elections, the PP lost its majority in every region, including 
Valencia, Madrid and Zaragoza, which were previously traditional 
strongholds (Global Times, 2015). What is also critical here is that although 
the PP held its position as the largest party nationally, and the PSOE 
remained the second party, Podemos received sufficient support to 
determine the conditions for coalition politics for most of Spain’s largest 
cities and regions (The Irish Times, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Opinion polling, Source: The Spain Report 
 
Analysing election trends from the European elections onwards, and looking 


















together with Ciudadanos, might break the two-party dominance of the 
Spanish party system. However, rather than totally crushing the mainstream 
parties, which was the case in Greece, the Spanish case will most probably 
experience a change whereby the mainstream parties continue to receive 
around 50% of the vote in total, but they are unable to form a majority 
government unless it is with the support of young parties such as Podemos 
and Ciudadanos (Casal Bértoa, 2015).   
 
 Consequently, and different to the case of Turkey, interaction between 
a protest movement and electoral politics ended up with the formation of a 
brand new political party in Spain. The success of the party demonstrates the 
extent to which movements can redefine and influence conventional politics. 
What happened after the 15M movement – formation  of a new party and 
strengthening of other smaller parties- also confirms our contention that the 
crisis of representation, resulted from mainstream parties’ becoming alike 
and their failure to act responsive, was the major factor, if not the only one, 
behind the mass protests. On the one hand, a brand new party, the Podemos, 
and a relative newer political party, the Ciudadanos, have gained unexpected 
strength in the political system so two alternative forces increased their 
appeal and challenged the position of mainstream parties who fail to come up 
with alternative discourses. From this perspective, new political actors 
emerged in order to resolve the deadlock of the political system. The 
Podemos, conversely, adopted the discourse of populism and mainly aimed at 
acting responsive to the demands of population even at certain times at the 
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expense of responsibility. To this end, the party has been very careful in 
framing its position on the side of “people” against the elites. In other words, 
the party has targeted the resentment of population against political elite 
responsible to international forces by strengthening its responsiveness to 
population. However, it has to be noted that this carries the risk of enhancing 
responsiveness while degrading responsibility which would again lead to a 
crisis of representation. On the other hand, as the case of Syriza has 
demonstrated in Greece, when these populist parties came to power, they are 
mostly forced to readapt their position as the current realities of European 
economy limits not only mainstream but also these parties’ space for 
maneuver.  
 
All in all, the interaction stream between contentious and 
conventional politics in the case of Spain reaffirms the contention of this 
study since as expected the party system has responded the crisis of 
representation through new actors and new agendas. 
 
 
5.4. What Explains Differences? 
 
Throughout this chapter, we decipher the ways in which social movements 
have interacted with the routine politics in Turkey and Spain in the aftermath 
of protests and analysed the terms of adaption and change in each political 
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system. Consequently, we also looked at how this interaction has related to 
the crisis of representation in both cases.  
 
 What is observed is that in both cases movements had clear influence 
over the way politics is conducted since; however, the mechanisms of 
interaction have varied. While in the case of Turkey already existing political 
actors have adopted their discourse and tactics and no sharp changes is 
experienced in electoral balance of power, in Spain a new political force 
emerged out of the movement, other small parties strengthen their positions 
and the electoral strength of mainstream parties has extremely declined to 
the extent that long-lasting two party system in the country seems to come to 
an end.  
 
Here it is also vehemently important to explain cross-country 
variation in the ways in which contentious politics interact with conventional 
politics. As discussed in the first section, there are several ways through 
which movements can influence the functioning of political system. But 
depending on the social and institutional constrains of a given country the 
mechanism of interaction might differ. The question here is why Spanish 
politics has experienced the formation of a new party and a party system 
change, whilst in the case of Turkey the change occurred mostly in the 
discourse and campaigning tactics of existing political forces without leading 




As in the literature on party politics suggests that institutional and 
social factors determine the functioning of political systems, looking at the 
institutional system and sociological conditions, the reasons of why the terms 
of interaction between protests movements and electoral politics have been 
different in Turkey and Spain can be discerned. While the institutional factors 
draw the boundaries of political practice (see Lijphart, 1999; Sartori, 1994; 
Shugart, and Carey, 1992; Linz, 1994), the sociological factors account for the 
demand side of story as they determine the type of cleavages in society (see 
Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Chibber, 2001; Desai, 2002; Przeworski and 
Sprague, 1986).  
 
 
5.4.1. Institutional and Social Constraints in Turkey  
 
The design of political institutions has been considered one of the 
fundamental determinants of political system in any country (see March and 
Olsen, 1984). The constitutional design in Turkey was mainly constructed by 
military leaders following limited or no consultation with other political 
elites and mainly aimed at preventing small groups from gaining political 
representation (McLaren, 2008). Therefore, the electoral rules such as 10% 
election threshold, provisions and eligibility criteria for public funding and 
requirements of party formation were all introduced to serve this goal. From 
this perspective, it has been a challenging task to establish a new political 
party if there is no significant amount of support from the society.  
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As discussed previously, the Gezi movement has never been strong 
enough to challenge the electoral balance of power since the proportion of 
people joined or supported the protests constituted minority, mostly based in 
large cities. This can also be grasped by looking at the educational level of 
protestors which is way above the population averages. Carkoglu also argues 
that as these people are mostly composed of liberal left leaning and mostly 
young people, they are already voting for the opposition and so unable to 
challenge the AKP’s continued electoral strength which prevents a party 
system change. Consequently, lacking the support of sufficient proportion of 
population and required financial sources, under these electoral rules and 
regulations the best options for Gezi movement were either to ally with 
existing political parties and or movements which already developed strong 
roots in society or to stay as a civil society organisation. 
 
 In sociological terms, as discussed before,  from the early years of the 
republic, the major socio-cultural cleavages of Turkish politics have been 
determined by attitudes towards religion (Sunni-Islam versus secularism) 
and ethnicity (Kurdish versus Turkish ethnics), which in turn have also 
described left-right self-placements (Kalaycioglu, 2010). Whilst secularists 
tend to place themselves on the left, Sunnis have placed themselves on the 
right of the political spectrum (Kalaycioglu, 2008). On the other hand, 
Kurdish ethnic nationalists tend to place themselves on the extreme left and 
Turkish nationalists on the extreme right (2008: 309).  When the voting 
behaviour in Turkey is analysed what is seen is that majority of population 
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tend to identify themselves with right-wing politics. Checking the electoral 
trends from 1983 onwards whist the right wing votes account for around 
60% of total votes, the centre-left and left wing votes remain around 30 to 
40%. Therefore, there has been a strong right-wing leaning in Turkish 
politics. As the right is defined on the basis of religiosity and ethnic 
nationalism and Gezi protestors are mostly composed of liberal and left-
leaning social groups (Carkoglu, 2015), the difficulty for the Gezi movement 
to reach this well-positioned right-wing electorate transpires. Although Gezi 
protestors also aimed at challenging existing parameters of left-right 
spectrum and asked for new politics, current sociological realities of the 
country make it very difficult for movement to expand its appeal. 
 
 
5.4.2. Politics, Society and Movement Politics in Spain 
 
In the case Spain as well institutional rules have been mostly restrictive 
though not as much as the Turkish case. During the democratic transition 
Spanish political elites were attentive to avoid fragmentation and political 
instability and therefore in designing the electoral system they limited the 
proportionality of the system which makes it extremely difficult for small 
parties to increase their appeal. Through using, low district magnitude, 
closed list d’Hondt, high levels of over-representation of rural provinces and 
3% threshold for each magnitude, the proportionality of the system has been 
decreased which has supported the mainstream parties (Chari, 2013: 378). 
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 In sociological terms, the major advantage of the 15M movement has 
been the significant degree of cognitive mobilisation in Spanish society which 
led to growing individualisation of society as well as growing dissatisfaction 
from politics (Magone, 2009). This individualised population hit by the 
economic crisis has been more and more critical towards existing parameters 
of political practice. This enabled both Podemos and the Ciudadanos to 
increase their appeal. As the population at large started to question definition 
of existing left-right spectrum, introduction of a new cleavage into politics by 
Podemos, between the people and la casta, worked extremely well under 
current sociological conditions. Moreover, the 15M movement received 
widespread support among Spanish public which can be mainly defined as 
left-leaning and this makes it easier for Podemos to change the electoral 

















Understanding the factors behind the emergence of protest movements has 
been one of the major concerns of both social studies and comparative 
politics not only because throughout the history social movements have been 
the main forces of social and political change but also because they reveal the 
dynamics of complicated relationship between human action and social as 
well as political structures. This study maintains this search and rather than 
considering protest movements as the irrational expression of social dissent, 
it attempts to explain the emergence and influence of mass mobilisations in 
relation to the functioning of political systems and to locate protests within 
the political context of a given country.  
 
 Analysing the Gezi movement in Turkey and the 15M movement in 
Spain comparatively, our findings suggest that one of the major factors 
behind the current wave of protests has been the crisis of representation 
experienced at two different levels. On the one hand, diversified voters have 
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been left unrepresented not only due to convergence or divergence of 
political parties in the political spectrum but also because of parties’ inability 
to satisfy people’s search for new politics that go beyond conventional forms 
of political action in each country. The parties in government, conversely, 
have failed to act responsible and responsive at the same time, either 
enhancing responsiveness at the expense of responsibility (as was the case in 
Turkey) or vice versa (which was what happened in Spain). In other words, 
when people cannot find political contenders to represent their demands and 
expectations, and when parties in government fail to fulfil the requirements 
of party government model, then crisis of representation is experienced, 
which in turn makes people search for other ways of expressing their views.   
 
 Besides accounting for the question of what explains protest 
movements in otherwise two dissimilar cases, this research also looked at 
what happens after the protests movements and how movement politics 
interact with electoral politics. According to our findings, although the 
interaction streams differ depending on the social and institutional structure 
of a given country, in both cases under examination protest movements affect 
the functioning of politics and the ways in which routine politics have 
adopted to movement politics is highly determined by the type of crisis of 
representation the country experiences.  
 
While in the case of Turkey, parties have to adopt their discourses and 
tactics in line with the concerns of protest movement, in Spain a new political 
195 
 
actor emerged out of the 15M movement. In responding representation 
crisis, on the one hand, in both cases existing or new opposition parties have 
attempted to widen the political spectrum through changing their ways of 
doing politics. On the other hand, in Turkey they have started to underline 
importance of responsibility in governing as both the CHP and the HDP, two 
major parties that aligned with the movement, have tried to present 
themselves as parties for all. In Spain the focus has been more on 
responsiveness best expression of which is the Podemos’s way of presenting 
itself as the party of people, ‘la gente’, against the parties of elites, ‘la casta’. 
Accordingly, the very fact that the type of crisis has determined parties’ way 
of responding protest movements has verified the central argument of the 
research which is that crisis of representation is the main factor behind the 
rise of protest movements, if not the only one. 
 
 
6.1. Summary of Findings   
 
This research mainly examines the questions as to what explains the 
emergence of contemporary mass protests, and what the impact of these 
protests on routine politics is. Analysing two dissimilar cases of Turkey and 
Spain, first, the dynamics of current disaffection from party democracy have 
been clarified in order to define what is meant by a crisis of representation. 
Herein, both supply and demand side of story have been clearly examined 
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with the aim of developing theoretical and analytical framework for the 
following empirical chapters.  
 
Then two cases, Turkey and Spain, have been analysed respectively 
and how a crisis of representation materialised in real cases is demonstrated 
empirically. In the case of Turkey, both increasing polarisation that has 
created huge gap in the political spectrum, and parties’ inability to go beyond 
ethnic and religious politics have left important segments of society 
unrepresented. Conversely, the AKP government has lost its command over a 
cross-ideological coalition and began to respond to its own Islamic 
constituency at the expense of wider population, which in turn decreased 
party’s ability to serve for public good, in other words to act responsible. 
 
In the Spanish case, lasting two-party system that dominated politics 
from democratic transition onwards has started to lose its appeal as two 
major parties, the PSOE and the PP, have become alike. The convergence of 
two parties in the political spectrum, once again, has left certain segments of 
society unrepresented mainly because these parties have failed to come up 
with alternative policy proposal for meeting the demands of diversified 
electorate. On the other hand, forces of Europeanisation and globalisation 
have limited parties’ ability to control policy-making, particularly in 
economic policy, and this in turn has further alienated voters as parties have 
neglected responsiveness. The contention was that understanding the 
current wave of protests requires careful analysis of party systems as crisis 
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of representation resulted from party failures is the major factor behind the 
protest movements.  
 
Furthermore, this research has provided an analysis of what 
happened after the movements in two cases under examination in order to 
discern the dynamics of interaction between contentious and conventional 
politics. What is observed is that different types of adoption and change took 
place in Turkey and Spain. In the case of Turkey, while the governing party, 
the AKP, position itself to the opposite of what the Gezi protests represents, 
the opposition front has formed more aligning relationship with the 
movement. The CHP, for instance, has acknowledged the demands of 
movement and not only reformed its candidate selection procedure, leaving 
more say to party members in the process, but also has attempted to go 
beyond the existing parameters of party politics, previously shaped by 
ethnicity and religiosity. Although it is difficult to claim that these moves are 
directly resulted from the Gezi Park protests, the movement’s demands for 
increasing participation in decision-making procedures and its call for new 
politics have certainly affected the CHP. After all, the protestors were 
considered to be discontented CHP electorate and this has forced party to 
listen to the demands of Gezi movement. The HDP, conversely, has become 
the major party to capitalise the movement politics in that the party has not 
only adopted innovative methods and slogans of the Gezi, but also changed 
its discourse in line with Gezi movement’s demands – increasing its focus on 
radical democracy and trying to go beyond regional politics.  
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In the Spanish case a brand new political party, the Podemos, emerged 
out of protest movement which has managed to become the third party after 
the PSOE and the PP in all elections it participated. The formation of a 
political party from a social movement is actually the most extreme way of 
interaction between movement politics and electoral politics. The Podemos 
reflects the 15M movement in terms of its ideology, organisation, leadership 
style and decision-making procedures. From this perspective, popular 
mobilisation has introduced a new actor into the Spanish political system 
that has already started to change the way politics is conducted in 
accordance with the expectations of the movement.  
 
Herein, the research also noted how the developments after the 
protests movements in both cases relate to the type of crisis of 
representation each country has experienced. In Turkey even though 
opposition parties have attempted to go beyond politics of ethnicity and 
religiosity, crisis of representation is likely to endure on the governing side, 
as the AKP government continues to disregard responsibility. In the Spanish 
case, on the one hand, two new political actors, the Podemos and the 
Ciudadanos, have managed to increase their appeal and challenge the 
dominant position of two mainstream parties. In this respect, alternatives to 
the PSOE and the PP are existent now which have potential to relieve the 
crisis. On the other hand, the problems as to governing persist not only 
because the impact of Europeanisation and globalisation remains constant 
199 
 
but also because the Podemos’s populist position runs the risk of enhancing 
responsiveness, but this time, at the expense of responsibility.   
 
This research also provided sociological and institutional account of 
why different kinds of adoption have taken place in two cases under 
examination. In the case of Turkey both the institutional constrains such as 
election threshold and limited party funding for small parties and social 
limitations such as the lack of congruence between Gezi protest’s demands 
and that of population at large have worked against the emergence of a 
political force out of protests, though movement politics could influence the 
existing actors’ campaign methods, discourses and policies. Institutional and 
social structure in Spain – less restrictive rules on the emergence and 
survival of small parties- and more aligning society with movement, 
conversely, have allowed the formation of a brand new political party which 
could also challenge the conventional politics. Consequently, it is argued that 
the way of interaction between contentious and conventional politics is 
highly depended on the institutional and social features of a given country.  
 
6.2. Significance of the Research 
 
As indicated in the introduction, there are several reasons why this study 
would be of interest to students of comparative politics, party politics and 
social movements. First, though social movements have been the major 
forces that affect the behaviours of political parties, interestingly enough not 
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many studies to date analyse protest movements in relation to party politics. 
Looking at not only the role played by parties and party systems in the 
emergence of movements but also the ways in which movements shape the 
electoral politics, this research provides a concurrent analysis of cause and 
effect of movement politics in relation to party politics. Essentially, this 
research follows the agendas Tilly (2003: 254) recommended to social 
movement analysts to go beyond general movement models, to check for 
comparative politics of the features of movements, and to observe the 
relationship between movement politics and other types of politics 
comparatively. From this perspective, the very attempt to address social 
movements with a comparative politics view and to relate movement politics 
to that of routine politics without using general movement models extend the 
literature on social movements as well as comparative politics. 
 
In the political party scholarship, conversely, although crisis as to the 
functioning of party systems has been highlighted for a while (see Dalton, 
2008, Dalton and Watteberg, 2000; Mair, 2008; 2009; 2013), the actual 
results of these party failures or how these results, in turn, influence and 
shape parties’ behaviours, political tactics, organisation and ideology have 
been a rather neglected topic. However, analysis of interaction between 
contentious and conventional politics together with simultaneous 
observation of similarity and/or difference in adoption and change say a lot 
about not only the future of party politics but arguably democracy. As a 
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result, students of party politics might find this study useful in explaining the 
evolution of democracy. 
 
Moreover, through comparing Turkey, an electoral democracy, with 
that of Spain, a consolidated democracy, this research shows that regardless 
of their democratic quality countries might face with the same problem of 
crisis of representation but with different trajectories. This finding is 
particularly relevant for democratisation studies as it gives important hints 
about weaknesses of party government model which might require a 
renewed approach to institutional architecture in the process of transition 
and consolidation, particularly with regards to the types of capacities parties 
should develop in representing extremely diverse voters of the 21st century.  
 
Furthermore, the literature on populism and future of party 
democracy might also benefit highly from this research in the sense that the 
research has demonstrated the characteristics of current disaffection with 
democratic politics and related to that features of party failures. This is 
particularly important for understanding the rise of populist movements in 
Western Europe that challenge the mainstream parties significantly from 
Germany, the UK to France. A thorough analysis of identity, organisational 
structure, and decision-making processes of current wave of protests and 
how these have been adopted by their parties might provide a guideline for 
reform in democratic regimes. So, for instance, the Podemos’s way of 
employing direct democracy such as organisation through internet, 
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formation of regional circles as central organisational structure, 
establishment of citizen assemblies, funding through members and election 
of party leader through online procedures, has a lot to offer mainstream 
parties that try to increase their political legitimacy. Therefore, studying the 
21st century democracy, one needs to pay careful attention not only to the 
demands of “nowadays movements” such as increasing participation in 
decision-making processes but also how these protests themselves tackle 
with these questions as it would show possible directions of democratic 
reform in Western Europe and beyond. 
 
 
6.3. Future Research 
 
There are several aspects of social movements study. Though this research 
has emphasised on the party side of the story, many other interesting 
features of current mass mobilisations such as the use of social media, 
transnational connections, the identity of protestors, their social base, their 
response to varied political opportunity structures, organisational style, and 
prospects for institutional survival need to be analysed carefully as these 
protest movements have potential to challenge existing parameters of 
democratic practice. In this research, though we referred to the identity of 
protestors, and how they use communication technologies, limited attention 
was devoted to most of these features as the focus was on the party-related 
factors. However, analysing the other side of the story based on these 
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characteristics of current mobilisations would, for sure, make important 
contributions.    
 
In the future, the approach and method adopted in this study might be 
expanded with other cases. Particularly, these protest movements might be 
studied in relation to Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protests as the US political 
structure significantly differ from the cases analysed here. The dominant 
two-party system in the US, due to restricted electoral arrangements, gives 
almost no chance to a third party challenge, and therefore the party system 
provides a totally different political opportunity structure for the 
movements. Even under these circumstances, the OWS has many similarities 
to other mass mobilisations in terms of their demands and mobilisation 
tactics. Therefore, adding OWS to this comparative research using same 
method would make better equipped to deal with the causes and effects of 
“nowadays movements”. One can also think of similar mobilisation in other 
parts of the world such as V for Vinegar in Brazil or the Umbrella Movement 
in Hong Kong.   
 
Moreover, another important task to be done as part of future 
research is to broaden the analysis of the relationship between contentious 
and conventional politics. Keeping in mind that social movements have been 
the major forces that initiate political and social reforms, this endeavour 
would display how the 21st century democracy might look like and what kind 
of a role political parties play within this new democracy. The rise of protest 
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movements in several parts of the world as well as the increasing appeal of 
populist parties have already forced established political forces to redefine 
their positions and attitudes, and knowing more about what went wrong 
would also provide policy-makers with important tools for tackling with all-
embracing problem of social discontent. 
 
Keeping in mind that political parties remain essential actors in 
democratic politics, understanding the failure of parties and party systems as 
well as how they interact with movements that challenge their position is a 
crucial task. Within this context, examining the ways in which parties and 
party systems function in relation to the emergence and outcomes of protest 
movements in different parts of the world has the potential not only to test 
the widely shared view that democracy is unthinkable save in terms of 
parties, but also to explicate the complex relationship between democracy 
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